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Abstract
Ports form an essential part of a country's infrastructure by facilitating trade and 
ultimately helping to reduce the cost of goods for consumers. They are characterised 
by solidity in physical infrastructure and legislative frameworks – or high levels of “asset
specificity” – but also face the dynamics of constantly changing global market 
conditions requiring flexible responsiveness.
Through a New Institutional Economics lens, the ports of Port Hedland (Australia), 
Prince Rupert (Canada), and Tauranga (New Zealand) are analysed. This dissertation 
undertakes a cross-country comparative analysis, but also extends the empirical 
framework into an historical analysis using archival data for each case study from 1860
– 2012. How each port's unique institutional environment – the constraints, or “rules of 
the game” – affected their development and organisational structure is then 
investigated. This enables the research to avoid the problem where long periods of 
economic and political stability in core institutions can become the key explanatory 
variables.
The study demonstrates how the institutional pay-off structure determines what 
organisational forms come into existence at each port and where, why and how they 
direct their resources. Sometimes, even immense political will and capital investment 
will see a port flounder (Prince Rupert); or great resource booms will never be captured
(Port Hedland); other times, the port may be the victim of special interest pressure from
afar (Tauranga). All of these failures, and eventual successes, are traced to changes in 
each port's institutional environment over time.
This work is particularly relevant to those involved in port planning of all forms, whether
dealing with higher-level governance issues or everyday allocation problems. The 
thesis concludes that for ports, institutions do matter: without understanding the 
i
institutional constraints a particular port faces at a particular point in time, even the best
laid plans may go awry.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Introduction
The great classical economist Adam Smith wrote in the Wealth of Nations that “without 
the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must have procured to 
himself every necessary and conveniency of life which he wanted”.1 That short 
passage highlights how important Smith thought exchange was in improving the 
welfare of individuals. As facilitators of trade ports therefore play a critical role in any 
society, growing in importance every day as globalisation increasingly connects people 
with one another and economies become highly specialised and complex. Today 90 
per cent of world trade and 80 per cent in value is carried by ship, yet maritime costs 
have not declined for two decades.2 Ports, as a key component in the maritime 
transport network, are one place where those potential efficiency gains may be found.
The first ports began to emerge as people discovered new regions, often with diverse 
climates that produced goods not readily available locally. Gordon Jackson described 
this process, noting that “as men began to extend their horizons, as population grew 
and produced surpluses of some goods and shortages of others, trade began to flow 
wherever water sites were suitable”.3 Since those days ports have grown increasingly 
important to the lives of people everywhere, allowing for the production and 
consumption of a range of goods that would not otherwise be available to the average 
person. 
Distance is no longer the barrier it once was. Marc Levinson estimated that once 
containerisation took hold, a “doubling of the distance shipped – from Hong Kong to 
1 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776. Reprint
(Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1843), II, 7.
2 Evdokia Moïsé and Florian Le Bris, Trade Costs - What Have We Learned?, OECD Trade 
Policy Papers (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, April 23, 
2013), 21, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/workingpaper/5k47x2hjfn48-en.
3 Gordon Jackson, The History and Archaeology of Ports (Kingswood: World’s Work Limited, 
1983), 12.
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Los Angeles, for example, rather than Tokyo to Los Angles [sic] – raises the shipping 
cost by only 18 percent”.4 With distance conquered, the key factors became “well-run 
ports and a lot of volume”, or how to effectively achieve least-cost economies of scale.5
One factor that constrains port efficiency is the institutional matrix that limits the choice 
set faced by individuals within it. According to the Nobel Prize winning economist 
Douglass North, institutions can be thought of as the “rules of the game”, guiding 
economic activity through incentives.6 Important also are their enforcement 
characteristics, as rules that cannot be credibly enforced tend not to be effective.7
Despite the importance of both ports and institutions in facilitating efficient, welfare-
improving exchanges, there have been relatively few studies that look at the two in 
unison.8 Although in recent years this has begun to change there still remains a void, in
particular of studies that look at institutional change.9 Failing to understand the existing 
institutions that constrain the choice set faced by port actors and how they evolve – for 
better or worse – may lead to poor outcomes. According to another Nobel Prize winner,
the late Elinor Ostrom:
“Policy reform that ignores an existing institutional context is doomed to 
failure.”10
Chapter 2 surveys the existing port economics literature and then provides an outline of
the New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework utilised throughout this study. This 
dissertation then attempts to broaden the port economics literature by including 
4 Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the 
World Economy Bigger (Princeton University Press, 2010), 268.
5 Ibid., 269.
6 Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Douglass C North, “Institutions,” The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 (1991): 97–112.
7 Avner Greif, “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical 
Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies,” Journal of Political Economy, 1994, 
912–50.
8 Chapter 2.1 surveys the literature.
9 Chapter 2.4 provides examples of how the literature is starting to include institutions.
10 M.M. Polski and E. Ostrom, “An Institutional Framework for Policy Analysis and Design,” 
1998, 5.
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institutions in the analysis of port efficiency, organisation and governance over time. A 
comparative approach through the use of case studies was selected to achieve this 
goal to allow for a sufficiently large dataset as well as some institutional diversity. The 
ports selected were Port Hedland in Western Australia; Prince Rupert in British 
Columbia, Canada; and Tauranga in New Zealand.
A comparative approach allows one to better capture the dynamic component of 
economic efficiency – the ability of a port to adapt to changing circumstances – and 
also the potential benefits and costs a particular institutional arrangement may have in 
terms of (largely unseen) foregone arrangements.
1.2. Design of the Thesis
Roscoe Pound once stated that:
“Perhaps no institution of the modern world shows such vitality and tenacity as 
our Anglo-American legal tradition which we call the common law.”11
That idea inspired the selection of case studies which all had an Anglo-Saxon, 
Common Law tradition. In other words, they all inherited their institutions from Britain.
While it would have been interesting to compare ports with a completely different 
institutional heritage, for example the continental European system of Civil Law, the 
barriers involved in investigating a port where the spoken language is not English were 
a significant constraint. In addition, by limiting the focus of this study to Common Law 
locations it was hoped that the institutional diversity that evolved over time would lead 
to more testable outcomes – i.e., outcomes that can be more easily traced to 
institutional diversions over time – than if their institutional beginnings were too diverse 
to begin with.
The three case studies of Port Hedland, Prince Rupert and Tauranga as well as the 
11 Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law (Marshall Jones Company, 1921), 1, 
http://journals.lww.com/jonmd/Abstract/1924/07000/The_Spirit_of_the_Common_Law.63.as
px.
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152-year time period were selected for a number of reasons. For one, all three ports 
are located in colonies of Britain – Australia, Canada and New Zealand. All three were 
colonised, achieved responsible government and passed their own constitutions at a 
relatively similar time. Unlike other former British colonies, all three still have variations 
of the Westminster-style of parliamentary politics.12 The spoken language in all three is 
English and they all have reasonably accessible national and local archives, meaning 
data was available for long periods of time and is not restricted as modern, 
commercial-in-confidence data can be.
Finally, the lengthy period studied enables the research to avoid a common problem 
among such studies where long periods of economic and political stability in core 
institutions can become the key explanatory variables. Institutions are also historically 
dependent, so a long time frame allows for the examination of institutional evolution, 
“connecting the past with the present and the future; history in consequence is largely a
story of institutional evolution in which the historical performance of economies can 
only be understood as a part of a sequential story”.13 History constrains the choice set 
actors face – both the players and the rule-makers – and so an understanding of the 
historical context and the status quo is vital for a valid comparison.14
Oliver Williamson separates institutional analysis into four levels, or 'tiers', of 
institutions:
12 As opposed to, say, the United States which achieved independence significantly earlier 
and did not adopt a traditional British parliamentary style of government.
13 North, “Institutions,” 97.
14 Peter J. Boettke, Christopher J. Coyne, and Peter T. Leeson, “Comparative Historical 
Political Economy,” Journal of Institutional Economics 9, no. 3 (April 2013): 14.
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Table 1.1: Williamson's Four Levels of Social Analysis15
Tier 4 (continuous) Tier 3 (1-10 years) Tier 2 (10-100 years) Tier 1 (100+ years)
Resource Allocation 
and Employment
Governance 
(especially contracts)
Institutional 
Environment: formal 
rules
Embeddedness: 
customs, traditions
Neoclassical / Agency
Theory
Transaction Cost 
Economics
Property Rights / 
Political Economy Social Theory
Most of the port literature focuses on Tier 4 institutions or the economics of resource 
allocation and employment. By contrast, this study takes both a comparative case 
study approach, and also restricts the analysis to Tier 3 and Tier 2 institutions, that is 
the transaction (contracts and governance) as well as the formal institutional 
environment (property rights and political economy).
While this approach may limit the ability to generalise between case studies, it was 
viewed as an appropriate trade-off to allow for the discovery of institutional change that 
worked, or failed, at differing times and places. To paraphrase Ronald Coase, the 
interrelationships that govern the mix of market and hierarchy are extremely complex 
and are different at various times and places.16 The empirical work undertaken in this 
dissertation attempts to uncover the “patterns, puzzles and anomalies revealed by the 
systematic gathering of data”, involved at various points in time for three ports: Port 
Hedland; Prince Rupert; and Tauranga.17
With all of that in mind, the question that this dissertation sets out to answer is:
What role did institutions play in the efficiency, organisation and ultimately, the 
outcomes at Port Hedland, Prince Rupert and Tauranga over time?
15 Oliver E. Williamson, “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” 
Journal of Economic Literature 38, no. 3 (2000): 597.
16 Ronald H. Coase, “Ronald H. Coase - Prize Lecture: The Institutional Structure of 
Production,” accessed February 20, 2014, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1991/coase-
lecture.html.
17 Ibid.
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1.3. Structure of the Thesis
The three ports selected for this comparative case study approach each share a 
number of commonalities but are at the same time diverse.
Chapter 3 looks at Port Hedland, a port located approximately 1,650km North-East of 
Perth in Western Australia's resource-rich Pilbara region. It is the world's largest bulk 
export port but this has only been a relatively recent development. Initially dubbed the 
“Mangrove Harbour”, the port itself has a long history, having first been used by pearl 
luggers following its discovery in 1863. Today the primary trade is the export of iron ore;
the port has always been strongly dependent on hinterland mining connections, and 
would not exist in its present form without them.
While there has been no real economic analysis of Port Hedland's past, it has been the
subject of historical examination. The first such work was Hardie's 1981 book 
Nor'westers of the Pilbara breed, an excellent glimpse at the lives of the people who 
lived through the booms and busts in the region, including at Port Hedland.18 That was 
followed by a more comprehensive treatment of the port itself with Shaw's 2006 book 
Moving Mountains: The Evolution of Port Hedland Harbour.19 The book is largely an 
historical narrative, but does contain elements of politics and economics. However, it 
lacks institutional analysis and so, along with new evidence uncovered from archival 
sources, is expanded upon in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 focuses on Prince Rupert, a port in Canada approximately 1,500km North-
West of Vancouver, just South of the Alaska-Canada border. It is North America's 
closest port to Asia by three days and has excellent access to the continent's hinterland
through the Canadian National railway. The intermodal (ship to rail) terminal was one of
the first completed in North America and was the first to be able to move over 750,000 
twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU's) annually.
18 Jenny Hardie, Nor’westers of the Pilbara Breed (Port Hedland, W.A.: Shire of Port Hedland,
1981).
19 Murray Shaw, Moving Mountains: The Evolution of Port Hedland Harbour (Carlisle, W.A.: 
Hesperian Press, 2006).
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The historical literature on Canadian ports is rather sparse, with researchers preferring 
to examine the nation's railways, an industry that has a wealth of information available. 
Fortunately Price Rupert's status as a terminus of the Grand Trunk Pacific meant that, 
along with the abundance of archival material available in the Library and Archives 
Canada as well as in the Hansard, a comprehensive economic history of the port could 
be written. Although lacking economic analysis, Leonard's 1996 book A Thousand 
Blunders: The Grand Trunk Pacific Railway and Northern British Columbia, along with 
Hick's 2003 book Hays' Orphan: The Story of the Port of Prince Rupert, were 
particularly valuable.20
Finally, Chapter 5 examines the port of Tauranga, located in New Zealand's fertile Bay 
of Plenty region, approximately 200km South East of Auckland on the nation's North 
island. In 1999 the port became the first in New Zealand to establish a fully integrated 
inland port service and today it is New Zealand's most technically efficient and 
profitable port, as well as the nation's largest port by volume and land area.
Most of the research concerning Tauranga has focused on the modern history and New
Zealand's port policy in general. The most comprehensive historical study on Tauranga 
is Hansen's 1997 book titled History of Tauranga Harbour & Port.21 While rather brief, 
the book contains the best pre-World War 2 historical account of the port. However, 
Tauranga is also most fortunate to have the most comprehensive archival collection of 
all of the three ports studied. The quantity and quality of the historical documents 
available at Archives New Zealand allowed for the discovery of new evidence that 
facilitated a comprehensive institutional analysis of the port's development over time.
All three ports share in the fact that their successes are only relatively recent – that is, 
until the 1960s they were at best secondary, relatively ignored, port options. Therefore 
they are an ideal sample for a case study approach that tries to determine why and 
20 Frank Leonard, A Thousand Blunders: The Grand Trunk Pacific Railway and Northern 
British Columbia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996); W.B.M. Hick, Hays’ Orphan: The Story of 
the Port of Prince Rupert, 1st ed. (Prince Rupert: Prince Rupert Port Authority, 2003).
21 Neil Gilbert Hansen, History of Tauranga Harbour & Port (Port of Tauranga Limited, 1997).
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how they grew into the successes that we see today, as well as analyse failures, if any, 
along the way. Importantly, it allows for the examination of any change, sudden or 
incremental, in the port's institutions that may have enabled or delayed their move from
obscurity to industry leaders.
It should be added that the examination of institutions is fundamentally different from 
that of the examination of organisations. This study does not attempt to do the latter, 
that is, it does not attempt to study the internal workings or strategies of each port 
organisation, or organisations, in any great depth. Organisations develop in 
consequence of the institutional framework they operate within and so according to 
North, “what must be clearly differentiated are the rules from the players”.22 North 
continues:
“Modeling the strategies and the skills of the team as it develops is a separate 
process from modeling the creation, evolution, and consequences of the 
rules.”23
While this research is interested in the eventual outcomes of how ports adjust to 
institutional constraints, such as how integrated a port may be (i.e., how vertically 
integrated it is), the primary focus is how the institutional matrix may have influenced 
an organisational structure by limiting the choice set available to actors at the time.
“[C]ontracts and organizations”, notes Aoki, are “supported by a fabric of institutions 
which define outside options for organizational participants and constrain individual and
organizational behaviour”.24 It is the institutional “fabric” that constrains particular 
options and the outcomes that result that is the subject matter of this dissertation. 
However, it is also acknowledged that in a modern democracy, special-interest groups 
work to change or maintain their current position, both through the market and 
22 North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, 4.
23 Ibid., 5.
24 Masahiko Aoki, “Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis: Motivations and Some 
Tentative Theorizing,” Japanese Economic Review 47, no. 1 (1996): 6.
8
politics.25 This study is concerned with that process when it involves an attempted 
change in the institutional matrix at one of the case studies. So while individuals and 
groups will be analysed as drivers of institutional change (or lack thereof), the inner 
workings of the “team” itself will not be delved into, as that is a task better left to other 
branches of economics and the behavioural sciences.
25 M. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social 
Rigidities (Yale University Press, 1982).
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework
2.1. Introduction
“I do not think we can hope to understand the problems and policies of our own day if 
we do not know the problems and policies out of which they grew.” - Lionel Robbins, 
1952.26
A significant portion of the existing economics literature on ports undertakes static 
equilibrium analysis; that is, a neoclassical analysis that examines what determines 
prices in a given (assumed) institutional environment. Governance issues receive 
attention but how and why the institutions that influence these governance decisions 
came to exist in their present form is rarely discussed.
However, there is a growing body of economics literature that has brought the role of 
institutions, defined by 1993 Nobel Prize winning economist Douglass North (shared 
with Robert Fogel) as the “rules of the game”.27 These institutions guide economic 
activity through incentives, bringing them to the forefront of economic analysis. A 
society's institutions can be thought of as the combination of formal constraints, 
informal rules and their enforcement characteristics.28 The goal of institutional analysis 
is to evaluate the economic efficiency and distributional implications of given 
institutional structures.
Since institutions are created as an attempt to satisfy goals using incentive structures, 
the division of labour, rules for entry and exit into an industry, and decision making 
authorities, all such aspects of institutions should be considered in explaining 
institutions and their effects. Comparative institutional analysis can be seen as an 
26 L Robbins, The Theory of Economic Policy in English Classical Political Economy, 1952. 
Reprint (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd., 1962), 1.
27 North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance; North, “Institutions.”
28 Greif, “Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical 
Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies”; Douglass C. North, “Institutions and 
the Performance of Economies over Time,” in Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 
ed. Claude Menard and Mary Shirley (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 21–30.
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effective way to broaden the neoclassical toolkit and then use this “broadened 
analytical framework to explain phenomena that had previously seemed 
impenetrable”.29
This chapter first surveys the existing economics literature relating to ports, introduces 
the New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework, and discusses the applicability of 
that framework to the analysis of ports.
2.2. Existing Economics Literature Relating to Ports
In a 2006 chapter reviewing the maritime economics literature to date, Trevor Heaver 
stated that research in port economics probably began in 1958 with Svendsen's Sea 
Transport and Shipping Economics.30 This was then followed by a book that shaped, 
and still shapes, the way most port economics is undertaken today, Thorburn's (1960) 
Supply and Demand of Water Transport.31
These works and their successors examine microeconomic factors at the port within a 
given institutional arrangement. Important issues such as the internal cost structure of 
a port, the role the port plays in the economy (i.e., GDP contribution), and the impact 
port efficiency has on the entire supply chain are examined. 
Pallis et al. estimate that between 1997 and 2008, all of the 395 papers surveyed 
relating to port economics fell into the following categories:32
29 M.K. Nabli and J.B. Nugent, “The New Institutional Economics and Its Applicability to 
Development,” World Development 17, no. 9 (1989): 1336.
30 Arnljet Stremme Svendsen, “Sea Transport and Shipping Economics,” Institute for Shipping
Research, Bremin, 1958; Trevor D. Heaver, “The Evolution and Challenges of Port 
Economics,” in Port Economics, ed. Kevin Cullinane and Wayne K. Talley, Research in 
Transportation Economics 16 (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006), 11–41.
31 Thomas Thorburn, Supply and Demand of Water Transport (Stockholm: Business Research
Institute at the Stockholm School of Economics, 1960).
32 Athanasios A. Pallis, Thomas K. Vitsounis, and Peter W. De Langen, “Port Economics, 
Policy and Management: Review of an Emerging Research Field,” Transport Reviews 30, 
no. 1 (2010): 115–61.
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Table 2.1: Existing Port Literature, 1997 - 2008
Category Themes No. of Papers
Terminal Studies
- Performance Measurement
- Operations
- Strategies
40
Transport and Supply Chains
- Shipping Networks
- Supply Chain Trends
- Logistics
- Information Flows
- Hinterland Chains
56
Governance
- Models and Reform
- Role of Port Authorities
- Industrial Relations
- Community Cooperation
61
Planning and Development
- Trends and Developments
- Development Case Studies
- Forecasting
- Economic Impact Studies
- Expansion Projects
- Tendering of Services
57
Policy and Regulation
- Port Pricing
- OH&S Regulations
- Anti-Trust
- Supranational Policies
67
Competition and 
Competitiveness
- Competition
- Strategy Analysis
- Performance
- Choice
74
Spatial Analysis
- Spatial Change
- Spatial Networks
- Port Cities
- Port Hinterlands
40
Comparative institutional analysis is not mentioned; the closest would be a combination
of parts of the “Governance” and “Planning and Development” categories, but these 
tended to deal with static time and place issues rather than constraints over time. The 
authors do note in a subsequent paper that port economics “is an emerging field that 
lacks coherence... International comparative research and international cooperation 
between scholars are still limited”.33
They conclude by stating that “more comparative research is needed on how seaport 
systems spatially behave under different market environments (e.g. an overall traffic 
decline due to an economic crisis) and different institutional settings (e.g. the level of 
33 Athanasios A. Pallis et al., “Port Economics, Policy and Management: Content 
Classification and Survey,” Transport Reviews 31, no. 4 (2011): 445.
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'centralization' of port policy and applicable governance models)”.34
That is not to say that there is anything wrong with the existing port economics 
literature. It is simply that there is an opportunity, as noted by Pallis et al., for the 
literature to be broadened by adding institutions to the equation. But before developing 
a framework to undertake that task, the existing literature needs to be examined so that
it can be expanded upon.
To achieve that, a table has been developed which condenses the literature into three 
categories and seventeen sub-themes. The table is presented in chronological order, 
enabling one to view the evolution of the port economics literature over time. While it 
would be impossible to list every paper written on the subject, the following table 
highlights some excellent studies that look at a port within a given institutional 
structure.
Table 2.2: Condensed Non-Institutional Port Literature Examples
Category Themes References
Pricing and Investment
Cost-benefit analysis
Input-Output
Bulk shipping costs
Optimal pricing
Goss (1967)
Goss and Jones (1970)
Heaver (1970)
Heggie (1974)
Walters (1975)
Bennathan and Walters (1979)
Jansson and Shneerson (1982)
Goss and Stevens (2001)
Haralambides et al. (2002)
Strandenes (2004)
Efficiency and Ownership
Container terminals
Vessel time in port
Industrial Organisation
Taxes
Productivity
Labour Issues
Goss (1967)
Heaver and Studer (1972)
Gilman et al. (1977)
Robinson (1978)
Gilman (1999)
Baird (2002)
Cullinane and Grammenos (2002)
Cullinane et al. (2004)
Talley (2004)
Liu, Liu and Cheng (2006)
BTRE Australia (Waterline)
Bichou and Bell (2007)
34 Ibid., 468.
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Category Themes References
Privatisation and 
Governance
Comparative Studies
Economic Functions
Port Authorities
Competition
The Hinterland
Regulation
Politics
Public Goods
Goss (1990; 1990; 1990; 1990)
Hayuth (1993)
Slack (1993)
Baird and Fleming (1999)
Ircha (1999)
Dombois and Heseler (2000)
Heaver et al. (2000)
Turner (2000)
Brooks (2001)
Cullinane and Song (2001)
Heaver et al. (2001)
Hofmann (2001)
Notteboom and Winkelmans (2001; 2001)
Martin and Thomas (2001)
Benacchio et al. (2002)
Fitzgerald et al. (2002)
Heaver and Tretheway (2002)
Heaver (2002)
Everett (2002)
Notteboom (2002)
Cullinane and Song (2002)
Baird (2002)
Carbone and De Martins (2003)
De Souza et al. (2003)
Flor and Defilippi (2003)
Liang et al. (2003)
Song (2003)
Baird (2004)
Brooks (2004)
De Langen (2004)
Lam and Yap (2004)
Cullinane et al. (2005)
Meersman et al. (2005)
Midoro et al. (2005)
Notteboom and Rodrigue (2005)
Meersman et al. (2007)
Reveley and Tull (2008)
Detailed references in footnote35
35 R. O. Goss, “Towards an Economic Appraisal of Port Investments,” Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy 1, no. 3 (September 1967): 249–72; R. O. Goss and C. D. Jones, 
The Economics of Size in Dry Bulk Carriers (London: HMSO, 1970); Trevor D. Heaver, “The
Cost of Large Vessels–an Examination of the Sensitivity of Total Vessel Costs to Certain 
Operating Conditions,” National Ports Council, Research and Technical Bulletin 7 (1970): 
342–56; Ian G. Heggie, “Charging for Port Facilities,” Journal of Transport Economics and 
Policy 13, no. 1 (1974): 3–25; Alan A. Walters, “Marginal Cost Pricing in Ports,” The 
Logistics and Transportation Review 11, no. 4 (1975): 299–308; Esra Bennathan and A. A. 
Waters, Port Pricing and Investment Policy for Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1979); Jan Owen Jansson and Dan Shneerson, Port Economics, MIT 
Press Series in Transportation Studies 8 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982); R. O. Goss and 
Hendrik Stevens, “Marginal Cost Pricing in Seaports,” International Journal of Maritime 
Economics 3, no. 2 (2001): 128–38; Hercules E. Haralambides, Pierre Cariou, and Marco 
Benacchio, “Costs, Benefits and Pricing of Dedicated Container Terminals,” International 
Journal of Maritime Economics 4, no. 1 (2002): 21–34; Siri Pettersen Strandenes, “Port 
Pricing Structures and Ship Efficiency,” Review of Network Economics 3, no. 2 (2004); R. 
O. Goss, “The Turnaround of Cargo Liners and Its Effect on Sea Transport Costs,” Journal 
of Transport Economics and Policy 1, no. 1 (1967): 75–89; Trevor D. Heaver and K. R. 
Studer, “Ship Size and Turn-around Time – Some Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Transport
Economics and Policy 6, no. 1 (1972): 32–50; Stephen Gilman, R. P. Maggs, and S. C. 
Ryder, Containers on the North Atlantic: An Economic Analysis of Ships and Routes 
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Henrik Stevens was one of the first people to explicitly look at comparative institutions 
in the analysis of seaports in a book titled The Institutional Position of Seaports: An 
International Comparison.36 While a noble first attempt, the analysis simply does not go
far enough; in trying to cover eight individual ports around the world as well as the 
entire US industry, the author – out of necessity – could not go into enough detail. In a 
review of the book, Brian Slack notes that while “a book exploring the dimensions of 
(Liverpool: Marine Transport Centre, University of Liverpool, 1977); R Robinson, “Size of 
Vessels and Turnaround Time: Further Evidence from the Port of Hong Kong,” Journal of 
Transport Economics and Policy 12, no. 1 (1978): 161–78; Sidney Gilman, “The Size 
Economies and Network Efficiency of Large Containerships,” Maritime Economics and 
Logistics 1, no. 1 (1999): 39–59; Alfred J. Baird, “The Economics of Container 
Transhipment in Northern Europe,” International Journal of Maritime Economics 4, no. 3 
(2002): 249–80; Kevin Cullinane and C. Th. Grammenos, “The Productivity and Efficiency 
of Ports and Terminals: Methods and Applications,” in The Handbook of Maritime 
Economics and Business (London: LLP Professional Publishing, 2002), 803–31; Kevin 
Cullinane et al., “An Application of DEA Windows Analysis to Container Port Production 
Efficiency,” Review of Network Economics 3, no. 2 (2004); Wayne K. Talley, “Wage 
Differentials of Intermodal Transportation Carriers and Ports: Deregulation versus 
Regulation,” Review of Network Economics 3, no. 2 (2004); B.L. Liu, W.L. Liu, and C.P. 
Cheng, “Efficiency Analysis of Container Terminals in China: An Application of DEA 
Approach,” Unpublished Manuscript, Nankai University/Soochow University, Taipei, Taiwan,
2006; Khalid Bichou and Michael G.H. Bell, “Internationalisation and Consolidation of the 
Container Port Industry: Assessment of Channel Structure and Relationships,” Maritime 
Economics & Logistics 9, no. 1 (2007): 35–51; R. O. Goss, “Economic Policies and 
Seaports: The Economic Functions of Seaports,” Maritime Policy and Management 17, no. 
3 (1990): 207–19; R. O. Goss, “Economic Policies and Seaports: The Diversity of Port 
Policies,” Maritime Policy and Management 17, no. 3 (1990): 221–34; R. O. Goss, 
“Economic Policies and Seaports: Are Port Authorities Necessary?,” Maritime Policy and 
Management 17, no. 4 (1990): 257–71; R. O. Goss, “Economic Policies and Seaports: 
Strategies for Port Authorities,” Maritime Policy & Management 17, no. 4 (1990): 273–87; Y.
Hayuth, “Port Competition and Regional Cooperation,” in De Dynamiek van Een Haven, ed.
E. Van de Voorde, G. Blauwens, and De brabander G. (Uitgeverij Pelckmans: De 
Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1993), 199; Brian Slack, “Pawns in the Game: Ports in a 
Global Transportation System,” Growth and Change 24, no. 4 (1993): 579–88; Douglas K. 
Fleming and Alfred J. Baird, “Comment Some Reflections on Port Competition in the United
States and Western Europe,” Maritime Policy and Management 26, no. 4 (1999): 383–94; 
M C Ircha, “Port Reform: International Perspectives and the Canadian Model,” Canadian 
Public Administration 42, no. 1 (1999): 108–32; Rainer Dombois and Heiner Heseler, 
Seaports in the Context of Globalization and Privatization (Arbeiterkammer Bremin: 
Kooperation Universität, 2000); Trevor D. Heaver et al., “Do Mergers and Alliances 
Influence European Shipping and Port Competition?,” Maritime Policy and Management 27,
no. 4 (2000): 363–73; Jan Hofmann, “Latin American Ports: Results and Determinants of 
Private Sector Participation,” International Journal of Maritime Economics 3, no. 2 (2001): 
221–41; Theo E. Notteboom and Willy Winkelmans, “Reassessing Public Sector 
Involvement in European Seaports,” International Journal of Maritime Economics 3, no. 2 
(2001): 242–59; Theo E. Notteboom and Willy Winkelmans, “Structural Changes in 
Logistics: How Will Port Authorities Face the Challenge?,” Maritime Policy and 
Management 28, no. 1 (2001): 71–89; Jeffrey Martin and Brian J. Thomas, “The Container 
Terminal Community,” Maritime Policy and Management 28, no. 3 (2001): 279–92; 
Haralambides, Cariou, and Benacchio, “Costs, Benefits and Pricing of Dedicated Container 
Terminals”; R. H. Fitzgerald, T. Frounfelker, and Trevor D. Heaver, The Effects of Local 
Taxes and Subsidies on Port Competition in the Pacific Northwest of North America 
(Panama: Proceedings of the international association of maritime economists, 2002); 
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the institutional arrangements of seaports is welcome”,
“There is unequal treatment of the ports, from the very complete survey of 
Rotterdam, to the very general coverage of Antwerp, Hamburg and Durban. 
While the book contains a wealth of information about the administration of a 
number of ports around the world, the integration is weak.”37
Trevor D. Heaver and Michael W. Tretheway, The Economics and Politics of Taxation and 
Subsidies for Ports and Airports (Panama: Proceedings of the international association of 
maritime economists, 2002); Trevor D. Heaver, “Supply Chain and Logistics Management: 
Implications for Liner Shipping,” in The Handbook of Maritime Economics and Business, ed.
C. Th. Grammenos (London: LLP Professional Publishing, 2002), 375–96; Sophia Everett, 
“Deregulation, Competitive Pressures and the Emergence of Intermodalism,” Australian 
Journal of Public Administration 61, no. 3 (2002): 19–26; Theo E. Notteboom, 
“Consolidation and Contestability in the European Container Handling Industry,” Maritime 
Policy and Management 29, no. 3 (2002): 257–69; Kevin Cullinane and Dong-Wook Song, 
“Port Privatization Policy and Practice,” Transport Reviews 22, no. 1 (2002): 55–75; Alfred 
J. Baird, “Privatization Trends at the World’s Top-100 Container Ports,” Maritime Policy and 
Management 29, no. 3 (2002): 271–84; Valentina Carbone and Marcella De Martino, “The 
Changing Role of Ports in Supply-Chain Management: An Empirical Analysis,” Maritime 
Policy and Management 30, no. 4 (2003): 305–20; Geraldo Araujo De Souza Junior, 
Anthony KC Beresford, and Stephen J. Pettit, “Liner Shipping Companies and Terminal 
Operators: Internationalisation or Globalisation?,” Maritime Economics and Logistics 5, no. 
4 (2003): 393–412; Lincoln Flor and Enzo Defilippi, “Port Infrastructure: An Access Model 
for the Essential Facility,” Maritime Economics and Logistics 5, no. 2 (2003): 116–32; An-
Shuen Nir, Kuang Lin, and Gin-Shuh Liang, “Port Choice Behaviour–from the Perspective 
of the Shipper,” Maritime Policy and Management 30, no. 2 (2003): 165–73; Dong-Wook 
Song, “Port Co-Opetition in Concept and Practice,” Maritime Policy and Management 30, 
no. 1 (2003): 29–44; Alfred J. Baird, “Public Goods and the Public Financing of Major 
European Seaports,” Maritime Policy & Management 31, no. 4 (October 2004): 375–91, 
doi:10.1080/0308883042000304890; Mary R. Brooks, “The Governance Structure of Ports,”
Review of Network Economics 3, no. 2 (2004): 168–83; Peter De Langen, “Governance in 
Seaport Clusters,” Maritime Economics and Logistics 6, no. 2 (2004): 141–56; Wei Yim Yap
and Jasmine SL Lam, “An Interpretation of Inter-Container Port Relationships from the 
Demand Perspective,” Maritime Policy and Management 31, no. 4 (2004): 337–55; S. X. H. 
Gong, M. Firth, and K. Cullinane, “Choice of Financing and Governance Structures in the 
Transport Industry: Theory and Practice,” in World Shipping and Port Development, ed. T. 
W. Lee and K. Cullinane (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 50–75; H. Meersman, E. 
Van de Voorde, and T. Vanelslander, “Ports as Hubs in the Logistics Chain,” in International
Maritime Transport: Perspectives, ed. J. Leggate, J. McConville, and A. Morvillo (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2005), 32–45; Renato Midoro, Enrico Musso, and Francesco Parola, “Maritime 
Liner Shipping and the Stevedoring Industry: Market Structure and Competition Strategies,”
Maritime Policy and Management 32, no. 2 (2005): 89–106; Theo E. Notteboom and Jean-
Paul Rodrigue, “Port Regionalization: Towards a New Phase in Port Development,” 
Maritime Policy & Management 32, no. 3 (2005): 297–313; H Meersman, E de Voorde, and 
T Vanelslander, “Fighting for Money, Investments and Capacity: Port Governance and 
Devolution in Belgium,” Devolution, Port Governance and Port Performance, 2007, 85–108;
James Reveley and Malcolm Tull, Port Privatisation: The Asia-Pacific Experience, Transport
Economics, Management and Policy 6 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008).
36 Henrik Stevens, The Institutional Position of Seaports: An International Comparison, vol. 
51, The GeoJournal Library (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).
37 Brian Slack, review of The Institutional Position of Seaports: An International Comparison, 
by Hendrik Stevens, Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie 91, no. 4 (2000): 
466.
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Similarly, a paper that begins to touch on institutional issues is Wayne Talley's study on 
regulated port labour relative to unregulated port labour. It is a fascinating comparative 
study, but unfortunately does not draw a connection to the institutional environment that
may have led to his result.38
A good indicator of the usual topics examined by mainstream port economics is Coto-
Millán, Pesquera, and Castanedo's recent Essays on Port Economics, which covers 
topics on demand, supply, economic impact, cost-benefit analysis and externalities.39 
Institutional analysis is stressed as an important consideration in a theoretical chapter 
by Ricardo Sanchez and Gordon Wilmsmeier, but that is where it ends. Institutions 
matter, but – again, perhaps a sign of the immaturity of institutional analysis in port 
economics – meaningful empirical studies are scant. The rest of the chapters in their 
Essays are of a static equilibrium nature, examining various types of technical, 
allocative and economic efficiency at a particular point in time within a given 
institutional structure. Adaptive efficiency and the institutional heritage are taken as 
given.
This is a similar theme shared by other major maritime economics textbooks and essay
compilations, with both Talley's collection of maritime essays in the Blackwell 
Companion to Maritime Economics and Stopford's Maritime Economics textbook, as 
should be expected, covering what the majority of literature does: a history of shipping; 
how shipping markets are organised; shipping trade cycles; supply, demand and freight
rates; markets for shipping; the economics of shipping companies; transport systems; 
and forecasting and supply.40
But there are exceptions. In a 1999 article, Goss defined various forms of rent-seeking 
behaviour at ports and asked whether artificially restricted competition as a result of 
38 Talley, “Wage Differentials of Intermodal Transportation Carriers and Ports.”
39 Pablo Coto-Millán, Miguel Ángel Pesquera, and Juan Castanedo, eds., Essays on Port 
Economics (London: Springer, 2010).
40 Wayne K. Talley, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Maritime Economics, Blackwell 
Companions to Contemporary Economics (Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2012); Martin 
Stopford, Maritime Economics, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2009).
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port policy enables 'pure' and 'quasi' rents to be extracted by various interest groups.41 
He stressed that it was “necessary to ensure that competition actually exists – within 
ports and between them”, and that “institutional arrangements, including constraints on 
contestability”, are paramount to any study that examines port competition. Without 
institutional analysis, rent-seeking at a port may be well above what traditional models 
show when institutions are assumed away. Rent-seeking manifests itself not just in 
potential inefficient outcomes as described by Goss, but also through waste in the 
process of achieving those outcomes as resources are squandered in competitive 
lobbying.42
However, the port economics literature is not barren of institutional analysis and since 
Goss' paper, institutions have received considerably more attention. Classic topics 
such as efficiency, governance, organisations, privatisation, productivity, and property 
rights; as well as new insights such as path dependency, public choice economics and 
transaction costs are being covered with increasing frequency and depth, and will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.4.
2.3. New Institutional Economics
“Appropriately thorough analysis should include an examination of the institutional 
structure itself in a predictive explanatory sense. [The economist's] task includes the 
derivation of the institutional order itself from the set of elementary behavioral 
hypotheses with which he commences. In this manner, genuine institutional economics
becomes a significant and an important part of fundamental economic theory.” - James 
M. Buchanan, 196843
Neoclassical economic theory uses the lens of choice, focusing on “human behavior as
41 R. O. Goss, “On the Distribution of Economic Rent in Seaports,” Maritime Economics & 
Logistics 1, no. 1 (1999): 1–9.
42 Anne O. Krueger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” The American 
Economic Review 64, no. 3 (1974): 291–303; Gordon Tullock, “The Fundamentals of Rent-
Seeking,” The Locke Luminary 1, no. 2 (1998): 93.
43 James M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods (Chicago: Rand McNally, 
1968), 5.
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a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses”, relying 
on comparative static techniques to compare technical efficiencies at a port.44 From this
point of view, the economic problem can be reduced to one where measured ex post 
quantitative and qualitative data can be used to highlight deficiencies and improve 
upon a given process.
In contrast, while the NIE also views the economic problem as one of resource 
allocation, this is not the central problem: the real task of the economist is to focus on 
exchange – the transaction – and the role that institutional arrangements play in 
facilitating these interactions.45 From this point of view, the economy is viewed through 
the lens of contract where the market is an order consisting of a multitude of both 
complex and simple exchanges from which mostly uncontrollable, spontaneous 
outcomes emerge. While measured ex post quantitative and qualitative data can be 
used to identify problems, the NIE does not assume that they are variables subject to 
control.
As Kenneth Arrow observed, the NIE differs from the old Institutional Economics in that 
it does “not consist of giving new answers to the traditional questions of economics – 
resource allocation and the degree of utilization. Rather it consists of answering new 
questions, why economic institutions emerged the way they did and not otherwise; it 
merges into economic history, but brings sharper reasoning to bear than had been 
customary”.46
Institutional analysis should be viewed as complementary, a broadening of the 
neoclassical framework to include the factors that impact the development and 
continued operation of a port. Questions such as why port organisational structures 
differ from each other, why certain ports developed and others did not, or why some 
44 L Robbins, The Nature and Significance of Economic Science (London: Macmillan, 1932), 
16.
45 James M. Buchanan, “What Should Economists Do?,” Southern Economic Journal, 1964, 
213–22.
46 Kenneth J. Arrow, “Reflections on the Essays,” in Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory 
of Economic Policy, by George Feiwel (New York: New York University Press, 1987), 734.
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ports seem to continuously fail whereas others are beacons of success are all 
questions that can be better answered by including institutions in the analysis.
According to North, institutions are developed as an attempt to satisfy goals using 
incentive structures; they are the framework that deﬁnes the incentive structure of a 
society.47 Formal institutions include constitutions, legal and political structures, as well 
as written contracts and codified standards (e.g., accounting standards) which all serve
to reduce risk and uncertainty (lower transaction costs).
“In the jargon of the economist”, North explains, “institutions define and limit the set of 
choices of individuals. Institutional constraints include both what individuals are 
prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under what conditions some individuals are 
permitted to undertake certain activities... They are perfectly analogous to the rules of 
the game in a competitive team sport”.48
Informal institutions include the family, associations, culture, customs and norms, 
conventions, or religious precepts. The defining feature of informal rules is that they are
not backed by formal laws but by social custom.
Oliver Williamson provided a useful hierarchy of institutional levels, his “four levels of 
social analysis”, which help to illustrate the difference between the type of institutions 
and also how each has traditionally been analysed.
Table 2.3: Williamson's Four Levels of Social Analysis49
Tier 4 (continuous) Tier 3 (1-10 years) Tier 2 (10-100 years) Tier 1 (100+ years)
Resource Allocation 
and Employment
Governance 
(especially contracts)
Institutional 
Environment: formal 
rules
Embeddedness: 
customs, traditions
Neoclassical / 
Agency Theory
Transaction Cost 
Economics
Property Rights / 
Political Economy
Social Theory
The four tiers range from Tier 1's social or informal institutions – culture, customs, 
47 North, “Institutions and the Performance of Economies over Time,” 22.
48 North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, 3–4.
49 Williamson, “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” 597.
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values, traditions – down to Tier 4 where there is constant, sometimes daily, change. 
Chapter 2.2 demonstrated that the majority of port economics to date has focused on 
the 4th level (the ongoing resource allocation process and marginal conditions within 
the port e.g., physical measures of output and financial performance indicators), with 
occasional ventures into the 3rd level. This thesis will instead focus primarily on the 2nd 
and 3rd levels which are the focus of the NIE; in other words, how a port's 
organisational structure was shaped over time by transaction costs and the institutional
environment it exists within.
2.3.1 Transaction Costs
The theory of transaction costs can be traced back to Ronald Coase's 1937 paper “The
Nature of the Firm”, where he highlighted the important point that the decision to 
organise as a firm – indeed, the very existence of firms – is largely determined by the 
costs of transacting. The decision to organise in a firm as opposed to undertaking all 
transactions on the open market depends on the relative costs of internal versus 
external exchange.50 Using the open market has costs such as price discovery, 
contracting, and enforcement. Internalising these costs in the form of a firm reduces 
these – especially for highly specific assets – but replaces them with the additional 
costs of internalising, such as adaptation costs, low-powered incentives for employees 
(as well as performance measurement, including imperfect measurement and 
enforcement), and the discovery of information.51 When those costs become too high, a
50 Oliver E. Williamson, “Markets and Hierarchies: Antitrust Analysis and Implications,” 
Markets and Hierarchies: Antitrust Analysis and Implications, 1975; Oliver E. Williamson, 
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985); Benjamin Klein,
R.G. Crawford, and A.A. Alchian, “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process,” Journal of Law and Economics 21, no. 2 (1978): 297–
326; Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” The Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 691–
719; Oliver Hart and John Moore, “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” 1990.
51 Douglass C North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1981), 34. Also relevent is Hayek's concept of “knowledge of the particular 
circumstances of time and place”, or Coase's insight that as a firm grows the managers 
may fail to “place the factors of production in the uses where their value is greatest”, due to 
their boundedly rational nature. F.A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” The 
American Economic Review 35, no. 4 (1945): 521–22; Ronald H. Coase, “The Nature of the
Firm,” Economica 4, no. 16 (1937): 394.
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firm may choose outsource certain transactions rather than further vertically integrating,
maintaining an organisational form that still allows it to effectively contract for its more 
specific assets while using the market to source various inputs.52
Generally speaking, the governance structure or organisational form of a given port – 
absent political and institutional constraints (Tier 3 institutions) – will largely be 
determined by how specific, or relationship dependent, are its assets and the 
transaction costs it faces (Tier 2 institutions).
Institutions influence the transaction costs that a firm faces and therefore constrain the 
options available to actors. As Coase put it, “if we consider the operation of a sale tax, 
it is clear that it is a tax on market transactions and not on the same transactions 
organized within the firm. Now since these are alternative methods of ‘organization’ – 
by the price mechanism or by the entrepreneur – such a regulation would bring into 
existence firms which otherwise would have no raison d’etre”.53
However, institutions are not something that can be changed overnight. While they can 
be brought about endogenously through the political process, “an economy may be 
also locked into an inefficient institutional arrangement due to sunk costs in existing 
institutions and network externalities among institutions”.54 These sunk costs are 
irrelevant from a neoclassical point of view – sunk costs are sunk – but from a NIE 
perspective, “the experience [of a sunk cost] may modify anticipations about choice 
alternatives in the future”.55
These are what are known in the literature as “path-dependent outcomes”, where an 
elaborate structure of historically derived institutions (of all tiers) constrain the choice 
set faced by actors – politicians, entrepreneurs, managers, consumers – as they seek 
52 Williamson, “Markets and Hierarchies”; Hart and Moore, “Property Rights and the Nature of 
the Firm.”
53 Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” 393.
54 Aoki, “Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis: Motivations and Some Tentative 
Theorizing,” 9.
55 James M. Buchanan, Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory (University of 
Chicago Press, 1969), 45.
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to change the status quo.56
2.3.2 Path Dependence
Actors are constantly jousting to better their position by either attempting to change or 
prevent change to the status quo by altering the institutional matrix (incentive structure)
that they face, sometimes accidentally through exogenous means (e.g., new 
technology) and other times endogenously (e.g., through deliberate political action). 
This incentive structure determines the quantity and quality of investment in an 
economy and is at the heart of the NIE: that the choice is between institutions that 
promote production or those that promote predation.57 Path dependent 'lock-in' then 
constrains the options of would-be reformers, whether working in the political sphere, a 
regulatory apparatus or at the operational level of a port.
Studies that have investigated this phenomena include David's famous investigation 
into the QWERTY keyboard; Coase's examination of radio broadcasting spectrum 
rights in the Britain; Krueger's study on the US sugar industry; Sampson and Spiller's 
look at telecommunications regulation in Jamaica; Higgs on the Washington salmon 
industry; Libecap on western mineral rights; Reveley and Tull's comparative analysis of 
centralised port planning in Britain and New Zealand; Reveley's investigation into path-
dependency in New Zealand's port labour markets; Dooms et al. on stakeholder 
management and path dependence in Antwerp; Engerman and Sokoloff on institutions 
and path dependency in the Americas; Heffernan on path dependency in the 
automobile industry; Notteboom et al. on institutional plasticity and path dependency in 
seaports; Acemoglu et al. on the relationship between institutions and long-run growth; 
Easterly and Levine on whether it is natural endowments or institutions that enable 
growth; and Stone, Levy and Paredes' comparative analysis of the regulatory systems 
of the Brazilian and Chilean garment industry.58
56 Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, “Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History,” 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1995): 205.
57 J Nye, “Taking Institutions Seriously: Rethinking the Political Economy of Development in 
the Philippines,” Asian Development Review, Vol. 28, No. 1, Pp. 1-21, 2011, 2011.
58 P.A. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” The American Economic Review 75, no. 
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2.4. Applying the NIE to Ports
“Until we realize that we are choosing between social arrangements which are all more
or less failures, we are not likely to make much headway.” - Ronald Coase, 196459
Ports form an essential part of a country's infrastructure by facilitating trade and 
ultimately helping to reduce the cost of goods for consumers. They are characterised 
by solidity in physical infrastructure and legislative frameworks – or high levels of “asset
specificity” – but also face the dynamics of constantly changing global market 
conditions requiring flexible responsiveness.60
A major constraint any researcher faces when using an institutional approach is a long 
period of political stability in core social and political institutions which then tend to 
2 (1985): 332–37; Ronald H. Coase, “The Federal Communications Commission,” Journal 
of Law and Economics 2 (1959): 1–40; Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of 
Controls: American Sugar (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
1991); Cezley I. Sampson and P.T. Spiller, “Telecommunications Regulation in Jamaica,” in 
Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: Comparative Studies of Telecommunications, 
ed. B. Levy and P.T. Spiller, 1996, 36–78; R Higgs, “Legally Induced Technical Regress in 
the Washington Salmon Fishery,” in Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, ed. Lee 
Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass C. North (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 247–79; Gary D. Libecap, “Economic Variables and the Development of the 
Law: The Case of Western Mineral Rights,” The Journal of Economic History 38, no. 2 
(1978): 338–62; Andrew Stone, Brian Levy, and Ricardo Paredes, Public Institutions and 
Private Transactions: The Legal and Regulatory Environment for Business Transactions in 
Brazil and Chile, Policy Research Working Papers, WPS 891 (World Bank Publications, 
1992), https://encrypted.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Y2zase-i-fUC; James Reveley 
and Malcolm Tull, “Centralised Port Planning: An Evaluation of the British and New Zealand
Experience,” in Resources and Infrastructures in the Maritime Economy, 1500-2000, ed. 
Gordon Boyce and Richard Gorski, Research in Maritime History 22, 2002, 141–61; James 
Reveley, “Path Dependence: Institutional Change in New Zealand’s Port Labour Markets, 
1950-1989,” The Journal of Transport History 29, no. 2 (September 2008): 193–212; M. 
Dooms, A. Verbeke, and E. Haezendonck, “Stakeholder Management and Path 
Dependence in Large-Scale Transport Infrastructure Development: The Port of Antwerp 
Case (1960--2010),” Journal of Transport Geography, 2012; SL Engerman and KL Sokoloff,
“Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World 
Economics,” NBER Working Paper Series N10, no. 9259 (2002): 1–55; G.M. Heffernan, 
“Path Dependence, Behavioral Rules, and the Role of Entrepreneurship in Economic 
Change: The Case of the Automobile Industry,” The Review of Austrian Economics 16, no. 
1 (2003): 45–62; Peter De Langen, T. Notteboom, and W Jacobs, “Institutional Plasticity 
and Path Dependence in Seaports: Interactions between Institutions, Port Governance 
Reforms and Port Authority Routines,” Journal of Transport Geography 27 (2012): 26–35; 
Daron Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J.A. Robinson, “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of 
Long-Run Growth,” Handbook of Economic Growth 1 (2005): 385–472; William Easterly 
and Ross Levine, “Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic 
Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics 50, no. 1 (January 2003): 3–39.
59 Ernest W Williams and Ronald H. Coase, “Discussion,” The American Economic Review 
54, no. 3 (May 1964): 195.
60 Michael H. Riordan and Oliver E. Williamson, “Asset Specificity and Economic 
Organization,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 3, no. 4 (1985): 365–78.
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become the key explanatory variable of policy outcomes. Both cross-country 
comparative analysis (e.g., Levy & Spiller) and extending the empirical framework into 
an historical analysis (e.g., Henisz, Palmer) are ways in which the analyst can ease 
these constraints.61 Thus, this thesis undertakes a cross-country comparative analysis, 
extending the empirical framework into an historical analysis using archival data for 
each case study from 1860 – 2012. This enables the research to avoid the problem 
where long periods of economic and political stability in core institutions can become 
the key explanatory variables.
The NIE takes the view that the credibility and effectiveness of a region’s institutions 
(national, State, local) would have a direct effect on the success or failure of a given 
port. Ports that operate in an environment with weak political and social institutions will 
find reduced performance as a result of lower private investment and less support for 
efficiency incentives. The goal is to find out why particular port governance models 
evolved at different places in the world at different times while keeping as many other 
potential explanatory variables – e.g., legal heritage – constant. Therefore, the case 
studies of Port Hedland in Australia, Prince Rupert in Canada and Tauranga in New 
Zealand were selected. None of the locations, historically, were major ports; their 
successes have been relatively recent. More importantly, they all had the same British 
institutional heritage. While this could be viewed as a limitation of the study, the 
enormous number of variables at play and the amount of time covered – and 
institutional change – turn this into a strength. The case studies will then be used to put
differing port governance structures within the broader institutional framework, 
highlighting why those governance structures might be the way they are and what 
institutional constraints would-be reformers might face.62
61 B. Levy and P.T. Spiller, Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: Comparative Studies of
Telecommunications (Cambridge University Press, 1996); W.J. Henisz, “The Institutional 
Environment for Infrastructure Investment,” Industrial and Corporate Change 11, no. 2 
(2002): 355–89; Sarah Palmer, “Government and the British Shipping Industry in the Later 
Twentieth Century,” in The World’s Key Industry: History and Economics of International 
Shipping, ed. Gelina Harlaftis, Jesús Valdaliso, and Stig Tenold (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 124–41.
62 Elizabeth Maitland, Stephen Nicholas, and Gordon Boyce, “The Economics of Governance:
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This view of ports sees their organisational and administrative structure as being 
shaped by historical, geographical and political factors as well as the diverse economic 
and social environments that each port functions within. Historically ports, given their 
high level of “asset specificity” – that is, investments that are not easily redeployed63 – 
face large transaction costs when attempting to engage in autonomous market 
contracting.64 Ports, along with similar utilities with similarly high levels of specificity, 
instead have to rely on a more complex governance structure. They are more likely to 
engage in incomplete bilateral trading where both parties have a stake in preserving 
the relationship, be involved in more elaborate forms of dispute resolution, and remove 
some transactions altogether by organising internally or vertically integrating many 
services (such as hinterland connections).
Given their asset specificity, ports are also more susceptible to the hold-up problem 
and rent seeking.65 This is a result of the contractual incompleteness that they must 
engage in: if circumstances change unexpectedly, the original agreement may no 
longer be effective. The costs of failing to adapt to such events are defined by 
Williamson as “maladaption costs”, where hold-ups occur as trading partners or other 
interest groups may try to expropriate rents accruing to the specific assets (the port).66 
This then results in under-investment unless there are protections for such 
contingencies in place. In reverse, too much protection – for example, heavy 
government guarantees on debt or subsidies, or legal barriers to entry – can lead to 
inefficiency and over-investment. The right governance structure along with strong 
Transaction Cost Economics and New Institutional Economics,” in Symposium on the 
Multiple Facets of Governance (Symposium Program, Newcastle: University of Newcastle, 
2009), http://hdl.handle.net/1959.13/919448.
63 Defined by Williamson as “durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular 
transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments is much lower in best alternative 
uses or by alternative users should the original transaction be prematurely terminated”. 
Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 55.
64 Riordan and Williamson have noted that neoclassical economics is not well suited to the 
study of specific investments and instead excels at non-specific, or re-deployable, 
investments. Riordan and Williamson, “Asset Specificity and Economic Organization,” 367.
65 Daron Acemoglu, “Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and 
Politics,” Journal of Comparative Economics 31, no. 4 (2003): 620–52.
66 Oliver E. Williamson, “Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete 
Structural Alternatives,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 1991, 269–96.
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property rights, less bilateral dependence (where possible), and a strong institutional 
environment can all aid to prevent potential maladaption costs.67
A port's governance structure is therefore determined from the set of feasible 
institutional alternatives they must choose from; or, “the arrangement that protects their
relationship-specific investments at the least cost”.68
The choice set available at a given time and place is never a choice between the 
present situation and some ideal. As Demsetz puts it, “[t]he view that now pervades 
much public policy economics implicitly presents the relevant choice as between an 
ideal norm and an existing “imperfect” institutional arrangement. This nirvana approach
differs considerably from a comparative institutional approach in which the relevant 
choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements”.69
It is because of this that efforts to “transplant” governance structures that have worked 
at a particular place at a particular time to solve problems identified at another place at 
another time tend to fail when the region has differing social and political institutions. 
The type of reform undertaken should therefore be dependent on the institutions 
present at that given time and place; and one way to discover these institutions is by 
undertaking a comparative institutional analysis through time.
It should be added that while the differing governance structures between ports is well 
documented in the port economics literature (e.g., Table 2.4), the NIE would define 
virtually all ports as having a hierarchical, as opposed to a market, governance 
structure.
67 Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (Oxford University Press, 1996), 14.
68 P.G. Klein, “New Institutional Economics,” Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 1 (2000): 
468.
69 H Demsetz, “Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint,” Journal of Law and Economics
12, no. 1 (1969): 1.
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Table 2.4: Traditional distinctions of port governance structures70
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From this transaction cost point of view, all ports would be considered to be on the 
hierarchical end of the spectrum as opposed to the market end, with the market end 
resembling something like a pure anonymous spot market. That is because port assets
are extremely relationship-specific, in that it is generally more efficient for investment 
decisions to be made internally, i.e., within a single or small number of firms, as 
opposed to on the open market. Such a hierarchical structure offers the port greater 
protection for their investments but comes with additional agency and bureaucracy 
costs. The optimal governance structure is therefore a 'hybrid' that minimises 
transaction costs within a given institutional matrix, not some theoretical ideal. Differing 
institutions will lead to different governance structures between two ports that are 
otherwise similar. The institutional matrix will also shape the industry as a whole; some 
ports may not come into existence due to institutional constraints while others may 
grow beyond what they otherwise would have.
Ports have never been organised as pure markets for the same reason Coase noticed 
firms existed: positive transaction costs.71 There are multiple solutions to a given 
70 World Bank, Port Reform Toolkit (The World Bank, 2003), 11, 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/0-8213-5046-3.
71 Coase, “The Nature of the Firm.”
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problem (one of which is to do nothing) that differ depending on the institutional 
environment the port operates within. The problems ports face as highly specific 
assets, as Williamson noted, is one of transacting where long-term or relational 
contracting is involved.72
The World Bank in their Port Reform Toolkit emphasise that when looking to improve 
port efficiency one of the first steps policy makers should take is to examine the 
present governance structure.73 The toolkit instructs the reader that there are four 
governance choices for ports: the service port; the tool port; the landlord port; and the 
private port.
While this is all correct, it ignores institutional constraints between these choices. For 
example, a government that cannot credibly commit not to expropriate rents ex post will
struggle to find private capital for a private or landlord port. In that institutional 
environment, the options would be restricted to the public service, tool port and 
potentially landlord governance options, but the successful implementation or 
'transplantation' of any model would still require further study. Attempts at establishing 
a private port in such an environment would likely fail, not necessarily in the sense that 
the port will fail (at least not in the short run), but in the sense that society will face 
costs above what an alternative model would have offered.
The lesson of the NIE is that societies that provide incentives and opportunities for 
investment will, ceteris paribus, be richer than those that fail to do so.74 The purpose is 
to tackle the questions that neoclassical economics assumes as given; the “big picture 
as it seeks to understand the determinants of institutions and make policy 
72 Oliver E. Williamson, “The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach,” 
American Journal of Sociology 87, no. 3 (November 1, 1981): 548–77.
73 World Bank, Port Reform Toolkit.
74 Douglass C North, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973); Douglass C North and Barry R. Weingast, 
“Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 
Seventeenth-Century England,” The Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4 (1989): 803–32; 
Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social 
Rigidities.
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recommendations about changing them”.75 Everyday issues such as how port charges 
are clearing the shipping market; how differing shippers, hinterland operators or 
stevedores impact on port congestion; on how a port influences the prosperity of the 
local economy; and the environmental costs of the port are well handled by 
neoclassical economics. Centred on aspects of a port within a given set of legal and 
behavioural constraints, these are relatively short run issues best dealt with 
neoclassical models that can provide an idea of what the optimal performance within 
existing institutional constraints could be. While those issues are very important, they 
are not the whole story.
Important to the NIE framework is the period being examined. Institutions are not 
perfectly malleable in the short run. Institutional changes such as property right 
allocations and legal institutions – especially in a democracy – take longer to be 
implemented because they have distributional consequences; that is, they are rarely 
Pareto optimal and many different interest groups are affected. For example, changes 
to the transportation planning machinery that allows government to take land and 
decree how other land may be used takes time and impacts a port as well as outsiders.
Constitutional constraints take even more time to modify and have an effect on an even
wider group of people. Thus, the NIE investigates interactions across a range of 
interrelated markets over time, appreciating that examining them in isolation is unlikely 
to produce meaningful results.
Port reform depends on the institutions involved, e.g., constitutional constraints, the 
legal system and reliability of the courts (ability to reliably enforce contracts), the 
relative power of different levels of government, and the extent that stakeholders must 
be consulted. Sometimes devising second-best reforms may be the only option given a
particular institutional matrix that a port operates within, if changing the institutional 
environment to reach a desired governance structure is not possible or will incur too 
75 W Easterly, “Institutions: Top down or Bottom Up?,” The American Economic Review 98, 
no. 2 (2008): 95.
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many costs in the process. Often doing nothing may be the appropriate strategy until 
institutional reform can occur.
2.4.1 What is an efficient port? 
For the purpose of this thesis, efficiency will be defined in micro-economic terms: that 
is, efficiency is the ideal distribution of resources in the economy where land, labour, 
capital and enterprise are perfectly allocated amongst the various wants of individuals 
in the real world.76 Knowledge problems, transaction costs, boundedly rational actors, 
uncertainty, asymmetric information, moral hazard, opportunism and monitoring costs 
all play a part.
For something as complex as a port it is not sufficient to derive policy conclusions 
using only static benchmarks on complex, evolving systems where the valuation of 
diverse inputs and outputs is not clearly understood and where interpersonal utility 
comparisons must be made. As North has argued, a purely static analysis is almost 
certain to result in “policy prescriptions that produce results at odds with intentions 
because policy derived from static theory in a dynamic setting is going to produce 
unanticipated (and unpleasant) outcomes”.77
This is because a static approach to measuring the efficiency of a seaport by definition 
ignores the dynamic component of economic efficiency and the potential costs certain 
institutional arrangements may have in terms of (largely unseen) foregone 
arrangements. Dynamic efficiency, which is the efficiency required for any seaport to 
effectively respond or adapt to exogenous events, must be included in any meaningful 
analysis.78 North uses a similar term – adaptive efficiency79 – and defined it as being:
76 Demsetz, “Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint”; E.C. Pasour Jr, “Economic 
Efficiency: Touchstone or Mirage?,” The Intercollegiate Review 17, no. 1 (1981): 33–36.
77 Douglass C North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, vol. 7 (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 80.
78 J.H. de Soto, The Theory of Dynamic Efficiency (Taylor & Francis, 2008).
79 The term adaptive efficiency rather than dynamic efficiency will be used throughout the rest 
of this thesis. Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’; Kirznerian ‘entrepreneurial discovery’; 
and Hayekian ‘knowledge problems’ will be included. It is only by first having institutions 
conducive to adaptive efficiency that these other processes are able to occur. Hayek, “The 
Use of Knowledge in Society”; Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and 
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“[C]oncerned with the kinds of rules that shape the way an economy evolves 
through time. It is also concerned with the willingness of a society to acquire 
knowledge and learning, to induce innovation, to undertake risk and creative 
activity of all sorts, as well as to resolve problems and bottlenecks of the 
society through time.
In a world of uncertainty, no one knows the correct answer to the problems that 
we confront and no one therefore can, in effect, maximize profits. The society 
that permits the maximum generation of trials will be most likely to solve 
problems through time… Adaptive efficiency, therefore, provides the incentives 
to encourage the development of decentralized decision-making processes that
will allow societies to maximize the efforts required to explore alternative ways 
of solving problems.”80
To further clarify the difference between dynamic or adaptive and static efficiency, note 
that from the perspective of a static lens, a negative path dependent outcome may 
appear on the surface to be efficient. That is, an outcome where a seaport or 
stakeholders within a seaport, due to a number of institutions that evolved in the past 
(for legitimate reasons at the time), fight socially productive institutional change by 
allocating resources to the political rather than economic market as their existence 
depends on the perpetuation of existing institutions.81 This self-reinforcing path 
continues until another 'trigger point' occurs, itself often the result of a number of 
smaller events, forcing the path to change.82 But they are only efficient within a given 
institutional matrix; great efficiency improvements could still be made through 
institutional change.
Democracy, 5th ed. (Harper & Row, New York, 1976); I.M. Kirzner, Competition and 
Entrepreneurship (University of Chicago Press, 1978).
80 North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, 80–81.
81 For more on how path dependency relates to the selection of institutions, see North, 
“Institutions.”
82 James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society 29, no. 4 
(2000): 507–48.
32
This is not hard to understand when it is remembered that the key to the survival of any
organisation is to improve their efficiency (i.e., lowering production and transaction 
costs while boosting revenue) relative to that of their rivals. However, if you take a 
situation where there exists for instance a secure monopoly or oligopoly – an 
institutional situation created because, rightly or wrongly, it was desired at some point 
in the past – competition is muted and actors simply do not have to improve to 
survive.83 Competition and rent-seeking will still manifest themselves, but they will do 
so in a socially unproductive way.84
If appropriate price comparisons are not available, then static analysis must rely on 
other aggregates such as profit; however as Sowell observed, even a “small 
inefficiency can raise the price of a good by much more than the doubling of the profit 
rate would”; meaning that the costs to society of these sub optimal institutions might be
seriously underestimated when following a purely static methodology.85 Profit, which 
according to Alchian is an essential tool for entrepreneurs to test potential business 
plans, can lose effectiveness as a barometer for efficiency under static analysis.86
To meet these challenges, this dissertation analyses the temporal dynamics of each 
case study, allowing for the examination of important changes in investment strategies 
and governance structures used at each port over time. In the path dependency 
literature, these changes are usually triggered by a set of events, i.e., exogenous 
events as well as shifts in the behaviour of various stakeholders and actors in a 
83 If there are no barriers to entry – if the market is perfectly “contestable” – then large capital 
costs cannot be considered a barrier but a cost of entry that existing firms have already 
borne. Only costs above this are considered barriers to entry (e.g., discriminatory regulatory
barriers). As Brozen has pointed out, the cost may actually be lower for potential entrants 
as technological improvements would have likely reduced the capital required per unit of 
capacity. W J Baumol, “Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry 
Structure,” American Economic Review 72, no. 1 (1982): 1–15; Yale Brozen, “Competition 
Policy in Europe: Stimulus, Nuisance, or Drawback? Comment by Yale Brozen,” in 
Economic Policy and the Market Process, ed. K. Groenveld, J.A.H. Maks, and J. Muysken 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1986), 143.
84 William J. Baumol, “Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive,” Journal 
of Political Economy 98, no. 5 (1990): 893–921.
85 T. Sowell, Knowledge and Decisions (Basic Books (AZ), 1996), 198.
86 A.A. Alchian, “Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory,” The Journal of Political 
Economy 58, no. 3 (1950): 211–21.
33
position of power to implement change.87 A diagram is developed for each case study 
in the following format, where key events in time are marked as critical for the 
beginning or break of a path dependent outcome. Particular events such as a new 
technology or political decisions can trigger a positive or negative 'lock-in' (e.g., “Event 
A”) where a port continue to move down a path (e.g., “Path A”) that, had the event not 
occurred, it might not have (e.g., “Path B” or “Path C”). This can have long term 
repercussions, as lock-in might prevent subsequent deviations as well (e.g., B to B2).
Figure 2.1: Theoretical Path Dependence Diagram
Once lock-in occurs, a port may be stuck on that path until another event happens that 
breaks that path (e.g., “Event A” breaking “Path A”), even if a different path is 
technically more efficient.88
87 Liebowitz and Margolis, “Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History”; Paul Pierson, 
“Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political 
Science Review, 2000, 251–67; Paul Pierson, “The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional
Origins and Change,” Governance 13, no. 4 (2000): 475–99; Engerman and Sokoloff, 
“Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World 
Economics”; K. Hoff, “Paths of Institutional Development: A View from Economic History,” 
The World Bank Research Observer 18, no. 2 (December 2003): 205–26; Adrian Kay, “A 
Critique of the Use of Path Dependency in Policy Studies,” Public Administration 83, no. 3 
(2005): 553–71.
88 This is similar to the concept developed in Reveley, “Path Dependence,” 207.
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This framework loosely follows various other studies of institutional change and path 
dependency, from Liebowitz and Margolis to a number of port-related studies, such as 
Dooms et al., and their 2012 analysis of path dependency at the port of Antwerp. While 
not all of the studies that incorporate institutions focus specifically on ports – for 
example, Oakerson and Parks apply an institutional framework to local public 
economies – their methodology could be applied to port issues, e.g., Port Authorities.
The following table highlights in chronological order various studies that have included 
institutions in their analysis of ports.
Table 2.5: Condensed Institutional Port Literature Examples
Category Themes References
Institutional Analysis
Efficiency
Comparative
Governance
Organisations
Path Dependency
Privatisation
Productivity
Property Rights
Public Choice
Transaction Costs
Kagan (1990)
Rietveld and Stough(1997)
Stevens (1999)
Hall (2002)
Henisz (2002)
Reveley and Tull (2002)
Shirley (2002)
Button (2005)
Rietveld and Stough (2005)
Stough (2005)
Ubbels (2005)
Cheon (2007)
Jacobs (2007; 2007)
Sabandar (2007)
Reveley (2008)
Cheon et al. (2010)
Ng and Pallis (2010)
Oakerson and Parks (2011)
Boyce (2012)
De Langen et al. (2012)
Dooms et al. (2012)
Ng et al. (2012)
Reveley and Tull (2012)
Daamen and Vries (2013)
Root et al. (2014)
Wang (2014)
Detailed references in footnote89
89 Robert A. Kagan, “How Much Does Law Matter? Labor Law, Competition, and Waterfront 
Labor Relations in Rotterdam and US Ports,” Law and Society Review 24, no. 1 (1990): 
35–69; P. Rietveld and R.R. Stough, “Institutional Issues in Transport Systems,” Journal of 
Transport Geography 5, no. 3 (1997): 207–14; Stevens, The Institutional Position of 
Seaports; Peter Voss Hall, “The Institution of Infrastructure and the Development of Port-
Regions” (University of California, 2002); Henisz, “The Institutional Environment for 
Infrastructure Investment”; Reveley and Tull, “Centralised Port Planning”; M.M. Shirley, 
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2.5. Conclusion
“It is not sufficient to contrast the imperfect adjustments of unfettered private enterprise
with the best adjustment that economists in their studies can imagine. For we cannot 
expect that any public authority will attain, or will even whole-heartedly seek, that ideal.
Such authorities are liable alike to ignorance, to sectional pressure and to personal 
corruption by private interest." – Arthur Cecil Pigou, 192090
Institutional analysis comes to the forefront when the goal is the examination of the way
“Experience with Privatisation: A New Institutional Economics Perspective,” Journal of 
African Economies 11, no. suppl 1 (2002): 10–31; Kenneth Button, “Shipping Economics: 
Where We Are and Looking Ahead from an Institutional Economics Perspective,” Maritime 
Policy and Management 32, no. 1 (January 2005): 39–58; P. Rietveld and R.R. Stough, 
“Institutional Dimentions of Cross-Border Transport,” IATSS Research 29, no. 2 (2005): 7–
7; R.R. Stough, “Institutional Barriers to Port Infrastructure and Harbor Development,” 
IATSS Research 29, no. 2 (2005): 30–30; B Ubbels, “Institutional Barriers to Efficient Policy 
Intervention in the European Port Sector,” IATSS Research 29, no. 2 (2005): 41–41; 
SangHyun Cheon, “World Port Institutions and Productivity: Roles of Ownership, Corporate 
Structure, and Inter-Port Competition” (University of California, 2007); W Jacobs, Political 
Economy of Port Competition: Institutional Analyses of Rotterdam, Southern California and 
Dubai (Nijmegen: Academic Press Europe, 2007); Wouter Jacobs, “Port Competition 
between Los Angeles and Long Beach: An Institutional Analysis,” Tijdschrift Voor 
Economische En Sociale Geografie 98, no. 3 (2007): 360–72; W Sabandar, “Transport and 
the Rural Economy: Institutions and Institutional Change in Ambeso Village, Indonesia,” 
Asia Pacific Viewpoint 48, no. 2 (2007): 200–218; Reveley, “Path Dependence”; SangHyun 
Cheon, David E. Dowall, and Dong-Wook Song, “Evaluating Impacts of Institutional 
Reforms on Port Efficiency Changes: Ownership, Corporate Structure, and Total Factor 
Productivity Changes of World Container Ports,” Transportation Research Part E: Logistics 
and Transportation Review, Selected papers from the Second National Urban Freight 
Conference, Long Beach, California, December 2007, 46, no. 4 (July 2010): 546–61; K. Y. 
Ng and Athanasios A. Pallis, “Port Governance Reforms in Diversified Institutional 
Frameworks: Generic Solutions, Implementation Asymmetries,” Environment and Planning 
A 42, no. 9 (2010): 2147–67; R.J. Oakerson and R.B. Parks, “The Study of Local Public 
Economies: Multi-Organizational, Multi-Level Institutional Analysis and Development,” 
Policy Studies Journal 39, no. 1 (2011): 147–67; Gordon Boyce, “The Development of 
Commercial Infrastructure for World Shipping,” in The World’s Key Industry: History and 
Economics of International Shipping (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 106–23; De 
Langen, Notteboom, and Jacobs, “Institutional Plasticity and Path Dependence in Seaports:
Interactions between Institutions, Port Governance Reforms and Port Authority Routines”; 
Dooms, Verbeke, and Haezendonck, “Stakeholder Management and Path Dependence in 
Large-Scale Transport Infrastructure Development: The Port of Antwerp Case (1960--
2010)”; Adolf K.Y. Ng, Flavio Padilha, and Athanasios A. Pallis, “Institutions, Bureaucratic 
and Logistical Roles of Dry Ports: The Brazilian Experiences,” Journal of Transport 
Geography, 2012; James Reveley and Malcolm Tull, “Institutional Path Dependence in Port 
Regulation: A Comparison of New Zealand and Australia,” in The World’s Key Industry: 
History and Economics of International Shipping, ed. Gelina Harlaftis, Jesús Valdaliso, and 
Stig Tenold (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 158–79; Tom A. Daamen and Isabelle 
Vries, “Governing the European Port–city Interface: Institutional Impacts on Spatial Projects
between City and Port,” Journal of Transport Geography 27 (2013): 4–13; Haizhuang 
Wang, “Preliminary Investigation of Waterfront Redevelopment in Chinese Coastal Port 
Cities: The Case of the Eastern Dalian Port Areas,” Journal of Transport Geography, 2014.
90 Arthur Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (London: Macmillan, 1920), pt. II, ch. XX, 
sec. 4.
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formal and informal institutions along with their enforcement characteristics work 
together to ultimately determine the efficiency of an organisation. Therefore, the goal of
institutional analysis – and of this thesis – is to examine and evaluate the economic 
efficiency and distributional implications of given institutional structures over time; that 
is, to analyse the development of the organisations (agents) involved with Prince 
Rupert, Port Hedland, and Tauranga, and the various institutional arrangements that 
they exist within. By understanding the complex interdependent institutional matrix that 
a seaport functions in that we can begin to know what the appropriate suggestions to 
improving port performance should be.
As Williams noted while referencing the rush at the end of the nineteenth century to 
build deep water docks, the latest and greatest, most efficient facilities may not be the 
most economic investment.91 Context of time and place is important; there are always 
trade-offs that must be made and technical efficiency is only part of the story. The 
governance or ownership structure, the technical performance, the size and power of a 
port should be explained in the context of the institutional matrix they exist within.92
Private is not always better than public and vice versa. Privatisation of a monopoly, for 
example, may produce worse outcomes if ex post contracting hazards emerge such as 
the hold up problem. Potential hazards and a thorough cost-benefit analysis that 
uncovers as many ex post hazards as possible should be undertaken before 
attempting to alter existing governance structures. This requires an examination of the 
historical context and why the port is the way it is today before any meaningful changes
can be made. Any efficiency analysis, unless specifically mentioning its limitations, 
should include the dynamics of the institutions in which the port operates in its 
assessment.
91 David M. Williams, “Recent Trends in Maritime and Port History,” in Struggling for 
Leadership: Antwerp-Rotterdam Port Competition between 1870 –2000, ed. Erik Buyst, 
Greta Devos, and Reginald Loyen (Springer, 2002).
92 Williamson, “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” 608.
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Chapter 3: Port Hedland 1860 – 2012
A Tale of Three Booms
3.1. Introduction
This chapter utilises the framework from the preceding section to determine why 
certain activities occurred at the port of Port Hedland and how these activities shaped 
the organisational and institutional structure it operates within today, taking into 
consideration not just Port Hedland itself but also an examination of the factors beyond 
the Port that affected its development.
Illustration 3.1: Location of Port Hedland in Australia's North-West93
This includes the institutional pay-off structure that the actors who shaped the 
development of the port – both directly and indirectly – faced through time; that is, the 
incentive structure that determined what organisations come into existence – both 
public and private – and where they directed their resources (i.e., socially productive or 
93 Kurra Newman, “Pilbara Regional Map,” accessed May 30, 2014, 
http://www.kurra.com.au/index.php/pilbara-regional-map/.
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unproductive uses). The goal is less concerned with specific outcomes and more about
the structures and processes that were involved in reaching that outcome. What we 
want to know is in a situation where the ends are given, how effective were the chosen 
means – the decision making processes involved – at achieving those ends, and what 
role did institutions play in shaping these decisions? It can be argued that 
understanding the role of institutions in structuring the present situation is essential to 
have any hope of providing reliable policy advice for the future.
The chief concern of this chapter is the port of Port Hedland in the north-west of 
Western Australia. While the Port Hedland of today is the world’s largest bulk export 
port with a throughput of 246.7 million tons in the 2011-2012 financial year, this has 
only been a relatively recent development.94
Illustration 3.2: Aerial View of Port Hedland, October 201095
Most ports around the world evolve gradually, increasing or decreasing their throughput
94 Port Hedland Port Authority, Annual Report 2011/12 (Port Hedland, W.A.: Port Hedland Port
Authority, 2012), http://www.phpa.com.au/About-us/Corporate-Governance/Annual-
reports/pdf/PortHedlandPortAuthorityAReport2012FinalWeb.aspx.
95 Port Hedland Port Authority, “Photo’s of the Port and Its Surroundings,” accessed May 25, 
2014, http://phpa.com.au/About-the-Port/Photo-gallery.aspx?page=4.
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as populations increase and economies change; it is generally a steady, incremental 
process that, at least in old world areas such as the European region, has been 
ongoing for centuries.96 But not Port Hedland. Just 50 years ago, Port Hedland had 
more in common with its original name, the “Mangrove Harbour”, than anything 
resembling the world’s largest bulk export port.97 So how did the Mangrove Harbour go 
from a place for pearl luggers to shelter from the frequent storms to a bulk export 
powerhouse, able to cater to the world’s largest ships? What incentives and constraints
shaped the organisational structure and development of the port? Yes, luck in terms of 
resource endowment and the proximity of the port to those resources played a large 
part. But there are plenty of other places around the world where in spite of natural 
endowments development still fails to occur to this day. To understand how Port 
Hedland was able to eventually achieve success requires an examination of the 
institutions that shaped the incentives and constraints behind its development.
3.2. The Mangrove Harbour, 1860 – 1880
The Port Hedland of today bears little resemblance to what was dubbed the “Mangrove
Harbour” when it was discovered in April 1863 by Captain Peter Hedland, commanding 
officer of the Mystery and his Surveyor-General Charles Cooke Hunt, who decided to 
rename the harbour Port Hedland shortly afterwards.98 A natural, sheltered harbour – 
albeit with the minor inconvenience of a tidal sandbar that prevented ships from 
passing at low tides – Port Hedland was initially earmarked as a place to land sheep. 
But unfortunately for the port, Walter Padbury – a Perth-based businessman and 
pastoralist who was funding the voyage – deemed that the nearest inland water supply 
was too far away to risk driving sheep immediately after landing.99 The prospects for 
Port Hedland were further diminished the following year when the resident Magistrate 
96 For an example of how ports around the world developed and evolved see Yehuda Karmon,
Ports Around the World (New York: Crown Publishers, 1980).
97 Some accounts, such as Edwards, suggest that it was in fact called the “Mystery Harbour”. 
Hugh Edwards, Gold Dust and Iron Mountains: Marble Bar & Beyond: The Story of the 
Eastern Pilbara (Swanbourne, W.A.: H. Edwards, 1993), 65.
98 J. S. H. Le Page, Building a State: The Story of the Public Works Department of Western 
Australia 1829-1985 (Perth: Water Authority of Western Australia, 1986), 80.
99 Shaw, Moving Mountains: The Evolution of Port Hedland Harbour, 6.
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at Roebourne received a report from his surveyor Charles Wedge stating that both 
difficult landside access and limited water were a serious impediment to settlement.100
Shaw came to the conclusion that it was because of this dismal report that “Port 
Hedland languished for a further 25 years”, becoming home mostly to pearling 
‘luggers’101 until the discovery of gold at Marble Bar and Nullagine in the late 1880s 
which, when combined with Port Hedland’s favourable location and ability to cater to 
the new and relatively large steamships, saw it emerge as a potential export facility.102
3.3. Booms, Busts and Institutional Follies, 1880 – 1911
As a “settled colony” under British colonial law, the infant colony of Western Australia 
officially inherited the legal and Constitutional foundations of Britain (British common 
law) on June 1, 1829 when the Interpretation Act of Western Australia (9 Geo. V, No. 
XX, section 43) dictated that the colony “shall be deemed to have been established”. 
This saw the colony inherit the vast majority of English law and Constitutional principles
that came with it. The colony was subsequently guided by this institutional regime until 
the establishment of the Western Australian Constitution Act 1890, when Britain 
granted Western Australia the right to have its own elected government and 
constitution, eventually becoming a State within the Australian Commonwealth on 1 
January, 1901.
That the State inherited British law was very important in its response to the eventual 
gold boom and subsequent development at Port Hedland. Under British law, the owner 
of the land is entitled to all that is below it except the ‘royal metals’ of gold and silver 
which remain subject to State ownership absent a direct grant to a private party from 
the government. In Western Australia this process was relatively straight forward (for 
small-scale prospectors) and remained in place until 1982; the interested party could 
simply buy a miner’s right for a modest fee enabling him to mine unoccupied crown 
100 Hardie, Nor’westers of the Pilbara Breed.
101 A lugger was a small sailing ship with two or three masts and a lugsail on each.
102 Shaw, Moving Mountains: The Evolution of Port Hedland Harbour, 14.
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land for as long as desired provided it was being worked.
3.3.1. The Late-Nineteenth Century Gold Rush
The late nineteenth century was a very interesting point in time for Australia let alone 
pre-federation Western Australia. The discovery of gold and other metals around 
Australia led to an influx of population and capital, fuelling a mining and property boom 
that saw renewed interest in Port Hedland given its proximity to Marble Bar where the 
Pilbara gold boom was at its most intense. While Port Hedland was the closest port to 
the Pilbara mines, the government simply did not have the resources to develop it to 
facilitate a low demand for gold exports. As Spillman reported, auriferous land 
regulations for larger miners were still uncertain making it impossible to proclaim a 
goldfield.103 To compound the problem, the government did not even have official 
representation in the region until October 1886. This meant that the bulk of gold mining 
in the Pilbara during the 1880s comprised small-scale miners (often individuals) who 
generally transported any gold they found over land to avoid the colony’s Duty Upon 
Gold Act 1886 which, given the State’s inability to enforce it, likely saw the majority of 
the gold produced in the region during the boom smuggled out rather than declared 
(the Act collected the paltry sum of £27 while in operation).104 It was not until the Act 
was abolished only a year later that the State’s official gold exports began to 
increase.105
This proved costly for any hope of expansion at Port Hedland, as the combination of a 
lack of clear cut mining rights and the negative incentives to use official export 
channels in the form of regulations such as the Duty Upon Gold Act 1886 resulted in 
“diminished prospects of attracting company investment”, making the task of lobbying 
the government to upgrade port facilities or attracting private port investors rather 
103 Ken Spillman, “A Matter of Priorities: Colonial Politics and the Administration of 
Development Policies in Western Australia 1883-1902” (Murdoch University, 1995), 61.
104 Ken Spillman, A Rich Endowment: Government and Mining in Western Australia, 1829-
1994 (Perth: University of Western Australia Press, 1993), 54.
105 Harry Page Woodward, Mining Handbook to the Colony of Western Australia (Perth, W.A.: 
R. Pether, Government Printer, 1894), 61.
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difficult.106
Regardless, the gold boom would prove to be short-lived with the large inflows of 
British capital which had driven the expansion eventually drying up in the face of rising 
interest rates and restrictions on real estate speculation.107
Figure 3.1: Australia's Terms of Trade, 1880 – 1910108
Interestingly, the ensuing crisis would have far reaching ramifications leading to a 
gradual shift in the colony’s and later the State’s institutional environment that, as we 
will discover, indirectly helped shape the way Port Hedland and its organisational 
structure evolved into its modern form.
The reason a seemingly unrelated incident largely isolated to the capital cities can 
affect something as apparently different as Port Hedland is because the boom in the 
late 19th century was in fact not isolated to real estate speculators and British investors;
it had also seen a massive rise in the number of smaller financial institutions such as 
building societies and the establishment of government-controlled ‘savings’ banks 
106 Spillman, “A Matter of Priorities: Colonial Politics and the Administration of Development 
Policies in Western Australia 1883-1902,” 68.
107 Ernest Arthur Boehm, Prosperity and Depression in Australia, 1887-1897 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971), 271.
108 Author's calculations based on data in Susan Bambrick, “Australia’s Long-Run Terms of 
Trade,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 19, no. 1 (1970): 5.
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(operating through post offices) which allowed governments to reduce the “recurrent 
financial crises” they faced at the time, providing them with a “steady flow of funds at 
moderate rates of interest, not as subject to parliamentary supervision as conventional 
public borrowing”.109
While this phenomenon was largely isolated to the Eastern colonies, savings banks did
begin to appear in Western Australia from 1863, with their numbers reaching 14 by 
1971 when all post offices in Australia (excluding Tasmania which had yet to implement
an already-approved Act) were used for savings bank purposes.
The introduction of savings banks in Western Australia was achieved because the 
colonial government between 1850 and 1890 was, according to Black, effectively 
operating an almost dictatorial system of government where the colonial Governor 
could single-handedly suspend or remove members of the Legislative Council and 
withhold assent from any bills passed in the Legislative Council.110 
The colonial Western Australian government, now unshackled from its prior 
constitutional constraints inherited from Britain, bypassed the usual channels of 
approval to assume a direct role in the advance of certain industries in the colony. In 
1863 Western Australia became the first Australian colony to use post offices as 
savings banks when the Governor passed an Act establishing the Western Australian 
Post Office Savings Bank, operating through post offices with deposits to be used for 
ordinary expenditure of the colonial government or to invest in government securities 
(of which there were none until 1894).
While nothing significant came of the Bank before responsible government arrived in 
1890 – the British Treasury maintained watch over the colony’s finances up to that 
point (the same cannot be said for the Eastern States) – the entry of the State into the 
109 Sydney James Butlin, The Australian Monetary System 1851 to 1914 (Ambassador P., 
1986), 69.
110 David Black, “Politics and Government,” in Historical Encyclopedia of Western Australia, ed.
Jan Gothard and Jenny Gregory (Perth: University of Western Australia Press, 2009), 707.
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banking industry would prove to have some unforeseen consequences.
The first changes began only a year after John Forrest became the first elected 
Governor of Western Australia in 1890, which saw the establishment of the Loan Act 
1891 (allowing loans for colonial and later State infrastructure spending) and with it an 
increase in the colony’s debt from £1,367,444 in 1890 to £3,417,339 in 1894, 
committing “the government to a dominant role in economic development”, with Forrest
“keenly aware that he was fostering a pragmatic type of State socialism – a socialisme 
sans doctrines”.111 Forrest was eager to make the most of the revenue flowing from the 
gold mines (indeed, he borrowed against it) which saw the advent of the first land 
policies, State-owned railways, water supplies (such as the 330-mile Mundaring to 
Kalgoorlie pipeline) as well as the opening of Western Australia's Agricultural Bank in 
1894 to provide subsidised capital to farmers.112 He was a firm believer in the idea of 
'build it and they will come', stating that it was the government's duty to “not sit and wait
for traffic, but to create traffic”.113 This was at odds with the State's Engineer-in-Chief, C.
Y. O'Connor, who believed the opposite but was a lone voice in a State where the 
“entrenched ascendancy” was an “old-boy network” used to receiving preferential 
treatment in the affairs of government.114
Back in the Pilbara, the lack of demand for improved facilities at Port Hedland until the 
late 1890s was understandable given there was virtually no incentive to use it for gold 
exports. It was not until the larger miners arrived following the 1886 Goldfields Act that 
interest groups keen to see development at the port began to appear. At the time, a key
motivation for infrastructure development (including ports) in Western Australia was the
advice – or pressure – from prominent businessmen to the government.115 The 
111 Spillman, “A Matter of Priorities: Colonial Politics and the Administration of Development 
Policies in Western Australia 1883-1902,” 86–113.
112 Black, “Politics and Government.”
113 Anthony G. Evans, C.Y. O’Connor: His Life and Legacy (University of Western Australia 
Press, 2001), 120.
114 Ibid.
115 Barrie Dyster and David Meredith, Australia in the Global Economy: Continuity and Change,
1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 59.
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interwoven relationship between government and business was exemplified by the 
number of legislators that held business interests: out of the 400 members between 
1870 and 1930, three quarters “held business interests of some form”.116
Port Hedland was subjected to the same institutional constraints that incentivised the 
use of political markets to achieve certain goals and so following demand from local 
businessmen the future town site of Port Hedland was investigated, the deciding factor 
being a report from R.H. Downes, the District Engineer at nearby Cossack, who agreed
with the businessmen and recommended that a survey be conducted of the sandy 
headland fronting the inner harbour. The result was the eventual gazetting of Port 
Hedland as a town on October 22, 1896.117
Reports in local papers reveal that as early as October 1892 the shareholders in 
companies holding mining claims and leases at nearby Marble Bar were conducting 
their own inspections at Port Hedland. As one correspondent pleaded in the Western 
Mail four years prior to the gazetting, “the whole of the work necessary could be done, 
including the making of a proper harbour with accommodation for a steamer to come 
alongside, at a cost of not more than £5,000”.118 Whether or not this figure was 
accurate for the proposed works – it equates to approximately £500,000 in 2012 
currency – it does show that the actors interested in seeing the port grow were making 
their voices heard.119 Indeed, the view at the time was that Port Hedland was the only 
port in the North West where ships could discharge without the use of lighters and was 
safe and large enough for steamers to navigate.120
In response, the State government eventually commissioned the construction of a jetty 
and an 8km causeway inland over the mangroves in 1896, fully completed three years 
116 Roy Lourens, “1829-1901,” in A History of Commerce and Industry in Western Australia, by 
Peter C. Firkins (Perth, W.A.: University of Western Australia Press, 1979), 2.
117 Shaw, Moving Mountains: The Evolution of Port Hedland Harbour, 15.
118 “THE NOR’.-WEST GOLDFIELD,” Western Mail, October 15, 1892, 31.
119 Grahame Allen, Louise Goulding, and Jim O’Donoghue, Consumer Price Inflation since 
1750 (Great Britain: Office for National Statistics, 2004).
120 “MINING NEWS,” The West Australian, August 20, 1895, 6; “THE NOR WEST 
GOLDFIELDS,” Western Mail, August 23, 1895, 9.
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later in 1899 for the purpose of exporting not just the recently discovered gold but also 
tin and livestock.
Illustration 3.3: SS Albany at the Port Hedland Jetty, October 1898121
The project (including the causeway) cost the government £13,500, funded wholly 
through new borrowings.122 Initially the primary exports were tin to Singapore and 
livestock to the South of Western Australia with the first shipment of gold bullion 
occurring in 1900, well after the Pilbara gold rush had ended.123
However, locals at Port Hedland felt that one jetty was not enough and so following the 
announcement of the first jetty, the miners at Marble Bar and businesses in the Port 
121 “PORT HEDLAND JETTY. A USEFUL WORK.,” Western Mail, October 21, 1898, 29.
122 “RE-APPROPRIATION OF LOAN MONEYS,” The West Australian, August 24, 1898, 3; 
“Reappropriation of Loan Moneys,” Albany Advertiser, August 27, 1898, 3; “LOAN 
ESTIMATES,” The Inquirer and Commercial News, October 21, 1898, 14.
123 The population at Marble Bar peaked at somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 in 1886 
only to plummet to 600 by 1887 and 311 by 1901. Malcolm Fraser, Western Australian 
Year-Book 1902-04 (Perth: Perth, 1906), 437; P.E. Playford, “The Kimberley Gold Rush of 
1885-86,” 2004, 35. The Government was so late to the party that by the time the 
Goldfields Act 1886 became operative – the Act that established some form of mineral 
rights in the region – the State’s “only goldfield was in decline”. Spillman, “A Matter of 
Priorities: Colonial Politics and the Administration of Development Policies in Western 
Australia 1883-1902,” 67.
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Hedland Township continued to lobby the government for both a second jetty and 
railway between the two towns.124
While there was a delay of at least five years the residents of Port Hedland and the 
miners at Marble Bar were eventually successful. Both a new jetty and a railway were 
commissioned by the government in 1907, the jetty completed in 1909 (as construction 
was postponed for a year on funding concerns) for between £10,000 – £11,000 and the
115 mile railway on July 15 1911, at a cost of £300,000 (the initial estimate was 
£215,000).125 Despite optimism that the “iron horse had taken with it prosperity almost 
everywhere it had gone”, and that Mr. Daglish, the Minister for Works, hoped “it would 
impart new energy, vigour, and life to the pastoral and mining industries of the Pilbarra 
district”, it was not to be.126
Unfortunately for the government this investment proved to be ill fated, with the railway 
remaining in service until 1951 having never earned a profit in its 40 years of existence.
The fact was that gold mining at Marble Bar had become increasingly expensive with 
both the price of gold falling and input costs rising before the railway was even 
announced, making the railway a costly mistake for the State. While locals still 
supported the construction of the railway at the time, there were warnings abound, with
even advocates of the railway acknowledging that:
“Those who can recollect the inception of the agitation and its progress for the 
succeeding five years, will bear out the assertion that justification for 
constructing this railway appeared greater then than now.” 127
Meanwhile, gold mining had rapidly grown into the colony’s leading export – increasing 
from 14.4% in 1891 to 79.3% in 1901 – but that is where it ended as the value of gold 
124 P.J.H., “THE PILBARRA REGION—ITS PASTORAL LANDS,” Western Mail, June 28, 1902.
125 “PORT HEDLAND REQUIREMENTS,” The West Australian, February 21, 1908, 5; “PORT 
HEDLAND REQUIREMENTS,” Western Mail, February 29, 1908, 19; “WEST AUSTRALIA,”
Geraldton Guardian, July 18, 1911, 4; “VIGILANS ET AUDAX,” The West Australian, July 
19, 1910, 4.
126 “RAILWAY EXPANSION,” The West Australian, July 17, 1911, 7.
127 “THE PILBARRA RAILWAY,” Northern Times, September 7, 1907, 2.
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production in the region began to decline after that, falling from £8,770,729 to 
£6,246,848 from 1903 to 1910, a decline of over 40% – and that was a year before the 
railway was to even open.128
Figure 3.2: Value of Gold Production (£Millions), 1901 – 1913129
Following the completion of the railway in 1911 the amount of gold being mined in the 
region continued to stagnate and not much changed at Port Hedland during the 
railway’s entire 40 year life.130
The Pilbara gold boom and bust had a massive impact on the Western Australian 
mining industry, with the number of companies registered in the State declining from 
780 in December 1896 to 140 in December 1901; but more importantly in a dynamic 
world, institutions in one area – especially at the State or national level where actions 
affect the decision making process of the entire nation – can and often do have an 
impact, or unforeseen consequences, anywhere.131
128 “THE MINING INDUSTRY,” Western Mail, July 29, 1911, 32; R.T. Appleyard, Western 
Australia: Economic and Demographic Growth 1850-1914, ed. T: A New History of Western 
Australia in Stannage (pp. 211-236, 1981).
129 Australia, Year Book Australia, No. 1 - No. 7 (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics), 
accessed June 16, 2013, 
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The increased government involvement in the State’s economic activities would prove 
to indirectly shape Port Hedland’s future. For despite the before-mentioned increase in 
spending on public works, the resource-rich Pilbara region had been largely neglected. 
Adding to the problems faced in the North was that the government’s agents in the 
region were powerless to respond to local needs; for example, every mining warden 
had their own advance account to spend on local needs but none was authorised to 
spend funds without direct ministerial approval. Finally, Port Hedland and the Pilbara 
suffered because all decisions affecting transport infrastructure provision (railways, 
roads and ports) were made by the Perth-based Public Works Department which 
struggled to meet the growing demands of the Perth region, let alone the Pilbara’s 
mining industry.132 In just one example of mismanagement, of the £165,000 (plus an 
additional £15,000 specifically for the Pilbara region) that had been allocated by the 
government to the goldfields over five years from 1891, £160,553 had been spent 
within four years, with £27,443 spent on maintaining just one 186km road between 
Southern Cross and Coolgardie.133
While the inflexibility and general unresponsiveness of the colonial and State 
governments to the transport demands of the Pilbara certainly stifled development, we 
must look to the more significant issue of the hold-up problem as described in the 
previous chapter.134 For even if private developers wanted to invest in Port Hedland (at 
this stage they were still prohibited by law but the government could have changed 
that), the “Forrest Government’s commitment to investment interests” – namely, 
132 This has been an issue throughout the history of the North-West. As J. J. Holmes, M.L.C., 
noted, Western Australia occupies a third of all of Australia but in 1938 had just 1/15th of 
the population. Therefore, “it was unreasonable to suppose that Western Australia with its 
limited financial resources could ever hope to fully develop the northern portion of the 
State”. J. J. Holmes, “NORTH OF THE STATE,” The West Australian, January 19, 1938, 20.
133 Spillman, “A Matter of Priorities: Colonial Politics and the Administration of Development 
Policies in Western Australia 1883-1902,” 121–133.
134 In 1934 the problems discussed here were still apparent, with people claiming “we cannot 
get things done”, as there is a “lack of cohesion” and a “lack of power” when officials are 
contacted, the proposed solution being the establishment of independent northern states. 
“How could an Empire wage a war in a number of theatres without delegating authority to a 
number of generals?” “NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT,” The West Australian, January 9, 
1934, 4.
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politically connected interests – meant that it would be hard for it to credibly commit not
to extract rents from a project with a high amount of asset specificity (large, location-
specific investments) such as a port.135
As Mossenson remarked, the Forrest Government was committed to “the wholesale 
granting of exemptions and the ministerial interference which applied in such cases”; in
other words, the institutional environment was one in which the government could 
ignore existing rights and intervene where it saw fit, creating a kind of uncertain risk 
profile that any business without the necessary ministerial connections would be 
frightened of.136
This evidence is in line with the transactional cost theory of public ownership discussed
in the previous chapter (as opposed to regulation-based or public interest arguments): 
given the incentives for opportunism in long-term, or relational, contracts, the State was
unable to credibly pre-commit to not expropriate value once investments were 
undertaken and so investors (there was no shortage of British capital at the time), 
acting rationally, reduced (or never undertook) investment in the region accordingly. 
The government was then able to, by necessity but of its own creation, use this as a 
pretext for controlling investment in the region.
Once the hold-up problem starts, credibility is lost and investment can stagnate for 
decades; and it is only possible because “infirmities in the institutional environment 
enabled governments to exploit opportunistically the sunk investment costs of franchise
operators, ultimately leading to a general contractual failure that resulted in a form of 
vertical integration that linked consumers and suppliers, namely high levels of State 
ownership of such assets”.137
135 Spillman, “A Matter of Priorities: Colonial Politics and the Administration of Development 
Policies in Western Australia 1883-1902,” 138; Oliver E. Williamson, “Credible 
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange,” The American Economic Review, 
1983, 519–40.
136 D Mossenson, “Mining Regulations and Alluvial Disputes, 1894-1904,” University Studies in
History and Economics 2, no. 3 (1955): 11.
137 R. Daniels and M. Trebilcock, “Private Provision of Public Infrastructure: An Organizational 
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Although there were moves throughout the Forrest administration to ensure the 
continuation of prior policy, where “the Colony is recognised throughout the world as 
one of the most important fields of investment, by capitalists, not only in the mother 
country, but of almost every civilised nation”, this short-term, informal policy was limited
to mining.138
While this was a positive step, the administration had altered the institutional structure 
into one where, given the discretionary powers that had been gradually ‘unlocked’ since
1850 and were being exploited by the Forrest government to achieve its goals of a 
great agricultural society, could easily be used for other less facilitative purposes in the 
future, such as a further “progression toward the interventionism which characterised 
agricultural policy”.139 Indeed as Forrest’s biographer declared, he was “extraordinarily 
lucky”, to have the unprecedented opportunities to intervene in economic affairs. But 
what he may not have realised was that he had altered the State’s institutions, and 
future governments would be more than happy to expand upon the trend he had set.140
3.4. Scaddan’s socialisme sans doctrines (State Socialism), 1911 – 1918
The election of John Scaddan’s Australian Labor Party (ALP) government in Western 
Australia in October 1911 saw the arrival of a government eager to act on the 
opportunity that the changes in Western Australia’s institutions had enabled. The 
institutional structure had shifted further towards one that allowed for a stronger and 
more active, hands-on State. Nations around the world were experimenting with 
different forms of socialism and Australia was no different. Expanding the work of 
preceding governments, the 35-year-old Scaddan introduced a more extreme spell of 
State socialism utilising a more “efficient” way to expand, this time by exploiting a 
loophole in the constitution to use executive action when parliament was not sitting, 
(1996): 414–415.
138 Department of Mines, Report for the Year 1896 (PP 8/1897, 1896), 13.
139 Spillman, “A Matter of Priorities: Colonial Politics and the Administration of Development 
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bypassing the State’s Liberal-dominated Legislative Council to undertake public 
investments and increase State borrowing.141 Financed by debt – the Scaddan 
government in 5 years increased debt by more than the previous 13 years combined – 
it controversially established various State-owned enterprises and nationalised several 
private ones.142 In one such example, the government used funds from the Loan 
Suspense Account without prior approval to establish the State Shipping Service (SSS,
initially four vessels) in 1912 to counter an alleged ‘meat ring’ in the north.143 The 
government also commenced the purchase of the privately owned and operated 
tramways, bus services and Swan river ferry in the Perth metropolitan area, shortly 
followed by the establishment of various dairy farms, sawmills, hotels, quarries, 
brickworks, abattoirs and butcheries. According one account, the “speed and extent of 
the government’s entry into the world of business and commerce was something quite 
new”.144
How did this affect Port Hedland? The structure of property rights in an economy 
shapes the incentives actors face when looking to capture rents by creating wealth – 
such as by investing in capital goods – or through transfers – such as by lobbying the 
government.
When the businesses in Port Hedland and miners at Marble Bar sought a railway 
connecting the two in the early 20th century the incentives they faced encouraged the 
use of political markets; the pay-offs were greater for them to lobby the government to 
construct the railway rather than to construct and maintain it themselves and so they 
141 J.R. Robertson, “The Foundations of State Socialism in Western Australia: 1911--16,” 
Australian Historical Studies 10, no. 39 (1962): 311.
142 Such as the London-owned tramway system for £475,000 and the South Perth ferry service
owned by Joseph Charles. Ted Joll, “1901-1930,” in A History of Commerce and Industry in 
Western Australia, by Peter C. Firkins (Perth, W.A.: University of Western Australia Press, 
1979), 56.
143 The Loan Expense Account was to be used for “advances to public officers… and to pay 
expenses of an unforseen nature”. Robertson, “The Foundations of State Socialism in 
Western Australia: 1911--16,” 311. The loophole was thus interpreting this statement to be 
one that legally justified Scaddan’s spending for the establishment of several State trading 
concerns.
144 T Stannage, A New History of Western Australia (Intl Specialized Book Service Inc, 1981), 
383.
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did.145 Likewise with the SSS: the service was the brainchild of lobbyists in the 
Kimberley who petitioned the Premier of the day to establish a “State boat between 
Fremantle and Wyndham… by running in the interests of the people, and not of the 
private company would do much to induce settlers to come to this portion of the State”. 
While this was not acted on immediately, the opportunity was not missed by the 
incoming Scaddan government who in May of 1912 established the SSS to “provide a 
regular schedule of calls at the isolated outposts of the State from Fremantle north to 
Wyndham and south to Eucla”.146
Like most State trading concerns at the time the SSS lost money every year it was in 
operation, losing on average an amount equal to almost 50% of expenditures per 
annum, operating only in the “public interest”.147 While there are reports that some 
consumers benefited from this and other State owned enterprises, most agree that a 
combination of “amateurish” management and poor accounting and quality control 
mean the State Ships project was a failure up until 1995 when it was finally sold to 
private interests by the Court government, long after the original justification for its 
existence had expired (there were ample road freight options long before 1995 as well 
as a more competitive private shipping industry).148 The life of the SSS, if anything, 
shows how difficult it is to unwind policy once it is entrenched, where powerful interest 
groups fight for its continuation at the expense of the voting population who are to the 
contrary a dispersed, disorganised group.
This is in line with the insights of Olson discussed in Chapter 2, where over time 
entrenched interest groups working to secure a bigger piece of society’s pie results in 
the ossification of society’s institutions to a point where it has a noticeable effect on 
145 In fact, at the time neither was legally able to construct it themselves; the Public Works Act 
1902 had officially delegated all responsibility for railway construction and ownership to the 
Crown.
146 A.M. Stephens, The Stateships Story: 1912-1977 (Western Australian State Shipping 
Service, 1970), 10–11.
147 A Kerr, Australia’s North-West (University of Western Australia Press, 1975), 286.
148 G.C. Bolton, Land of Vision and Mirage: Western Australia Since 1826 (University of 
Western Australia Press, 2008), 101.
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economic growth.149 This path-dependent outcome is broken when a “trigger” event 
(e.g. economic stagnation) brings about an institutional shift and transition in regulatory
and governance regimes. While technological and ideological reasons are also partially
responsible, they fail to account for the major shifts seen here. For example, while 
Scaddan’s ideology certainly shaped the direction in which his government moved the 
State’s institutions, he only garnished support because voters were frustrated with the 
previous regime (Olsen’s theory does not discriminate; both regime shifts – whether 
from market-oriented to statist, or vice versa – can occur). The technological 
explanation also fails to fully account for institutional shifts: transportation technology 
had changed dramatically well before the SSS was abolished to a point where it had 
long outlived its original purpose, yet it persisted.
Thus we can see that the transactional cost theory is the most viable explanation for 
the ownership structure at Port Hedland. For property rights to come into existence and
be credible – the government is the sole supplier of property rights in a nation – the 
potential rents of that property must be high enough so that side payments to actors in 
a position of power can be made to bring about a change. The fact that there were 
seemingly no attempts by private parties to develop Port Hedland prior to 1960 
indicates that the potential rents (profit potential) were insufficient to justify such pay-
offs; it was cheaper to use existing government ports and use the system of political 
rather than market allocation to achieve desired ends. Once again, this stems from 
both the inability of the State to credibly commit to long-term relational agreements and
a lack of demand and thus profit opportunities required to change this.
The accelerating trend towards heavier government involvement in the economy during
the Scaddan government contributed to a continuation and even an increase in the 
hold-up problem until after the Second World War. Private infrastructure investment will
not occur when the pay-offs are greater – even if it means lower efficiency and 
149 Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social 
Rigidities.
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therefore social wealth – to lobby the government for infrastructure funding. It was 
easier to capture rents by lobbying the State to fund large infrastructure projects than it 
was to alter the institutional structure and raise capital for private investment. Going 
forward, government investment in Port Hedland was the only option that remained. A 
difficult-to-break path dependent outcome had been set in motion where future 
generations inherit “the artificial structure – the institutions, beliefs, tools, techniques, 
external symbol storage systems – from the past”.150
3.5. The “Cinderella Section” of Western Australia, 1918 – 1938151
The period between the end of the First World War but prior to the Second World War 
saw an increase in political interest in the Pilbara primarily for defensive reasons along 
with a general vibe of dissent towards the Commonwealth; indeed, Western Australia 
voted to secede in 1933, although constitutional issues prevented it from being 
enforced.
A major talking point in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s – perhaps due to an 
increase in the price of gold – was how best to develop the Pilbara.152 While Port 
Hedland does not receive much of a mention, it certainly would have been impacted in 
one way or another by the outcome of the debate, given that its future depended on the
government’s decisions. As early as August 1926, a letter from the Prime Minister 
Stanley Bruce indicated the willingness of the Commonwealth to take over all of 
Western Australia north of the 26th parallel, assuming liability for the struggling Western 
Australian State government’s loan debt of £2.7 million in that territory. Two months 
later the State Cabinet rejected the proposal, suggesting instead that the 
Commonwealth take over all territory north of the 20th parallel as well as allocate a 
minimum sum of money per annum to develop the region, in a similar deal that had 
150 North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, 7:156.
151 This is a take on the fact that Western Australia has often been referred to as the 
“Cinderella State”, a story of rags to riches as a result of the repeated mining booms and 
busts. Brian de Garis, “Cinderella State,” in Historical Encyclopedia of Western Australia, 
ed. Jan Gothard and Jenny Gregory (Perth: University of Western Australia Press, 2009).
152 “NEEDS OF THE NORTH-WEST,” Northern Times, August 30, 1933, 6.
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previously been promised to South Australia when the Commonwealth took over the 
Northern Territory in 1911. This amended proposal was declined.
The North West debate continued in the press until the Second World War with not 
much resolved. The Western Australian government (and most of the opinion in the 
papers) would not believe that the Commonwealth government was seriously 
interested in developing the North, having sensationally failed in the Northern Territory, 
and perceived that the offer was nothing more than a ploy to prevent the secession of 
Western Australia.153 154 A lengthy letter to the Western Australian Premier Peter Collier 
in 1933 titled The Empty North. Federal Proposals. Secession., by Sir H. K. 'Keith' 
Watson, who was himself a leading force behind the secession movement, presented 
fourteen points in favour of secession. He portrayed the Commonwealth’s offer as one 
that would comprise of “artificial and impossible restrictions imposed by people entirely 
ignorant of, and inexperienced in, local conditions in the North, and blind to world 
influences”, noting that the Commonwealth’s record in the Northern Territory should “be
regarded as being more reliable than any glowing promises or proposals for the 
future”.155
According to Watson local knowledge was the key, with Northern development 
requiring “our State government assisted by a Committee of local citizens possessing a
practical knowledge of the needs of the North”.156
However in the end nothing came to fruition as neither party wanted to concede an 
inch. The Pilbara continued to be deprived for capital as the Commonwealth starved 
the region of funding and offered what most thought was an illusory pot of gold in an 
attempt to force the issue ahead of the secession vote as the State government, 
153 According to the Payne Committee, the federal government spent £15m over 26 years to 
encourage movement to the Northern Territories, but only increased the population by 
2,000. “NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT,” The West Australian, January 19, 1938, 20.
154 “NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT,” The West Australian, January 9, 1934, 4.
155 Henry Keith Watson to Peter Collier, “The Empty North. Federal Proposals. Secession.,” 
July 24, 1933, 1, No. 1956/0847, Cons. 1545, State Records Office of Western Australia.
156 Ibid., 3.
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already in massive debt, could not afford to develop it itself.157 As an account following 
a visit by Sir John Kirwan, President of the Western Australian Legislative Council in 
August 1933 bemoaned:
“During the tour we saw country quite unoccupied that would provide food, 
clothing, and all reasonable requisites and comforts for a population as large as
that of the British Isles. That it is rich in natural resources was obvious. Its 
mineral wealth includes gold, iron, copper, lead, asbestos, antimony, 
manganese, and mica … With gold at over £7/14/ an ounce it is not surprising 
there should be a revival of gold-mining at the old camps. When gold was 
standardised at £4/4/11 ½ an ounce scores of mines were abandoned that 
would to-day, at the enhanced price, pay enormous profits. But the opening up 
of these old mines needs capital, and capital has not been forthcoming … In 
spite of the country’s mining, pastoral, agricultural, and horticultural resources, 
the population of the North and the North-West has diminished rather than 
increased in recent years. Not mining only has declined, but also wool growing 
and cattle raising.”158
But capital was forthcoming if it was only allowed. As a 1933 letter to the Premier from 
the Agent-General Sir Hal Colebatch discusses, there were British Chartered 
Companies with “£200,000,000 of capital being available here for the purpose [of 
developing the North]”.159 This was widely reported in the media with one of the first 
reporters to break the news, Alan Moyle, claiming that the funds were to be used to 
“build railways, towns, roads, to urge wealth from the soil, to breed beef and shear 
sheep, to mine gold and tin and precious stones and mica”.160
157 From 1911-1937 the Federal government provided £7,950,000 in grants to Western 
Australia, including the North-West (although none was specifically allocated to this region, 
it was up to the State government), while providing the Northern Territory with £15,000,000 
over the same period. “THE NORTH-WEST,” The West Australian, September 30, 1942, 2.
158 “An Empty Land,” Sunday Times, July 30, 1933, 18 S.
159 Hal Colebatch to Peter Collier, July 20, 1933, No. 1955/0864, Cons. 1545, State Records 
Office of Western Australia.
160 Alan Moyle, “Where Water Is Dearer than Gold,” The Daily Express, August 20, 1933, No. 
1956/0847, Cons. 1545, State Records Office of Western Australia.
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In a subsequent interview Sir Hal Colebatch highlighted that attracting investment was 
never about capital but a question of “removing prohibitive restrictions”, and allowing 
“freedom to trade with the nation's customers”, following which development of the 
North West would be “inevitable”.161
The final outcome for the “Cinderella Section” was for the State government to refuse 
all major offers to develop the North West, being unable to either remove restrictions on
development or agree to the terms that would see large portions of land turned over to 
either Federal or Commercial interests for as some claimed up to 99 years. Thus, with 
transactional cost issues still deterring private interest and neither the Commonwealth 
nor the State willing to develop the region, Port Hedland languished until the 
manganese boom would again raise potential profits and reignite interest in the region.
3.6. Manganese Blues and the Iron Ore Embargo, 1938 – 1957
Development at Port Hedland was non-existent after the Second World War due to low 
prices for local commodities and therefore a lack of demand for port facilities in the 
region. The use of Port Hedland for commercial purposes was also hampered when in 
1942, following bombing attacks by the Japanese, it was occupied by the military until 
the end of the War.162 It was not until the Korean War began in 1950 that the port saw 
any kind of growth or development in the 20th century. Prices of manganese soared 
prior to and following the outbreak of the war and with the discovery of the mineral at 
nearby Woodie Woodie, exports out of Port Hedland commenced in 1953.
161 Hal Colebatch, “Help Those Already There,” The Sydney Morning Herald, July 21, 1933, 9, 
No. 1929/0171, Cons. 1496, State Records Office of Western Australia; “DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE NORTH,” The Daily News, July 21, 1933, 3.
162 Wendy Birman, “Port Hedland,” in Historical Encyclopedia of Western Australia, ed. Jan 
Gothard and Jenny Gregory (Perth: University of Western Australia Press, 2009), 715.
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Figure 3.3: Global Manganese Price and Western Australian Production, 1948 – 
1972163
Australian manganese exports (Western Australian production comprised over 90% of 
Australian manganese production until the Northern Territory started producing in the 
mid-1960s), despite rapidly rising global prices – up 284% between 1940 and the peak 
in 1957 – failed to react to this price increase in time and thus missed out on the 
lucrative opportunity. It was not until the Northern Territory began production in 1965 
that Australian exports took off, with Western Australia falling behind despite ample 
supplies (Woodie Woodie still produces manganese today).
While the gold boom in the late 19th century had numerous issues ranging from an 
infant government to a simple lack of demand for port facilities, we have to ask 
ourselves why did the State fail to jump at the chance to develop on the back of 
manganese exports? The conditions in the State were far better than during the 1880s 
gold boom; the government had matured, the debate over the fate of the Pilbara had 
been settled in favour of State government controlled development and the Second 
World War had been over for almost a decade.
163 Gavin M. Mudd, The Sustainability of Mining in Australia: Key Production Trends and Their 
Environmental Implications (Victoria: Department of Civil Engineering, Monash University, 
2007), 153–154; U.S. Department of the Interior, “U.S. Geological Survey,” USGS Minerals 
Information: Manganese, accessed February 11, 2013, 
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We are therefore drawn to the State’s – or in this case, a combination of State and 
Federal – institutions as the most likely culprits: regarding manganese, it was the 
Federal government that prevented entrepreneurs from capturing this profit opportunity 
(both the availability of manganese reserves and the export profit opportunity were 
known at the time) through the imposition of a very uncertain, virtual trade embargo on 
manganese exports that heavily favoured established interests at the expense of new 
entrants. Indeed, at the time rule No. 3 of the Statutory Rules 1949 prohibited the 
export of manganese without a direct recommendation from the Federal Department of 
Supply and Development.164 The Department was responsible for national defence and 
so control of essential raw materials was bestowed upon it, one of which was 
manganese (and another was iron ore).
The manganese buying and selling decisions had been stripped from people with the 
knowledge of how best to use the minerals – in this case, to sell the State’s 
manganese to the United States for more than twice the domestic price – and replaced 
it with a situation where every single exporter had to seek what would appear to be a 
very restrictive recommendation from the Chief of a federal department to export their 
product.165 The only people with the power to influence the federal government to 
change this policy – to shift the institutional structure away from one where only the 
largest, most established players were able to take part to one more facilitative to free 
trade and exchange where new entrants could challenge the status quo – were the 
actors empowered by the present structure. In this case, it was BHP who benefited 
from the regulation as the sole purchaser of manganese in Australia.
The justification for these trade restrictions was one that is familiar to Australia, the 
same one that had been used in 1938 to justify the iron ore embargo: one that once the
164 This Department was subsequently broken up, with mineral export decisions controlled by 
the new Department of National Development. Australia, House of Representatives 
Debates, 2nd Session, 2nd Period, 22nd Parliament, vol. 42 (Canberra, 1957), 1483.
165 “Export of Manganese,” Geraldton Guardian, February 15, 1949, 3; “MANGANESE 
CONCESSION IS WELCOME,” The West Australian, January 27, 1953, 7.
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Japanese threat had subsided after the Second World War, was no longer valid; that 
Australia had a supply problem and so manganese must be preserved for domestic 
use.166
While the federal government maintained that Australia’s manganese supplies would 
last for at most 25 years, Western Australian explorers were arguing that reserves of 
manganese were in fact in “ample supply” in the State, with local politicians urging the 
Federal government to remove its quasi-embargo (quasi- because permits could still be
– and were – granted by the Department of National Development in very limited 
quantities).167 In one scathing attack, Minister Mr. Grayden of Swan criticised Federal 
government departments for being so far disconnected from Western Australia that its 
knowledge of the State, in particular the vast availability of chromite and manganese, 
was so poor that it had placed a ban “on the export of manganese and chrome for no 
other reason than the fact that it is not known how much manganese and chrome there
is in Australia”.168
The controversy surrounding the embargo and the favoured status granted to certain 
organisations was rife at the time. While the vast majority of mining entrepreneurs in 
Western Australia were met with a brick wall when applying for an export permit, 
organisations with connections in the federal government had no such trouble.
In one such example over which there was heated parliamentary debate was the 
government’s involvement in the Manganese Company, where following an inquiry by 
the Western Australian Audit Department it was revealed that the government had lost 
a considerable sum of £62,361. 5s. 2d. in the venture (approximately £3.5 million in 
2012 currency).169
166 J.G. Blockley, I.W. Reid, and A.F. Trendall, “Geological Aspects of Australian Iron Ore 
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The implications for Port Hedland were obvious: while it was barely surviving on the 
few exports that were permitted to be shipped from the port, no development was 
taking place and the future still looked grim. With an export embargo on the most 
lucrative mineral in the State at the time and with the ports’ clients being limited to 
those with the political power to get their way, infrastructure investment was unlikely to 
take place. The State government would not invest given its tense budget constraints 
and private interest was lacking given the transactional cost issues as well as the port’s
small throughput, itself a result of the Federal embargo over which it had little control.
Little control because, as people with more knowledge about the North-West at the 
time were pleading in Parliament, one of the reasons for the export restrictions was the 
result of a State regulation on prospecting. There were “deposits of manganese in that 
area [the North-West] which have never been pegged because under the State mining 
laws if the deposits were pegged a certain number of men would have to be employed 
in working them”. The State had raised the price of prospecting by requiring deposits to
be worked constantly, and no one was “prepared to spend a few thousand pounds a 
year in producing manganese when it cannot be marketed [as a result of the 
embargo]”.170 A vicious cycle, or path-dependent outcome, had been created where the
federal Bureau of Mineral Resources was underestimating the quantity of manganese 
in the North-West on the basis of the limited prospecting activity, itself caused by a 
combination of the embargo and the State's regulations.
The dire situation that the people at Port Hedland found itself in was evidenced by the 
following in The West Australian:
“Local authorities said today that Port Hedland was being stifled by an embargo
on the export of manganese from Australia… Under the embargo, the B.H.P. 
dictates the conditions, price and supply of the ore… Authorities operating at 
170 Australia, House of Representatives Debates, 1st Session, 1st Period, 20th Parliament, 
26:708.
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Port Hedland said that America was having difficulty in getting high-grade 
manganese ore and was experimenting with substitutes.”171
It had to be clear that there was neither geological nor political (in the face of war, for 
example) justification for the continuation of the embargo. The only way such a poor 
policy can persist is if the institutions governing the players allow it to occur; and with 
both private and public actors looking out for their own self-interest, we can expect it to 
persist until certain forces arise that change the incentives faced by the actors involved 
to induce institutional change. What had happened in the Pilbara was that a path 
dependent outcome had arisen where the players benefiting the most – in this case, 
BHP and the politicians and bureaucrats with the discretionary power to enforce the 
embargo – had no incentive to force a change in the institutions and the players who 
desperately wanted to – certain State government officials and the vast majority of the 
Pilbara population they represented – did not have the political clout to enact such a 
change. State members went as far as to call for a Royal Commission into the Federal 
government’s actions, with Western Australian Federal Member for Swan Mr. Grayden 
describing the situation during Federal Parliament on November 10, 1953 as “farcical”, 
pleading that “mining is to Western Australia what taxation is to Canberra”, and that the
future of the State depended on it.172
Unfortunately for Western Australia and Port Hedland, Mr. Grayden’s repeated pleas in 
Federal Parliament went unanswered and it would not be until the iron ore boom in the 
1960s that the incentives were large enough for change to happen and for the path 
dependent outcome to break. For despite a few local State politicians decrying the 
actions being undertaken by both their colleagues in the State Parliament, their Federal
counterparts and certain organisations such as BHP (all of whom were simply playing 
the game to the rules they faced at the time), the institutional path had been set and 
171 “‘Crisis’ On W.A. Ore: Telegram To Menzies,” The West Australian, July 27, 1954, 8.
172 Australia, House of Representatives Debates, 2nd Session, 1st Period, 20th Parliament, 
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the manganese boom was not sufficient to alter it.
At the State level, weak property rights surrounding mining titles and related 
infrastructure in the State meant that the government could use vague clauses in the 
Mining Act 1902 enabling discretionary intervention to raise the cost of doing business 
by causing uncertainty, especially in industries with large fixed costs and high asset 
specificity. Section 276 of the Mining Act was used as a “cudgel to impose its will on the
companies who became interested in the Pilbara”, designed to “give the Minister 
almost dictatorial powers. Whether or not this is desirable, it has had the practical effect
of creating a great deal of confusion and uncertainty which in turn has given rise to 
resentment and charges of injustice”.173
Unless the State is constitutionally or legally constrained in its ability to bestow such 
privileges (and thus private actors will find lobbying less profitable vis- à -vis 
production), it will continue to do so and as we see in the case of Western Australia in 
the 1950s, its actions in the Pilbara demonstrate that it was not at all constrained. 
Contracts could be dishonoured ex post, with the necessary property rights to finance 
projects with highly specific assets not available. Described by a West Australian 
correspondent as “a socialist Pilbara plan of confiscation”, even former State Labor 
Premier John Tonkin was highly critical of the State’s actions in the region, detailing an 
example of the State picking winners and losers in a speech prior to his 1971 election 
victory:
“The Government’s mineral policy for the Pilbara involves the deprivation of the 
rights under law of an occupant of a temporary reserve who has spent a large 
sum in discovering a payable ore body. Such a policy strikes at the very root of 
mineral exploitation and savours of bushranging. It must make every occupant 
of a temporary reserve fearful that he may find himself in a similar position to 
173 N Phillipson, Man of Iron (Wren Publishing, 1974), 98.
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that of Hancock and Wright and be deprived of the fruits of his labour.”174
Though following the failures of State socialism the government had reduced its direct 
involvement in the economy, it had continued to use its powers to regulate industry and
assist favoured business interests at the taxpayer’s expense – something not 
conducive to private investment in highly specified assets.175
At Port Hedland, although some manganese was permitted to be exported at the time it
was an extremely inefficient process. A good example of this was in 1953 when the 
largest shipment of less than 5,000 tons of manganese took 23 days to load on to the 
Fernbrook.176 While this was an incredible feat at the time given the facilities at Port 
Hedland – the captain of the Fernbrook was a “pioneer”; the first captain who, after 
undertaking his own daily surveys of the harbour, managed to manoeuvre his ship 
within the inner harbour without having to move out to sea which was the standard 
practice at the time – it was poor by international standards.177 To put this into a global 
context, at the same time the Fernbrook was loading its’ decks with 5,000 tons of ore, 
the facilities in Glasgow’s General Terminus Quay could already handle the 
simultaneous unloading of two ships with a capacity of 12,000 tons of iron ore each.178 
As Rod Fletcher, the field supervisor of the Northern Minerals Syndicate (formed in 
1947) said:
“The movement of the first shipments of manganese through Port Hedland 
posed enormous difficulties for the syndicate. Because of the physical 
limitations of the harbour, the Harbour and Lights Department believed the 
operation was impossible, but arrangements were made for the ore to be lifted 
by two ships, the Fernbrook and the Union Power, whose captains were 
prepared to undertake their own survey within the inner harbour and were quite 
174 J.F. Moyes, “Hancock and Wright,” April 1973, 8.
175 Robertson, “The Foundations of State Socialism in Western Australia: 1911--16.”
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confident of their ability to lift the shipments.” 179
One factor explaining this relatively poor performance was the organisational structure 
at Port Hedland, which was in turn shaped by the institutional structure. Given the 
outright prohibition of private investment and reluctance of any potential private actors 
to lobby the government to change this policy, the operation of the port fell to the 
Harbour and Light Department based in Fremantle, some 1,668km away. Following the
Fernbrook’s impressive feat, the Department expressed some ‘concerns’ about the 
extent to which ships could be loaded in Port Hedland and so immediately put a stop to
any further innovations that may have improved efficiency by artificially limiting ship 
loading capacity. As Fletcher said, this “was a serious hindrance to the expansion of 
the manganese industry because it required future shipments to be made in smaller 
ships, which had an adverse effect on the shipping rates”.180
This was to continue for some time, as no investment in its port facilities took place 
until in October 1957 following the federal government’s relaxation of regulations to 
allow the export of a third of all proven reserves, the State’s Public Works department 
was provided with £23,300 to extend the Port Hedland jetty and reconstruct various 
berths, completing the works in August 1960.181 Prior to this upgrade, facilities at Port 
Hedland were insufficient to cater to the demand from the Wittenoom Gorge asbestos 
mine, let alone the throughput the export of manganese would have provided had it 
been permitted.182
It was once again actors reacting to potential profit opportunities that created this 
institutional shift; as Fletcher put it, the “Northern Minerals Syndicate was directly 
responsible for the easing of the restrictions because of its exploration programme and 
mine development”.183 The Syndicate had spent a “great deal of capital” in improving 
179 Hardie, Nor’westers of the Pilbara Breed, 223.
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the infrastructure in the North-West, such as providing access to Port Hedland through 
a 284km road to the port from its Ragged Hills manganese mine.184
But as with the gold boom in the late 19th century, this was too little too late, with 1957 
proving to be the peak of the manganese boom as prices of the mineral reached 
US$121/ton. The Pilbara’s manganese production then peaked in June 1962 at 
$2,945,000 as export prices continued to decline and production costs escalated.185 
Somewhat ironically, two years following the peak of the boom in May 1959 North-West
Minister Charles Court visited and personally inspected the facilities at Port Hedland, 
declaring them unacceptable, but the eventual upgrades proved inadequate. Indeed, 
one proposed plan was to upgrade the facilities to cater to ships of 10,000 tons but by 
the time the report was completed in 1960 it was deemed to be obsolete, as not only 
had shipping technology outpaced the plan but the boom was well and truly over.186
“In every way the story of the manganese industry is one of the tenacity and 
determination needed to overcome enormous handicaps. Government 
restrictions made it difficult to get the project started at all. The mine was in 
harsh, inhospitable country. The loading facilities were demanding and 
frustrating. Physically it was really tough on men and machines.”187
With more than half of Port Hedland’s population being involved in the manganese 
export business and the Port continuously losing out to foreign exporters during the 
important, early stages of the boom given their competitors lower production costs and 
more efficient facilities, the port was never really able to capitalise on it. It would not be 
until 1974 that manganese prices would again reach the heights seen in the 1950s.
Port Hedland had ample opportunities to expand and capture a significant share of the 
world export market but it did not. The answer lies in a combination of the institutions 
184 Australia, House of Representatives Debates, 2nd Session, 1st Period, 20th Parliament, 
46:23.
185 Hardie, Nor’westers of the Pilbara Breed, 225.
186 Shaw, Moving Mountains: The Evolution of Port Hedland Harbour, 23–24.
187 Hardie, Nor’westers of the Pilbara Breed, 222.
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that govern the port and the fact that the profit opportunities for what would have been 
an expensive project were simply not large enough to encourage actors to alter these 
institutions. As Davis et al. point out in their landmark paper Institutional Change and 
American Economic Growth, institutional change is induced by private needs (profit 
incentives) – people’s desire to capture economic rents.188 They note that:
“It is the possibility of profits that cannot be captured within the existing 
arrangemental structure that leads to the formation of new (or the mutation of 
old) institutional arrangements.”
But the process of changing institutions is not free; there are numerous private costs 
such as learning costs (writing new laws and regulations), lobbying costs, and the cost 
of potential taxes. People will only begin to fight for a change in the existing institutional
arrangements when the net pay-offs exceed the benefits of remaining within the status 
quo. The most likely way for this to happen would be for some kind of external trigger 
to occur that raises the potential profits to a level greater than the costs of inducing 
institutional change. This equilibrium-upsetting event – and the discovery and soaring 
prices of iron ore would prove to be such an event – raises the benefits of having 
exclusive control and less ownership uncertainty, leading to lobbying for institutional 
change to a point where a new equilibrium is reached (where the benefits of even more
control and certainty are outweighed by the high pay-offs required). This is what we 
saw with the Northern Minerals Syndicate during the manganese boom and while they 
failed to significantly alter the institutional structure, they set the process in motion, 
something the future entrepreneurs of the iron ore boom would come to be thankful for.
3.6.1. Protectionism and the Iron Ore Embargo
While the gold industry was exempted from income tax at the time, tin, bauxite, iron, 
copper, lead, and manganese faced taxation that did not permit them to get “a 
reasonable return for the hazardous and speculative nature of the investment”. 
188 L.E. Davis, Douglass C. North, and C. Smorodin, Institutional Change and American 
Economic Growth (Cambridge University Press, 1971), 59.
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Prospectors were also prohibited from being granted mineral claims as the State had 
“frozen all iron ore deposits both known and those yet to be found”.189
Officially announced by the Commonwealth government in May of 1938 and 
implemented through an amendment to the Customs Regulations from July 1 1938, the
Federal iron ore embargo remained in place until December 1960 when the 
Commonwealth government announced that due to new information, it would consider 
the granting of licences for iron ore export.190
While this chapter is not concerned with the political rationale for the embargo, it was a 
critical piece of legislation that affected the development of Port Hedland for the 
entirety of its duration and so must be examined. The embargo also highlights how 
vulnerable large investments can be to government policy at all levels and the potential
costs investors and entrepreneurs face because of the risks and uncertainty as well as 
the costs of under-investment that society bears as a result. It is not just embargoes 
which distort private investment decisions but actions at all levels of government from 
competition policy, labour laws and environmental regulation all the way to local 
planning and zoning rules. The more predictable and less ad-hoc the rules are, the 
lower the risk for investment and the closer the level of investment will be to the 
optimal.191
The iron ore embargo had the effect of not only lowering the profit potential of 
exploiting existing iron ore reserves but also the effect of wiping out virtually any 
incentive to prospect for additional reserves.192 Private interest was “effectively 
extinguished, and increase in knowledge of national resources was doomed to 
189 Australia, House of Representatives Debates, 2nd Session, 2nd Period, 22nd Parliament, 
vol. 43 (Canberra, 1957), 765; Australia, House of Representatives Debates, 1st Session, 
2nd Period, 23rd Parliament, vol. 34 (Canberra, 1959), 410.
190 Blockley, Reid, and Trendall, “Geological Aspects of Australian Iron Ore Discovery and 
Development.”
191 Klein, “New Institutional Economics,” 478.
192 S.L. McIntyre, “The Extent and Global Importance of Australia’s Minerals: An Overview,” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 31, no. 1 (1977): 18.
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stagnation”.193
There was also no reason for existing interests with a large amount of skin in the game,
such as BHP, to protest the embargo as they were, it turned out, largely unaffected by 
it. Blockley et al. noted that “there were no strong reasons for that company [BHP] 
either to object to the embargo or to seek new ore supplies: it had ample reserves for 
its own long-term future, neither its existing export contracts for iron ore nor its 
continuing export of pig iron and scrap were immediately affected, and finally a 
potential export competitor had been eliminated overnight”.194
Monopolists such as BHP were comfortable with the existing status quo. BHP was able
to operate “efficiently” – that is, produce steel at a lower cost than its competitors – as a
result of unrivalled access to the cheapest coking coal and manganese in the world. 
This access was achieved through political means, as BHP had obtained a number of 
privileges from the State such as the iron ore-rich Cockatoo and Koolan Islands “in 
return for a small royalty”.195 Another privilege was the prohibition of Australian 
suppliers of steel inputs from exporting their product. For example, the global price of 
manganese in 1952 was £25 a ton against £8 in Australia, destroying any incentive for 
people to go “hundreds of miles into the outback of Western Australia… for such a 
return”.196
“Will the Minister for Trade and Customs say whether it is true that the 
Government is restricting the export of manganese ore? If so, is the Minister 
aware that mining companies in Western Australia could double the production 
of manganese if they were permitted to export the ore, and that the present 
restriction on production is one of the factors responsible for the high cost of 
193 Blockley, Reid, and Trendall, “Geological Aspects of Australian Iron Ore Discovery and 
Development,” 265.
194 Ibid.
195 Australia, Senate Debates, 1st Session, 2nd Period, 23rd Parliament, vol. 43 (Canberra, 
1959), 1106.
196 Australia, House of Representatives Debates, 2nd Session, 1st Period, 20th Parliament, 
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this important metal?”197
The desire for further government protection of any private enterprise – or lack of 
protest when it is proposed – is especially true when the corporation in question is 
already dependent on the government for preserving its position by artificially restricting
competition, such as BHP was. For this is the only way a monopolist can maintain its 
market position over time without being so efficient as to deter competition; as Baumol 
demonstrated, even for natural monopolies once you factor time into the equation, “the 
heroes are the (unidentified) potential entrants who exercise discipline over the 
incumbent, and who do so most effectively when entry is free”.198
The only way the incumbents can prevent entry is by “behaving virtuously, that is, by 
offering to consumers the benefits which competition would otherwise bring. For every 
deviation from good behaviour instantly makes them vulnerable to hit-and-run entry”.199 
In other words, in a market with no artificial entry barriers (regulations) if a monopolist 
is preventing entry by providing goods and services at or below a price that perfect 
competition would otherwise bring then the ‘problem’ does not exist outside of the 
economist's model.
While BHP was undoubtedly using its politically-granted status as the nation’s steel 
producer to influence policy, it was merely playing the game within the rules that it 
confronted. It is the institutions that set the rules governing the players and BHP was 
‘winning’, even if the outcome was a socially undesirable one. In a scathing account of 
the way BHP operated under the shield of government protection, Hughes notes:
“The Broken Hill Proprietary’s monopoly position has inevitably influenced its 
decision making, not in the direction of unduly high prices or profits as the 
proponents of nationalization feared, but rather in its failure to promote an 
197 Australia, House of Representatives Debates, 1st Session, 3rd Period, 19th Parliament, vol.
11 (Canberra, 1951), 394.
198 Baumol, “Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure,” 14.
199 Ibid.
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adequate rate of growth, its failure to take risks and to show enterprise. Yet in 
this respect the company has been far from unique in the Australian setting; 
rather it has shown a reliance on government support and a reluctance to leave
the safe havens of the domestic market which is a heritage of a hundred years 
of government assistance and tariff protection”.200
It was not until the price of iron ore rose to such a level – increasing by over 200% in 
the twenty years after WW2 – that, despite the government protection afforded to the 
incumbent monopolists and a lack of tenement or more secure property rights for 
explorers guaranteeing that they would receive at least some gains from their 
discoveries, people began to explore for iron ore in secrecy.
Figure 3.4: Iron Ore Price, 1945 – 1965201
As Blockley et al. point out, “the impossibility of obtaining any legal title to discoveries 
meant that an unusual degree of secrecy was maintained, and this has resulted in a 
dearth of contemporary documentary evidence [of iron ore deposits]”.202
200 H Hughes, The Australian Iron and Steel Industry 1848-1962 (Melbourne University Press 
Melbourne, 1964), 192.
201 U.S. Department of the Interior, “U.S. Geological Survey,” USGS Minerals Information: Iron 
Ore, accessed February 11, 2013, 
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This all had important implications for Port Hedland. Given its location, the future of 
Port Hedland depended on iron ore exports. However, despite the removal of the iron 
ore embargo in 1960, a prosperous future would prove to be anything but certain.
3.7. A Change in Direction, 1957 – 1970
The conventional history of Port Hedland assumes that no significant development 
occurred at the port until the mid-1960s because there was no iron ore to export (at a 
profit) up until that point. But that is only half the truth. There was a gold boom in the 
late 19th century followed by a manganese boom after the commencement of the 
Korean War and the miners in both cases would have jumped at the opportunity to use 
the port, only to be disappointed by high transaction costs which proved prohibitive. 
This was because in both of those booms, but more so during the manganese boom, 
government policy delayed the entrepreneurial response to rising commodity prices 
and thus no work was done to upgrade Port Hedland’s facilities to cater for them. The 
end result in both booms was for more efficient foreign miners and ports reaping the 
rewards of the boom while Western Australia missed out. In both cases, virtually no 
private investment occurred and all government-funded upgrades to the port occurred 
after the boom had peaked or did not occur at all, meaning that not only did Western 
Australia miss out but that taxpayers had to bear the burden of the mistakes. There is 
no reason to think that anything different would have happened with the removal of the 
iron ore embargo unless there had been a fundamental change in the State’s 
institutions that solved the transactional cost issues, creating an institutional 
environment where private investors felt confident that the State would commit ex ante 
not to expropriate their assets ex post. As Acemoglu et al. observed:
“Although the efficiency of one set of economic institutions compared with 
another may play a role in this choice [between good and bad institutions], 
political power will be the ultimate arbiter. Whichever group has more political 
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power is likely to secure the set of economic institutions that it prefers.”203
Aided by a booming Japan which drove iron ore prices through the roof – the Japanese
steel industry was importing 7,000,000 tons of iron ore in 1957 and at the time this was 
expected to increase to 20,000,000 by 1965 – the political pressure mounted on the 
government by special interests, both domestic and international, to first lift the 
embargo and then provide some kind of legal title to iron ore was immense.204
Without property rights, “it is not worth while to locate new deposits because the ore 
cannot be exported and cannot be sold”, even when “there are in sight supplies of iron 
ore sufficient for hundreds of years”.205
Incredibly, between 1953 and 1960 Australia had increased the value of her exports by 
just 1 per cent. In the same period of time, the value of world trade had increased 36 
per cent; the United Kingdom increased export value by 30 per cent; West Germany by
120 per cent; and Japan by 170 per cent.206 The rest of the world had begun to shed 
their protectionist shackles, but Australia lagged behind.
“One of the reasons why we are short of iron ore”, said Senator Victor Seddon Vincent 
in 1958, “is that the Western Australian Government has frozen all iron ore reserves, 
either known or yet to be discovered”.207
Senator Vincent was commenting on the peculiar situation the State and the mining 
industry found themselves in at the time. The federal embargo on iron ore had eroded 
the incentive to prospect for iron ore as the amount the monopsonist buyer, BHP, was 
203 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run 
Growth,” 390.
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willing to pay was below the cost of production for North-West iron ore. This had led to 
the perception in both Canberra and Perth that supply was limited, and so the Western 
Australian government “froze” all iron ore reserves, both found and not yet discovered, 
to preserve supply in case of war. “In other words”, notes Vincent, “if I were to discover 
a new deposit of iron ore in Western Australia, I would not be given a mining title to it 
by the State Government. I would not be allowed to mine the ore or sell it... If the State 
Government did something to give an incentive to prospectors and exploration 
companies so that we could build up our iron ore reserves, it would have no trouble in 
obtaining [federal] permits to export large quantities of iron ore”.208
Table 3.1 tracks the progression towards the eventual lifting of the iron ore embargo 
and emergence of Port Hedland as a world leading bulk export port.
Table 3.1: Institutional Change and the Development of Mineral Rights in Western
Australia, 1956 – 1982
Year Action
1956 Western Australia requests an export licence for 50,000 tons at Koolyanobbing and is refused209
1957 Western Australia enters into provisional agreement with Japan to export 1m tons of iron210
1957 Western Australia applies for a permit to export iron ore from Tallering211
1960 Commonwealth iron ore embargo partially lifted
1960 Western Australia allows independent prospecting in certain areas
1961 Western Australia deems Port Hedland “unacceptable” for iron ore exports
1961 Western Australia lifts the blanket reserve on mineral discoveries
1963 Commonwealth iron ore embargo completely lifted
1963 Western Australia reviews initial iron ore tender; Port Hedland selected by MGMA
208 Ibid.
209 This was excess ore that needed to be disposed of and could have been used to fund an 
expansion at Wundowie charcoal iron works rather than using further loan funds. Western 
Australia, Legislative Assembly Debates, 1st Session, 22nd Parliament, vol. 147 (Perth, 
1957), 1461.
210 Ibid., 147:983.
211 Ibid., 147:1460.
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Year Action
1964 First State Agreements provide some legal title to iron ore
1970 Port Hedland Port Authority Act passed
1982 Western Australian Mining Act provides specific tenement for large-area mineral exploration
The lobbying for a removal of the embargo was a joint effort from the Western 
Australian government and private interests, both of which saw the potential profits that
the iron ore industry could provide if only the embargo could be lifted. The private effort 
was led chiefly by the Japan-based Duval and Company who had contracted former 
politician Sir Arthur Fadden to lobby parliament on its behalf. Indeed, the State 
government submitted its first application for an export licence on the 16th of November,
1956 and, even though it was declined, by 1957 had both entered into a provisional 
export agreement with Japan and had tentatively begun calling for iron ore export 
tenders in direct conflict to the Federal embargo which was still in place.212 The deal 
would have provided the State with a royalty of £1 per ton, with BHP paying its current 
rate of 1s. 4d. and the Japanese paying the remaining 18s. 6d. as well as BHP’s 
undisclosed charges. This offer was declined by the Commonwealth who cited the 
1938 embargo and its “far-fetched” numbers regarding the State’s iron ore reserves as 
justification.213
Undeterred, a second application was made, but this time it was refused on the 
grounds that the Commonwealth, searching “very deeply for excuses… queried very 
much whether the anticipated profit would be made by the State. It asked why, if such 
profit could be made, some private individual or private company had not entered into 
the field”.214
212 Western Australia, Legislative Assembly Debates, 1st Session, 22nd Parliament, 147:983; 
Australia, House of Representatives Debates, 2nd Session, 2nd Period, 23rd Parliament, 
vol. 40 (Canberra, 1960), 1651.
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Even without a successful application from the Commonwealth, the miners were 
partially successful on December 3, 1960 when the embargo was relaxed, ushering in 
a rush of exploration that would sweep aside any concern that iron ore supplies in the 
State were at all limited.215
However, the State government still maintained a blanket reserve on all discoveries of 
iron ore, meaning that even if a company or individual discovered a significant deposit 
there was no guarantee that it could be exploited – and as we saw earlier, the State 
had a track record of taking discoveries from prospectors and handing them over to the
politically-connected monopolists in the form of BHP216. In 1960, the interests of BHP 
were still of paramount importance to those in power. “I know that the Broken Hill 
Proprietary Company Limited is launching a mammoth expansion programme”, said 
Mr. Whittorn during Parliament, “and our thoughts regarding the export of mined 
minerals must be methodically planned so that the Broken Hill Proprietary Company 
Limited is satisfied with regard to supplies for present and future needs... I believe our 
Government should materially assist in the plans of the company”.217
It was not until following the partial removal of the embargo that the most important 
step towards securing mining property rights took place: early steps towards the iron 
ore State Agreements, the first of which were formalised in 1964 to Mount Goldsworthy,
Mount Newman and Robe River. While the State wanted to do everything itself, it 
simply did not have the expertise or resources to undertake such a task and so every 
215 Even though as late as September 1960 the Federal government was staunchly holding to 
the claim that Australian supplies would last at most 30 years. Australia, House of 
Representatives Debates, 2nd Session, 2nd Period, 23rd Parliament, vol. 38 (Canberra, 
1960), 1134.
216 As Charles Edward Barnes made clear following the partial removal of the iron ore 
embargo: “I do not think it would be desirable for it [BHP] to do so [take control of 
Australia’s iron ore] in any case, because, after all, this Government supports free 
enterprise, and the basis of free enterprise is efficient competition… I counsel the 
Government that, in future, no more leases of iron ore should be granted to one company 
in Australia so that it will get a stranglehold on all the resources of this country.” Australia, 
House of Representatives Debates, 2nd Session, 2nd Period, 23rd Parliament, vol. 48 
(Canberra, 1960), 3486–3487.
217 Australia, House of Representatives Debates, 2nd Session, 2nd Period, 23rd Parliament, 
1960, 41:1969.
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aspect of the mining industry was contracted to private interests. As one account notes,
“the persistence of their lobbying was beginning to have some effect and, emboldened,
they [the State government] took the step to call for tenders. It was sound thinking”.218
At Port Hedland, the government had planned to expand the facilities to cater to the 
upcoming iron ore boom as outlined in a 1960 report; however, the report was obsolete
by the time the government was willing to act on it, as it catered only to 14,000 ton 
ships rather than the 40,000-60,000 tons the mining companies desired. But unlike 
during the gold and manganese booms, this time the mining companies would not take 
‘we cannot afford it’ for an answer and so even though the project was deemed 
“beyond the resources of the State”, the government – heavily influenced by vested 
interests seeking potential profits from the record iron ore price – decided that “the 
onus would be on the mining companies to undertake the port development 
themselves or search for a more viable location”.219
The government achieved this by issuing a tender for the mining, transport and 
shipment of ore from Mt Goldsworthy, with all facilities and improvements (including 
any work done at Port Hedland) ceding to the government upon completion of the 
mining at Mt Goldsworthy, as well as a royalty per ton shipped to be paid to the State. 
Despite these added costs, six companies submitted tenders to mine Mt Goldsworthy 
under those terms.220
This proved to be just the beginning, with the Mt Goldsworthy Agreement becoming 
“the pattern for all subsequent agreements with the Western Australian government… a
model on which the four remaining so-called ‘pioneer agreements’ were based – 
Hamersley, Newman, Robe and Deepdale”.221 The State government also began 
granting numerous temporary reserves for iron ore prospecting with each carrying 
exclusive rights for two years and the guarantee that, if iron ore was discovered, 
218 Phillipson, Man of Iron, 65–66.
219 Shaw, Moving Mountains: The Evolution of Port Hedland Harbour, 29.
220 Ibid., 30.
221 Phillipson, Man of Iron, 67.
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prospectors would be able to seek a mining title for it.
It seemed that what Port Hedland had failed to achieve in both the earlier gold and 
manganese booms was finally about to be realised – a State government had provided 
enough assurance and therefore confidence to private investors that their rents would 
not be expropriated ex post. However, despite the government delegating the port 
selection and development to the winners of the Mt Goldsworthy tender, North West 
Minister Court still had the final say as to the location of the port and in December 1961
he advised the Shire Council that Port Hedland could, as Shaw noted, “not be 
developed economically to take the size of bulk carriers that were required for the iron-
ore export trade”, as “all expert opinion consulted by the government had ruled out the 
possibility”, with the only option being to build a new iron ore facility elsewhere.222
It was not until almost two years later in November of 1963, five months after the 
Commonwealth government had completely lifted the iron ore embargo which allowed 
for significantly larger export quotas, that the State Parliament passed a bill allowing 
the original winners of the Mt Goldsworthy tender, Mt Goldsworthy Mining Associates 
(MGMA), to renegotiate the terms of the tender and to choose an export facility other 
than the government-selected Depuch Island. MGMA, after conducting its own surveys 
of the proposed ports, decided on Port Hedland.223
Port Hedland’s future was finally secured when, following BHP's examination of Mt 
Whaleback in 1966 and the subsequent discovery of high-grade ore far exceeding prior
estimates, it agreed to buy five to eight million tons of iron ore per year and to become 
a 30% partner in the venture. In January 1967, Mt Newman Mining Co Pty Ltd (MNM) 
was established as a wholly owned subsidiary of BHP, comprising:
 Pilbara Iron Limited (CSR) – 30%;
 BHP Minerals Limited – 30%;
222 Shaw, Moving Mountains: The Evolution of Port Hedland Harbour, 30.
223 Ibid., 33.
80
 AMAX Iron Ore Corporation – 25%;
 Mitsui-Itochu Iron Pty Ltd – 10%; and
 Seltrust Mining Corporation Pty Ltd – 5%.
From there the joint venture constructed a 426 kilometre railway between the mine at 
Mt Whaleback and Port Hedland, a 140-hectare train unloading, tertiary crushing, 
stockpiling, reclaiming and ship loading complex and an entire new suburb at the town 
of Port Hedland, Cooke Point.224
Port Hedland was also aided by the advent of the “bulk revolution” that had occurred “in
the wake of rapid economic growth [in Japan]”, increasing economies of scale allowing 
Port Hedland to expand rapidly.225 With Japanese demand forcing commodity prices up
and simultaneous maritime transport cost reductions, Port Hedland was well placed.
However, none of that would have been possible without institutional change. It was not
until the enactment of some of the earliest State Agreements, the first appearing in 
1952 at the Kwinana Oil Refinery, that potential private investors in large infrastructure 
projects could maintain some confidence that their rents would be protected. In the 
Pilbara, the most notable were in the form of the:
• IRON ORE (MOUNT GOLDSWORTHY) AGREEMENT ACT 1964;
• IRON ORE (MOUNT NEWMAN) AGREEMENT ACT 1964; and
• IRON ORE (ROBE RIVER) AGREEMENT ACT 1964.
The most likely reason for the twelve year lag in the implementation of the first iron ore 
agreements given they did exist was State government policy: no individual or 
corporation would seek a more secure title for their mineral rights when, at the time, 
prospecting was virtually illegal due to the State’s blanket which protected the 
incumbent monopolies from competition. This combined with a relatively low iron ore 
price and the Commonwealth’s 1938 export embargo lowered the profit potential to a 
224 Ibid., 54.
225 Yrjö Kaukiainen, “The Role of Shipping in the ‘second Stage of Globalisation,’” International
Journal of Maritime History 26, no. 1 (2014): 70.
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point where there would be no demand for such an agreement: the Federal embargo 
and State blanket had to go first.
These agreements represented the first time that private investment in port 
infrastructure in the Pilbara became viable, with the government committing to keep its 
hands off of investor's assets in exchange for an agreed amount of royalties.
State Agreements were only made possible because the profit potential was so large to
break the path-dependent outcome and induce a change in the Federal and State 
institutions. It would not have been possible to achieve the same during the prior two 
booms; the profit potentials were not high enough to induce actors to pay off those with
the required political clout to get it done. It was only with iron ore and the enormous 
profit potential that it represented that these syndicates were able to pay off the 
relevant actors, guaranteeing to build all of the transport infrastructure (roads, rail and 
ports) as well as commit to very healthy royalties that would allow the political actors to 
reduce the pressure on their budgets and redistribute revenue elsewhere in the State, 
in exchange for secure property rights. For the first time in its history, Western Australia
was no longer a “claimant State”, regaining “its full status within the federation”.226
226 A “claimant State” was one that received more in benefits than it sent in taxation to 
Canberra. Western Australia has not been a “claimant State” since the Port Hedland began 
exporting iron ore in 1968-69. Don Lipscombe, “1960-1979,” in A History of Commerce and 
Industry in Western Australia, by Peter C. Firkins (Perth, W.A.: University of Western 
Australia Press, 1979), 144.
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Figure 3.5: Port Hedland Exports, 1968 – 1990227
It is remarkable how many times Port Hedland looked like it would fall into obscurity; 
whether because of government neglect, poor institutions that would not facilitate 
private investment; or a failure to find – and guarantee – adequate private capital to 
finance the incredibly expensive dredging and infrastructure costs. But as early as 
1971 Port Hedland had become Australia’s largest export port, at which point the final 
change in governance took place with the State government transferring the 
administration of the port over to the Port Hedland Port Authority with the passing of the
Port Hedland Port Authority Act 1971.
3.8. The Port Hedland Port Authority, 1970 – 2012
The modern day port of Port Hedland was developed and operated by the consortium 
until 1970 when the Port Hedland Port Authority was constituted. Six other Western 
Australian ports were also developed and operated privately, all requiring “very 
significant capital expenditure to make them operable”. The major ones included 
Dampier, Barrow Island and Yampi.228
227 Australia, Year Book Australia, No. 56 - 75 (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics), 
accessed August 17, 2013, 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/allprimarymainfeatures/EAD14D11A8B60093
CA2573AE00045C9E?opendocument.
228 W Cumming, An Economic Appraisal of Australian Port Administration (Committee for 
Economic Development of Australia, 1977), 11.
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The transition to governance by a Port Authority – a wholly government-owned entity 
operating as a separate body corporate (known as a Government Trading Enterprise or
GTE), with its own board of directors appointed by the responsible Minister, was an 
important step in Port Hedland’s history. Port Authorities can be viewed as hybrids that 
have characteristics of both public and private organisations in that their ownership and
their control are public but their boards have significant industry representation.229
While on the surface the establishment of an Authority to oversee the mining 
companies at Port Hedland may have appeared to be the State trying to expropriate 
private rents, it was in fact anything but. Prior to the establishment of the Port Hedland 
Port Authority, port operations and development at Port Hedland only had minor 
oversight from the State Harbour and Lights Department, which concerned itself with 
cargo handling, stevedoring and operating State harbour facilities in the region.230 Thus 
the transfer was mutually advantageous: the mining conglomerates could transfer 
operational responsibility to the State (they were, after all, mining companies and not 
port operators) while receiving immense financial gains because of the way the tax 
code was written at the time. Provisions in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-1975 
(Commonwealth) relating to the mining industry had a significant effect on investment 
in private mining ports. Cumming notes that:
“The provisions of the Act related to expenditure on the transport of minerals. 
While allowing special deductions to be made for expenditure on railways and 
roads, it did not allow deduction of expenditure on certain port facilities – 
namely, initial dredging and navigational aids.”231
Cumming continued, using Port Hedland as an example:
“The significance of the cost is illustrated by the development of Port Hedland 
by Mt Newman Joint Ventures and Goldsworthy Mining Limited both of which 
229 Western Australia, Port Hedland Port Authority Act, 1970.
230 Kerr, Australia’s North-West, 225.
231 Cumming, An Economic Appraisal of Australian Port Administration, 20.
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constructed and operated separate facilities. In the case of Mt Newman Joint 
Ventures, expenditure on dredging accounted for 24 per cent of the total cost of
the project (including mine development) up to the date of the first export 
shipment.”232
It was through negotiation between the two major companies involved and the State 
government that a statutory Port Authority was established to operate the port.
Those tax incentives were eventually changed with the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1997 (Commonwealth) to include port facilities within the transport facilities definition 
(s. 40.870), although this was well after Port Hedland’s most significant development 
and so the outcome that did take place can be viewed as a successful one given the 
choice set available at the time.
While every other Port Authority was required to cover working expenses out of 
revenue irrespective of the tonnage handled, the structure of the Port Hedland Port 
Authority was different, with major working expenses covered with revenue from the 
“Port Improvement Rate” which is levied on iron ore shipments:
“The Port Improvement Rate is charged on the tonnage of iron ore shipped by 
mining companies through the port; the proceeds are returned directly to those 
mining companies as repayment of the capital value of the assets transferred to
the Port Hedland Port Authority at its inception in 1971”.233
This organisational structure was a deliberate attempt to allow the mining companies to
maintain a semblance of control over their interests despite giving up their absolute 
property rights at the port. In addition, the mining companies were able to lower their 
cost of funding for port infrastructure, as the State provided the Port Authority with a 
guarantee of obligations, enabling the mining companies – acting through the Authority 
232 Ibid., 21–22.
233 Bureau of Transport Economics, A Study of Western Australian Ports (Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1981), 24.
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– to borrow at a rate for low-risk investments.234
Given their importance to Port Hedland’s future and the structure of the Authority’s 
revenue being wholly dependent on iron ore levies, the mining companies maintained 
their control over the investment decisions at the port, as “the influence of a small 
number of port users (e.g. the iron ore companies at Hedland) on the revenue of the 
port authority is substantial. Therefore, it is understood that such users will have an 
influence on, and indeed will bear some responsibility for, major development 
programmes involving the port’s common facilities”.235
While this might incur the ire of those in government who believe that it operates the 
port, it was a very deliberate plan on behalf of the mining syndicates to protect their 
interests. They had virtually guaranteed that they would maintain private control over 
the iron ore jetties and wharves within the now-public port as well as a large influence 
over major infrastructure decisions, all at a reduced cost.
Finally, the mining companies maintained complete control over their own railways 
(vertical integration), allowing them to coordinate investment decisions with respect to 
export demand. What they did not want to operate –functions such as stevedoring, 
navigational aids and pilotage – were left to the Port Authority to perform.236
This is all in line with the transactional cost interpretation of public ownership and 
regulation. The need for State Agreements that granted control of operations to the 
mining companies and a Port Authority largely independent of the politics of the day 
stemmed from the high transaction costs involved in the region. The capital that was 
invested in the iron ore projects and transport infrastructure to facilitate exports was 
largely non-redeployable, leaving investors extremely vulnerable to ex post 
opportunism by trading partners, consumers and the government (both State and 
Federal). Likewise, if the government granted the mining companies exclusive rights 
234 Western Australia, Port Hedland Port Authority Act, VII, sec. 55.
235 Bureau of Transport Economics, A Study of Western Australian Ports, 27.
236 Ibid., 34–35.
86
they (and the residents of the Pilbara) themselves could be vulnerable to opportunistic 
behaviour.
The solution was the hybrid-model of organisation we see today: the mining companies
largely maintain operational control and exclusively fund infrastructure investment but 
the State prevents opportunistic behaviour by maintaining ultimate control through the 
Port Authority. This solved the contractual problem that had prevented investment in 
the region for a century: to induce investment, the State and mining companies came 
up with contractual arrangements that provided credible assurances that neither party 
would behave opportunistically ex post.237
3.9. The Pilbara Amalgamation, 2012 – Today
In late 2010 a “high level, wide-ranging review” of Western Australia's ports was 
commissioned by the State government, the outcome of which was the February 2012 
announcement that seven of the State’s eight existing port authorities will be 
amalgamated into four regional port authorities.238
The Port Hedland Port Authority will merge with Dampier, the proposed new ports at 
Anketell and Ashburton North; and the ports at Cape Preston, Port Walcott, Varanus 
Island, Barrow Island, Airlie Island, Thevenard Island and Onslow to form a new 
‘Pilbara Ports Authority’.
Details of this proposal have been scant; the State released a brief document titled A 
Vision for Western Australia’s Ports to go with the 2012 announcement which contained
an implementation plan consisting of:
 2012 – Consultation with industry and port customers, draft legislation, 
development of policy framework.
237 Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 327–384.
238 Western Australia, A Vision for Western Australia’s Ports (Perth: Department of Transport, 
2012), 
http://www.transport.wa.gov.au/mediaFiles/marine/mar_AVisionFWesternAustraliasPortsRe
port.pdf.
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 2013 – Present legislation to Parliament, consultation continues.
 2014 – Implementation begins with a staged approach, the announcement of 
the first regional port authority depending on current contracts and impacts on 
industry and port customers.239
The 2011 Western Australian Port Governance Review on which this decision was 
based is still confidential and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future, as the 
author's Freedom of Information request was rejected on the grounds that “disclosure 
would reveal the deliberation or decisions of an Executive body”.
But what is relevant to this dissertation and is most interesting about the governance 
reform decision announced by the State is that governance, from a transactional cost 
economics point of view, exists to mitigate conflict and realise mutual gains – to lower 
transaction costs.240
The object of a comparative analysis is not to obtain absolute measures of efficiency or
transaction costs, but to determine the factors that alter transaction costs between 
alternative forms of governance. The goal is, to paraphrase Coase, to fully consider 
how alternative governance structures will work in practice, not in their idealised 
forms.241 Thus, the government must have recognised – or perceived – that the existing
governance structures could be improved upon with amalgamations.
But can we be sure? Ex ante we know why Port Hedland is organised the way it is; the 
current governance structure was adopted to mutually benefit both the mining 
companies in the Pilbara and the State government, something that had not been 
possible for over a century. Moreover, given the high level of asset specificity 
surrounding ports, a lot of care should be taken to understand the attributes of the 
contracts that enable transactions to take place before a drastic overhaul of the existing
239 Department of Transport, “Ports Review 2012,” accessed July 30, 2013, 
http://www.transport.wa.gov.au/projects/ports-review-2012.asp.
240 Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations,” Journal of Law and Economics 22, no. 2 (1979): 233–61.
241 Williams and Coase, “Discussion,” 195.
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system is undertaken. Simply showing that the existing situation is flawed (and as the 
previous section of this Chapter recognises, it is) is not enough evidence to then 
conclude that an alternative structure – in this case horizontal integration through 
amalgamation – is superior. After all, all modes of organisation are flawed so careful 
attention must be paid to the strengths and weaknesses of each. Alternatives need to 
be examined comparatively and not in isolation.242 If after careful comparative analysis 
no superior feasible mode can be described then until something better comes along 
the status quo should be maintained.243
There is no one-size-fits-all port governance model. The success or failure of a 
governance structure is contingent on the institutional environment it operates within. 
The structure at Port Hedland is one where despite it being a statutory authority owned 
by the Western Australian government is in fact heavily influenced and financed by the 
large mining companies that operate out of it. It was not established on static efficiency 
grounds but out of contractual necessity. Before a mining company will invest funds in 
a mine it needs to be assured that, for example, the port or railway owners will not 
subject it to hold-ups. Likewise, the (potential) port and railway owners want to be sure 
that the mine owner will not demand a price below what would give them a reasonable 
return on the highly specific and expensive infrastructure required.
It may be that the government is now able to overcome these institutional hurdles, 
perhaps through renegotiating State Agreements or through some other means. If it 
does go with the current proposal, it must be careful not to repeat the mistakes of the 
Grand Trunk Pacific (GTP) and Prince Rupert, where rigid contractual obligations in the
face of levels of demand below expectations caused the venture to fail. If the mining 
companies are still to finance new infrastructure investment, the State must also be 
mindful of what public guarantees are offered so as to prevent excessive levels of 
investment.
242 Oliver E. Williamson, “Empirical Microeconomics: Another Perspective,” 2002, 30.
243 Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 408.
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Whatever the outcome, the decision to centralise the region's port authorities should 
not be taken lightly. While de-duplication can reduce costs, the failures of the National 
Harbours Board (NHB) in Canada and New Zealand Ports Authority (NZPA) in New 
Zealand should be heeded; central port authorities can succumb to the temptation of 
“picking winners”, cross-subsidisation and tend to have a reduced ability to adapt to 
changing conditions (“adaptive efficiency”). If public funds are to replace – fully or 
partially – mining company investment in the port, then the government must place 
strict constraints on the new Authority to prevent subsidisation, and over-building, at the
region's ports. Appropriate representation and constraints should also be in place to 
prevent potential capture by the ports being regulated. Such an outcome would result 
in scarce resources being diverted to sub-optimal areas where marginal productivity is 
lower, with the regulators, mining companies and foreign importers, not the taxpayer, 
the likely beneficiaries.244 While opening segments to competition through institutional 
change now that commitment problems are less problematic would likely provide a 
better long-term outcome for taxpayers, if amalgamation goes ahead then State-wide 
public-interest opportunity costs must be heeded when future investment decisions are 
being made.
244 R. O. Goss, “Seaports Should Not Be Subsidized,” Maritime Policy and Management 13, 
no. 2 (1986): 83–104.
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Chapter 4: Prince Rupert 1860 – 2012
Build it and They Will Come
4.1. Introduction
“Let me assure you that Prince Rupert is destined to become one of the great cities of 
the continent.” – Canadian Prime Minister 1896 – 1911, Sir Wilfrid Laurier245
Located on Canada’s Pacific Coast in the Province of British Columbia, Prince Rupert 
has the world’s second deepest naturally ice-free harbour and is the closest North 
American port to Asia by three days. In 2012 it employed over 2,330 people with a 
throughput of over 22 million metric tonnes, an increase of 15.3% over 2011.
Illustration 4.1: Prince Rupert's Location and Primary Trade Routes246
The Prince Rupert Port Authority plans to increase that to 100 million tonnes by 2020 to
meet growing demand in Asia, making it one of the largest international ports in North 
245 “Future of Prince Rupert,” The Evening Empire, August 23, 1910.
246 Prince Rupert Port Authority, “Competitive Advantages,” accessed April 11, 2013, 
http://www.rupertport.com/trade/advantages.
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America.247
But as recently as the 1990’s, the development of Prince Rupert was anything but 
certain. The Fairview container terminal, one of the first dedicated intermodal terminal 
(ship to rail) in North America and the first to move over 750,000 TEU's annually, was 
only completed in 2007, over 100 years after the Prince Rupert site was selected as 
the terminus for the Grand Trunk Pacific railway (GTP) in 1903. The site had previously
been occupied by a 1977-completed breakbulk facility, which was replaced by two bulk 
terminals (Ridley Terminals and Prince Rupert Grain) on nearby Ridley Island in 1984 
and 1985.
This chapter examines the institutions that shaped the incentives and constraints 
behind the development – and lack of development – of the port of Prince Rupert 
through time.248 It first details Canada and British Columbia's constitutional and legal 
background, followed by an examination of Canada's great railway boom and the effect
it had on the small town of Prince Rupert. Finally, it draws from this institutional history 
to show how the modern port of Prince Rupert got to where it is today.
4.2. “The Golden Age of Sail”, British Columbia and the British North America 
Act, 1860 – 1900249
In 1850, an official government census recorded the population of British Columbia to 
be 51,525 – or about 1.60% of the soon-to-be Canada’s total population (at the time 
Canada had not yet federated and was still British North America). But it would be well 
after 1860 when development of Canada’s Pacific coast began. West coast population 
growth was largely driven by the gold rush at the time, evidenced by the fact that after 
the rush in 1871, British Columbia’s population had fallen to 36,247 or less than 1% of 
247 Prince Rupert Port Authority, Monthly Traffic Summary, December 2012 (Prince Rupert, 
2012), http://www.rupertport.com/trade/performance/2012/12/31/pdf; Prince Rupert Port 
Authority, “A Vision for the Future,” 2013, http://www.rupertport.com/trade/vision.
248 In particular Williamson’s 2nd & 3rd tiers of institutions. Williamson, “The New Institutional 
Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” 597. See Chapter 2 for a more detailed 
elucidation of this framework.
249 E.W. Sager and L.R. Fischer, Shipping and Shipbuilding in Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914 
(Canadian Historical Association Ottawa, 1986).
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Canada’s total population.250 However, Canada’s Atlantic coast has a long and vibrant 
history from well before 1860 and to properly examine Prince Rupert – a Pacific port – 
one must take into account not just the transport, infrastructure and shipping policies at
the time but also the events that led to their creation. As North wrote, past events 
matter not only because they help to shape the opportunities available in the present 
but also because they shape ideology and expectations.251 Path-dependent outcomes 
can be created by past actions and institutional “lock-in” can occur, where an inefficient 
outcome will persist until an event or series of events create a shock large enough for it
to “break”.252
Ports and shipping in Canada have a vibrant history from 1860 – indeed, it has been 
dubbed the Atlantic “golden age of sail”, post-Industrial Revolution, seven years before 
Canada’s Confederation and just prior to what one might call the “modern times”.253 
The title of this section (“the golden age of sail”) is drawn from Sager and Fisher’s 
comprehensive history of the Canadian Atlantic shipping industry between 1820 and 
1914.254 The authors describe these five decades between 1850 and 1900 as a period 
when the Atlantic coast of Canada saw almost continuous growth in its shipping 
industry, peaking in 1879 with the fourth largest merchant fleet in the world behind only 
Great Britain, the United States and Norway.255 Although important for Canadian 
history, the Canadian Atlantic coast shipping industry and its influence on Canadian 
institutions alone could fill this entire chapter. But, this chapter is about the Pacific coast
and the port of Prince Rupert and so attention must be focused there.
250 F H Leacy, Historical Statistics of Canada, ed. F H Leacy, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: Statistics 
Canada, 1983), sec. A2–14, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/11-516-x1983001-
eng.htm.
251 North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance.
252 W.B. Arthur, “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical 
Events,” The Economic Journal 99, no. 394 (1989): 116–31; Liebowitz and Margolis, “Path 
Dependence, Lock-In, and History.”
253 Paul Johnson, The Modern Times Revised Edition: World from the Twenties to the Nineties 
(Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2001).
254 Sager and Fischer, Shipping and Shipbuilding in Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914; E.W. Sager 
and G.E. Panting, Maritime Capital: The Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914 
(MQUP, 1990).
255 Sager and Fischer, Shipping and Shipbuilding in Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914.
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British Columbia was proclaimed a British colony in August of 1858 following a letter 
from the Colonial Secretary Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton who recommended that the 
government “erect at once a New Colony there”, as there had been a “recent discovery
of Gold in the Neighbourhood”.256 British Columbia’s population at the time was 
somewhere in the vicinity of 50,000 – 55,000, a very low number which puts the density
somewhere in the region of 0.14 – 0.15 people per square mile in 1858.257 Indeed, all of
British North America at the time was sparsely populated, with an estimated density in 
1858 of somewhere between 0.72 – 0.96 people per square mile.
Table 4.1: Population of British Columbia and Canada, 1855 – 1881258
Region Census Year
1855 1861 1871 1881
British Columbia 55,000 51,524 36,247 49,459
Canada 2,436,297 3,229,633 3,689,257 4,324,810
This all had implications for the type of institutions established in both Canada and 
British Columbia. A British colony, Canada’s institutional structure was, similarly to that 
of the United States, Australia and New Zealand, initially developed by Britain. All of 
these land masses were relatively poor at the time of British colonisation – an important
determinant of the type of institutional structure each would inherit. As economists 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson defined, the colonisation strategy used by 
Europeans depended on the environment they encountered.259 In prosperous places, 
Europeans introduced or maintained pre-existing, or what they call “extractive” 
institutions; that is, institutions that facilitated exploitation such as local slave labour in 
mines and plantations as well as any existing taxation schemes. In contrast, in places 
such as Canada with a relatively agrarian local population and a large, sparsely settled 
256 Ged Martin, “The Naming of British Columbia,” Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with 
British Studies 10, no. 3 (1978): 257.
257 Leacy, Historical Statistics of Canada, sec. L1–2.
258 Ibid., sec. A2–14.
259 Daron Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J.A. Robinson, “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and 
Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 117, no. 4 (2002): 1231–94; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, “Institutions 
as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth.”
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land area, the British colonised in large numbers and created “inclusive” institutions. 
These institutions of private property and common law (the British proclaimed that 
“English Law” was in force in British Columbia in 1858) helped to facilitate the early 
trade, commerce and industry in the Province.
The institutions established in Canada therefore shaped the policies and factor 
endowment that developed (capital formation, both physical and human). People (men)
could vote, own land, obtain an education (Canada had an 82.5% rate of literacy by 
1861; in comparison even by 1870 the U.S. was only at 80%260) and could enjoy some 
protection from expropriation of their property through land titles sold or granted by the 
pre-federation colonies.
This is further evidenced by the land policies put in place by the British at the time. 
Given that enforcement was lacking,261 the primary drivers of development were more 
likely to be basic demand (farming opportunities) and new technology allowing 
development of new land and so institutions had to be developed to accommodate 
this.262 In British Columbia, this took the form of the Land Ordinance Act 1865 which 
allowed individuals to acquire up to 160 acres of uninhabited land (and prior to that was
the Gold Fields Act 1859, proclaimed to provide land rights amidst the 1850’s gold 
rush).
Despite all of this, prior to Confederation British Columbia and Vancouver Island (they 
united in 1866) were still, compared to the Atlantic coast which had thrived on trade 
with Britain and Europe, relatively undeveloped. In similar fashion to John Forrest's 
overarching influence on Western Australia, British Columbia and Vancouver Island 
260 Engerman and Sokoloff, “Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development 
among New World Economics,” 50–51.
261 “Lacking the resources to enforce official policy, the imperial and, especially, colonial 
authorities found it necessary to accede to some degree to local opinion and practice.” 
Michelle Vosburgh, Transatlantic Subjects: Ideas, Institutions, and Social Experience in 
Post-Revolutionary British North America, ed. Nancy Christie (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2008), 370.
262 E.g. Marquis wheat. J. W. Morrison, “Marquis Wheat - a Triumph of Scientific Endeavor,” 
Agricultural History 34, no. 4 (1960): 182–188.
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were essentially ruled by James Douglas, who “exercised almost total authority”.263 He 
quickly embarked on massive infrastructure projects, constructing roads throughout the
colony that it could not support, leaving “a burden of debt unpalatable to British 
authorities”.264 This left the colony in the precarious position and one that would lead to 
the Canada that we see today.
For in 1867, the British North America Act (BNA Act) was passed by the British 
parliament, forming what was called the Dominion of Canada by Confederating the 
Provinces of Canada (Quebec and Ontario), Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Shortly 
afterwards British Columbian groups such as the “Confederate League” sought to join 
the Dominion as a “means to secure Representative Institutions with Responsible 
Government for this Colony”.265 266 They were eventually successful when, following the
1869 confederation of Rupert’s Land and the North West Territories after being 
acquired from the Hudson’s Bay Company and the Province of Manitoba joining in 
1870, British Columbia agreed to confederate in 1871.267 While Britain had granted 
British North America (Canada) responsible government in 1848, responsible 
government was lacking in the West until this point and with deteriorating finances the 
choice became one of whether to join Canada or the United States (the United States 
had just purchased Alaska).268 The decision to join Canada was made primarily 
because the Dominion offered to wipe out its debts and, more importantly, to eventually
construct a transcontinental railway to the Pacific coast.269
263 Jean Barman, The West beyond the West: A History of British Columbia, 3rd ed. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007), 75.
264 Ibid., 102.
265 The British Colonist, August 26, 1868.
266 Although, as the deputy Under-Secretary for Colonies T. F. Elliott put it, “[G]ranting 
responsible government to a little Community like Vancouver would be a mockery and a 
scramble”. Kennedy, “The Colonial Despatches: 1450, CO 305/26, P. 571; Received 12 
February 1866,” December 16, 1865. Quoted in Peter Busby Waite, The Life and Times of 
Confederation, 1864-1867: Politics, Newspapers, and the Union of British North America 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 314.
267 The Province of Canada was first, followed by Prince Edward Island in 1851, New 
Brunswick in 1854 and Newfoundland in 1855. The Western Provinces remained under 
Crown control until Confederation.
268 Barman, The West beyond the West, 96.
269 Ibid., 101.
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The push for a Confederated Canada was also, as Andrew Smith argued, driven by a 
number of British investors who risked losing large sums of capital on their existing 
colonial railways.270 The Grand Trunk railway was close to bankruptcy and being 
intimately intertwined with British investors, the Canadian Provinces and their 
politicians, and eventually the unified Canada from the beginning, there was a powerful
impetus to save it.271 A Confederated Canada with a centralised government would 
allow them to continue to finance their colonial investments on the London bond 
market, as States with strong political power yet still within the British constitutional 
framework were deemed less risky. 
It was a similar motivation that also played a key role in the abolition of the Provinces in
the capital-starved New Zealand, and to a lesser extent in Australia's federation. All 
three maintained their links to Britain through their constitutions and the Privy Council 
for many decades after achieving independence, and the need for British capital was 
an important factor.
Canadian Confederation did not come without costs. As Sir Richard Cartwright noted 
when negotiations were occurring for British Columbia’s inclusion in the Dominion, 
“with the solitary exception of Sir Hector Langevin, who had spent a few weeks there, 
not a single minister had ever set foot in British Columbia”.272
Using this to its advantage and with the East keen to have it join to unite Canada and 
prevent the encroachment of the United States on the West, British Columbia agreed to
270 Andrew Smith, British Businessmen and Canadian Confederation: Constitution Making in 
an Era of Anglo-Globalization (Ithaca, N.Y.: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008).
271 Henry Almon Lovett, Canada and the Grand Trunk, 1829-1924, 1924. Reprint (New York: 
Arno Press, 1981).
272 Sir Richard Cartwright, Reminiscences (Toronto: William Briggs, 1912), 96, 
http://archive.org/details/reminiscence00cartuoft.
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join the Dominion of Canada only if certain terms were agreed upon.273 274 The key 
items in the British Columbia Terms of Union, from the point of view of the port of 
Prince Rupert, were:275
 The Dominion will undertake to secure the commencement simultaneously, 
within two years from the date of the Union, of the construction of a railway from
the Pacific towards the Rocky Mountains, and from such point as may be 
selected, East of the Rocky Mountains, towards the Pacific, to connect the 
seaboard of British Columbia with the railway system of Canada; and further, to 
secure the completion of such railway within ten years from the date of the 
Union.
 The payment to British Columbia a sum of 100,000 dollars per annum to cover 
the cost of any required public lands along the line of railway throughout its 
entire length in British Columbia.276
What the British Columbian newspaper had envisioned as “The iron horse [that] shall 
traverse the continent”, was now a reality and with it began what would become a 
Canadian rail construction boom far in excess of anything seen during the Maritimes’ 
“golden age of sail”.277
273 It was also rumoured in the British Columbian at the time that the United States was about 
to purchase the colony (The British Columbian, April 17, 1867. This was also the impetus 
for the original Confederation, as this speech in the Nova Scotia Assembly’s Debates and 
Proceedings made clear: “The whole police [sic] of the United States has been acquisition 
of territory. Their ambition is insatiable. ... If we remain disunited ... the time may come 
when we shall have the British flag lowered beneath the stars and stripes, and the last gun 
fired from the Citadel as a British fort.” Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864-
1867: Politics, Newspapers, and the Union of British North America, 271.
274 Carl E. Solberg, The Prairies and the Pampas: Agrarian Policy in Canada and Argentina, 
1880-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 227; K.H. Norrie and D. Owram, A 
History of the Canadian Economy, vol. 2 (Harcourt Brace, Canada, 1996), 214; Barman, 
The West beyond the West, 100–101; David E. Smith, The Invisible Crown: The First 
Principle of Canadian Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 167.
275This is a summary only.
276 Her Majesty in Council, British Columbia Terms of Union, 1871, 
http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/bctu.html.
277 The British Columbian, October 10, 1866.
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4.2.1 Institutional Change and the British North America Act
The bargaining ability shown by British Columbia was, although not directly, a result of 
the institutions established by the British decades earlier. Indeed, one of the early Acts 
passed by the new Dominion government, the Dominion Lands Act 1872, continued 
where the British had left off by providing small, free blocks of land for settlers so long 
as they lived or worked on said land. This new liberal homesteading Act was put in 
place as a national policy amid fears that anything less would divert scarce settlers 
South to the United States. It seemed to work, as by 1901, 87.1% of rural Canadians 
owned their own land.278 This led to a mini population boom in not just Canada (1871 – 
1901 population growth of 45.6%) but also in British Columbia, which went from a 
small, dispersed population in 1871 that was still below its 1851 gold-rush levels, to 
178,657 – a nearly five-fold increase (392.9%) in 30 years.
However, the inclusion of British Columbia in the BNA Act was not agreeable to 
everyone. Prior to federation, Canada’s first Prime Minister John A. Macdonald wrote in
a private letter that he "would be quite willing, personally, to leave that whole country a 
wilderness for the next half-century, but I fear if Englishmen do not go there, Yankees 
will".279 Likewise, local (British Columbian) press expressed their doubts, adding that “a 
little reflection would serve to show that the great North-West can never be governed 
by a central government of which the seat would have to be on the banks of the 
Ottawa”.280
Macdonald’s distaste for British Columbia was not unique to that Province; in drafting 
the constitution (BNA Act), Macdonald had plans to correct the “error” that the United 
States had made during the formation of its constitution, stating that its “primary error”,
“[W]as that each State reserved to itself all sovereign rights save the small 
278 Solberg, The Prairies and the Pampas: Agrarian Policy in Canada and Argentina, 1880-
1930, 227; Engerman and Sokoloff, “Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of 
Development among New World Economics,” 49.
279 Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864-1867: Politics, Newspapers, and the 
Union of British North America, 307.
280 Leader, January 27, 1860.
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portion delegated. We must reverse this process by strengthening the General 
Government and conferring on the Provincial bodies only such powers as may 
be required for local purposes… Thus we shall have a strong and lasting 
government under which we can work out constitutional liberty as opposed to 
democracy and be able to protect the minority by having a powerful central 
government.”281
Privately Macdonald had similar ambitions, writing in a well-known private letter to M.C.
Cameron that:
“If the Confederation goes on you, if spared the ordinary age of man, will see 
both Local Parliaments and Governments absorbed in the General Power.”282
While initially bestowing large powers to the central government (in exchange for the 
before-mentioned provincial concessions in the BNA Act), D. E. Smith noted that this 
power would not last.283 Contrasting Canada’s constitution with that of Australia’s, Smith
says that Australia’s political system initially embraced “bicameralism and a disposition 
to entrench constitutions from change, as well as federalism and responsible 
government along British parliamentary lines”, but Canada’s shared only the latter, 
enabling a “predisposition to executive dominance at both levels of government”.
Indeed, the system established by the BNA Act did not resemble a traditional federal 
system where the central and State (Provincial) governments would have clearly 
defined, constitutionally protected powers to prevent the encroachment of the other. 
Instead Canada adopted a system that was, in the words of Goldwin Smith, “not a 
federation, but a kingdom”; a system that would (or it was believed would) “extinguish 
the independent existence of the several Provinces”.284
281 Calvin R. Massey, “The Locus of Sovereignty: Judicial Review, Legislative Supremacy, and 
Federalism in the Constitutional Traditions of Canada and the United States,” Duke Law 
Journal 1990, no. 6 (1990): 1238.
282 Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864-1867: Politics, Newspapers, and the 
Union of British North America, 123.
283 Smith, The Invisible Crown: The First Principle of Canadian Government, 11.
284 Goldwin Smith, “The Proposed Constitution for British North America,” MacMillan’s 
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Concerns in the media at the time also reflected this idea. The Montreal True Witness, 
for example, observed that the vague definitions on the separation of what was “local” 
as opposed to “general” was “attempting to ‘define the powers’ of a government 
intentionally armed with indefinite power”.285
“We of the Maritime Provinces,” wrote the Yarmouth Tribune “are required to give up, 
not only… self-government won nearly thirty years since from the officials of Downing 
Street, but rights and powers… which we have enjoyed for more than a century… The 
loss of self control will be as total and complete as the loss of revenue.”286
By agreeing to the terms of confederation, the institutional structure in British Columbia 
was altered from one where executive power was controlled by the colonial 
government (or, to be precise, local representatives of Britain) to one where Ottawa 
would now be making a lot more of the executive decisions – at least initially.
One of the key features of the BNA Act that would ultimately shape the future of Prince 
Rupert was the express granting of rights to the Dominion or a “declaratory power” by 
sections 108, 92(10)(c) and 91(29) that enabled the central government to assume 
jurisdiction over a local work by declaring the work to be “for the general advantage of 
Canada”.287
The two sections interacted to play an important role in the eventual development of 
Prince Rupert. The first was that the central government could, at its discretion, make 
any laws viewed to be for the general benefit of Canada under s. 91(29) of the BNA 
Act. The exact passage gives the Canadian Parliament the power:
“[T]o make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada”.
Section 92(10) allows the federal government to declare any “local works or 
Magazine, March 1865, 408.
285 Montreal True Witness, January 13, 1865.
286 Yarmouth Tribune, June 27, 1866.
287 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Scarborough, Onterio: Carswell, 2004), 559.
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undertakings” to be of national importance, therefore removing them from provincial 
jurisdiction. The exact passage reads that:
“Such Works as, although wholly situate within the Province, are before or after 
their Execution declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the general 
Advantage of Canada or for the Advantage of Two or more of the Provinces.”
Finally, section 108 of the BNA Act states that:
“[T]he public works and property of each Province enumerated in the third 
schedule to this Act shall be the property of Canada.”
Item two in the third schedule was “public harbours”. While this only affected “public 
harbours” that existed at the time of federation, the Harbours and Piers Act 1877 would 
rectify that to allow the “Governor in Council”, under section 849 to:
“[B]y proclamation, - 
(a) declare to be a public harbour any area covered with water within the 
jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada; and,
(b) extend the area of any existing public harbour in Canada.”
While there has been some conjecture as to what exactly a “public harbour” is – for 
example, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the first fisheries case declined 
to give any general definition of what constituted a “public harbour” within the meaning 
of the above provisions of the BNA Act – there was no doubting that, once declared, 
they would fall under federal jurisdiction.288
It did, however, say that the “term used refers only to public harbours existing as such 
at the time when the Provinces became part of the Dominion of Canada”. Likewise, in 
the Supreme Court of Canada case of Attorney-General for Canada v. Ritchie 
288 The Attorney General for the Dominion of Canada v The Attorneys General for the 
Provinces of Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia (Canada), AC 700 (UKPC 29 1898).
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Contracting and Supply Co., the court found that the definition of what was considered 
a “public harbour” was quite broad. It determined that the definition included any port 
where:
 ships anchored there for safety, and found shelter and anchorage;
 it is a natural harbour and has been and now is used as a harbour; and
 it is called and classed as a harbour in all old records containing matters of 
general geographical notoriety.289
While this ambiguity was never really resolved, the general understanding at the time 
was that all harbours were in the jurisdiction of the Dominion whether declared or not 
(as under the Harbours and Piers Act 1877 any harbour could be proclaimed within the 
jurisdiction of Canada at any time). Likewise, all railways that could be construed as 
being for the “general advantage of Canada”, or “two or more of the Provinces”, which 
given the long-distance nature of railways would prove to be most of them, could and 
were removed from Provincial jurisdiction.
These constitutional clauses would later prove to have huge implications for the future 
of Prince Rupert. However, an important clarification must first be made here – mostly 
that “within the jurisdiction” of the Canadian central government does not necessarily 
mean public ownership; it rather means that the works are subject to central regulation 
which includes anything from public ownership and operations to fully private 
ownership and operations. It simply means that the central and not provincial 
government decides, or at least has a large influence on, the organisation forms that 
evolve for a given “work”.
This was quite different from the Port Hedland experience in that in Australia the States
had ultimate control over the ports and harbours within their borders with no influence 
from the federal government. While Port Hedland – being thousands of kilometres 
289 The Attorney-General For Canada v. Ritchie Contracting and Supply Co., 52 S.C.R. 78 
(Supreme Court of Canada 1915).
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North of Perth – experienced similar difficulties to Prince Rupert in the sense that 
infrastructure investment decisions were being decided by people who had never 
actually been to the respective ports, this is a key institutional differential that would 
play a decisive role in the ports future.
Finally, with railways being considered as the duty of the central government in the 
“general interest of Canada” (with, it should be added, immense public support) and 
with an obligation to complete a transcontinental railway as part of the 1871 addition of 
British Columbia, the great Canadian railway boom began. The new dominion 
government (with the support of the Provinces) would now embark on an endeavour 
that would not only shape the fortunes of Prince Rupert but that was to be, as Peter 
Waite put it, “the symbol of the new meaning of Canadian”.290
4.3. British Columbia and the Canadian Railway Boom, 1871 – 1901
“Almost every government from 1854 onward had been deep in rail-ways. In New 
Brunswick, one is tempted to think, politics were railways.” - Peter G. Waite, 1962291
By the time Canada federated in 1867, the North American railway boom was well and 
truly under way. In 1850 there were only 66 miles of railway in British North America but
by 1860 the length had grown to 2,065. Federation, which facilitated further expansion 
by allowing for government guarantee’s on British and New York capital together with 
the addition of British Columbia in 1871 saw that the expansion of this figure would be 
inevitable.292
As Charles Belford wrote at the time, (virtually) the only thing on the public’s mind was 
the creation of new railways: 
“Party politics do not run high. There are no great questions dividing parties and
290 Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864-1867: Politics, Newspapers, and the 
Union of British North America, 321.
291 Ibid., 243.
292 William Thomas Easterbrook and Hugh G.J. Aitken, Canadian Economic History, 2nd ed. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 316.
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the battles of Parliament are mainly of a personal nature, except when railway 
matters are introduced.”293
As part of the 1871 confederation of British Columbia, the Dominion government had 
promised British Columbia that a railway to connect the West would be started within 
two years and completed within ten. Politics or nationalism, not economics, formed the 
justification for the railway. It was seen to be paramount to encourage settlement in the 
west and to avoid the encroachment of the United States, a threat that did not exist in 
Australia or New Zealand.
While certain economic benefits were cited such as vague referrals to trade with the 
orient, politics was the primary factor. As Mr. Charles Tupper was quoted in the 1882 
Report of the Canadian Pacific Railway Royal Commission:
“That the Pacific Railway would form a great Imperial highway across the 
continent of America, entirely on British soil, and would provide a new and 
important route from England to Australia, to India and to all the dependencies 
of Great Britain in the Pacific; as also to China and Japan.”294
Viscount Monck, the first Governor General of Canada, highlighted additional 
(potential) benefits and that – as was the belief at the time – the railway would pay for 
itself in no time at all (the debts for the first transcontinental railway were guaranteed by
the British Government):
“The great work will add a practical and physical connection to the legislative 
bond which now unites the Provinces comprising the Dominion, and the 
liberality with which the guarantee for the cost of its construction was given by 
the Imperial Parliament is a new proof of the hearty interest felt by the British 
people in your prosperity.”295
293 Charles Belford, Leader, August 16, 1864.
294 Geo M. Clark, Samuel Keefer, and Edward Miall, Report of the Canadian Pacific Railway 
Royal Commission (Ottawa: Govt. Print. Bureau, 1882), 21.
295 Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 1st Session, 1st Parliament (Ottawa, 1867), 
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Interestingly, unlike the previous government railway in the Intercolonial, the Canadian 
Pacific Railway (CPR) was to be, from the start, a private endeavour (or should 
perhaps best viewed as a public-private partnership (PPP) in modern terminology).
The reason why the Canadian government opted for a PPP model as opposed to a 
vertically integrated (public ownership) model was, as Armstrong and Nelles have 
documented, the major and very public failure of the government owned-and-operated 
Intercolonial Railway.296 They note that,
“The Intercolonial Railway became a byword for inefficiency: the route was 
selected through parliamentary logrolling, and its employees were chosen 
through political patronage.”
Thus when the time came to fulfil its constitutional obligations and construct a railway 
to the Pacific, 
“[M]ost Canadians agreed that it would be best to encourage a private 
syndicate to undertake the task (through a combination of land grants and 
direct subsidies) to ensure efficient management.”
The failure of and reasons behind the Intercolonial Railway are well known.297 Most 
authors put it down to a combination of caps on rates, uneconomical (politically 
determined) routes during construction, political appointees to management, higher 
wage rates, and general corruption. Even proponents such as E.B. Biggar were only 
able to justify the railway on political grounds, noting it “was created for a public and 
6.
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national service and not to make money out of its operation”.298 Ex post, the expansion 
of the railway has been called a standard case of “defensive expansion”, examples of 
which existed in the United States as well with lines such as the Union Pacific.299
Ultimately all of these factors combined to leave the company in constant financial 
trouble. Cruikshank notes that the Intercolonial never paid “a substantial return on its 
capital, or to meet its operating expenses in 19 of its first 40 years”;300 and estimates 
from Dunn suggest that, between 1867 and 1914, the Intercolonial had cost the 
Canadian taxpayer a total of $348,089,518.301
This issue of inefficiency was raised numerous times in the Canadian Parliament. 
During the fourth session of the eighth Parliament, the Hon. Mr. Charles Arkoll Boulton 
compared the earnings on the Intercolonial with that of the PPP model of the CPR, 
showing that the earnings per mile on the Intercolonial were just 78 cents compared to 
$1.43 on the privately operated CPR. He then vented his frustration:
“I do not know that it is an honest policy to place a burden on one portion of the 
community in order to lighten it for themselves… I do not see why one part of 
the population should be supported at national expense and become a charge 
on the rest of the community.”302
Apparently the only justification for the railroad was political, namely that:
“[The government reports] it [the Intercolonial] was carried on on the same 
basis as it had always been – that it was treated as a national road and, being a
national road, it was not called on to do more than pay its running expenses. I 
298 E.B. Biggar, The Canadian Railway Problem (Toronto: Macmillan, 1917), 159.
299 Hugh G.J. Aitken, “Defensive Expansionism: The State and Economic Growth in Canada,” 
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regret to say it has not even, as a general rule, paid its running expenses.”303
What is clear is that, unlike in Australia and New Zealand (who had not had public 
railway failures to the same extent at this stage), by the time it came to building a 
transcontinental railway, the public had lost faith in pure government enterprise.304 The 
failures of Canadian bonded debt in the 1850s and 1860s had left painful memories 
and so “a method which had the semblance at least of limiting the government's 
obligations to fixed and predictable amounts”, was selected.305 Thus, on the 5th of 
February 1873, a Royal Charter was signed by the Governor General for a private Sir 
Hugh Allan-led company (the CPR) to construct a railway within ten years from 20 July,
1871. The company was granted 50,000,000 acres of land and a subsidy of 
$30,300,000, payable in instalments.306 However, just over eight months later, the 
company defaulted and executed a clause in its charter that allowed it to walk away 
without penalty.
The construction of the CPR continued by using a series of government contracts to 
private parties, an endeavour the 1882 Royal Commission into its construction labelled 
as “a Public Work at a sacrifice of money, time and efficiency… [with] extensive 
purchases made with much less regard to economy than would have happened under 
similar circumstances in a private undertaking.”307
Once constructed, the CPR was generally a financial success, with most studies 
reporting that even after ongoing government subsidies the railway was both privately 
and socially profitable.308 The story was not the same, however, for the transcontinental
303 Ibid.
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railways that would follow: the Grand Trunk Pacific (GTP) and the government’s 
National Transcontinental Railway (NTR).
4.4. Build It and They Will Come: Charles M. Hays and the Grand Trunk Pacific,
1901 – 1917
By the early 1900’s, the Canadian people (and competing rail operators) had been 
growing increasingly frustrated by the CPR’s perceived monopoly in the 
transcontinental trade.309 Thus, when the election of 1904 arrived the issue of building a
second transcontinental railway across Canada was the focal point, with the 
proponents under the leadership of Wilfrid Laurier winning out.310 Its proposal was for 
the Dominion government to build the line from Winnipeg to Quebec past northern 
Ontario and for the Grand Trunk Railway, under a new entity called the Grand Trunk 
Pacific (GTP), to build and operate a line from Winnipeg to the Pacific. Acting on 
various demands from provincial representatives and an unwillingness of the Grand 
Trunk to finance what was always going to be an unprofitable section of track, Laurier 
proposed that the government would build the Eastern section of the new 
transcontinental from Winnipeg to the Maritimes, while the Grand Trunk would build the
western section from Winnipeg to the Pacific. Once completed, the Eastern section 
would remain in government hands but the operations would be fully leased to the 
Grand Trunk for fifty years, free of charge for the first three years and at 3% on the cost
of construction thereafter.311
According to the original charter, the GTP’s Pacific terminus was to be “Port Simpson 
or another suitable location”, following the Yellowhead Pass west on the route mapped 
out by Sandford Fleming’s 1873 survey for the CPR, which had to build on an alternate 
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route for political considerations. Speculation was soon rife with the “rapidity with which
they [lots at Port Simpson] sell increases as the actual imminence of the importance of 
the little city grows more certain”.312 Port Simpson was considered a certainty to be “the
Terminus of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, the Coming Metropolis of Northern British
Columbia and the Rival of Vancouver and Seattle”.313
Unfortunately for the speculators, it would turn out that although Charles M. Hays was 
publicly sprucing Port Simpson (and the media was doing its best for Kitimat), he was 
already drawing up plans for Prince Rupert to be the GTP’s Pacific terminus. As an 
official from the GTP noted when the Prince Rupert site was announced, the two 
alternatives – Port Simpson and Kitimat – had already been “grabbed up by 
speculators, who put hold-up prices on their holdings”, which made Prince Rupert an 
even easier decision for the GTP.314
The GTP’s methods did not pass without scrutiny. Indeed, the actions at Kaien Island 
became the subject of an investigation by the Province (which ultimately found that 
they acted “in due course and according to the law”), where two “speculators”, Messrs 
Peter Larson (a railway magnate) and James Anderson (from Victoria) acquired, all up, 
over 10,000 acres of Kaien Island from the Provincial government at the standard rate 
for third-class land at the time of $1 an acre.315 Shortly after the acquisition, Mr. Larson 
travelled to Montreal and sold the concession to the GTP for $40,000 – a deal, paid for 
by the federal taxpayer and not the Province, that was particularly valuable as it 
included the provision to divide the foreshore into blocks of no less than 1,000 feet, 
312 The Spokesman-Review, September 30, 1906, 6.
313 “Port Simpson, B.C., the Terminus of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, the Coming 
Metropolis of Northern British Columbia and the Rival of Vancouver and Seattle: Some of 
the Advantages of Its Location”. George P. Baldwin, “Original Port Simpson Land 
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meaning that whatever blocks of land the Province selected would be rendered “almost
valueless”.316
Once it had acquired the land, the GTP needed a way to secure the waterfront as the 
Province under the Land Act had first choice of blocks.317
The GTP figured out that by dividing the lots into large, 1,000 foot blocks, it would be 
able to force the Province into a predicament where, while it could limit the GTP to 
3,000 feet of continuous waterfront by selecting a middle block, doing so would also 
destroy the value of its land. The GTP believed an unbroken waterfront of 6,000 feet 
was “absolutely necessary to the proper development of the terminal”, and would stop 
at no lengths to achieve that goal.318 Thus began a period of intense lobbying, with the 
final result being the acquisition of a 24,000 feet of waterfront with two blocks 
exceeding 6,000 feet and right-of-ways through the government’s blocks. As a 
newspaper referring to the government’s negotiators put it at the time, “never before 
has there been so much bolsuter [sic] on behalf of the people and so little gained for 
them… These men have blundered badly”.319
While these “speculators” were much maligned at the time, they were in fact still 
entrepreneurs, searching and finding discrepancies between the current price (what the
Province was selling the land for) and what they anticipated the future price would be. 
There is nothing wrong with this activity; if any criticism is to be laid it is that they could 
have been performing an entrepreneurial activity that, instead of extracting rents from 
the taxpayer – which is where the GTP’s land purchasing capital ultimately came from 
316 Hedley Gazette, March 22, 1906, 2; Hedley Gazette, July 12, 1906, 2; Boundary Creek 
Times, January 18, 1907, 1.
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318 Leonard, A Thousand Blunders: The Grand Trunk Pacific Railway and Northern British 
Columbia, 132.
319 The Empire, February 27, 1909.
111
– they could have performed a socially productive activity.320 But that is not a criticism 
that should be levied on entrepreneurs; it is a criticism of the rules of the game, the 
institutions that structure where entrepreneurial gains will be highest in a society.
Despite the controversy over land purchases, in November 1905 the GTP publicly 
announced that “Kaien Island, in the Skeena River, has been chosen, and the company
will not swerve from its decision to make a great port at that point at the dictation of a 
few men who may desire to speculate in city lots. The company holds that as regards 
trade with the far East, Kaien Island has an advantage of several hundred miles over 
the more southerly route”.321
A Kaien Island special committee was formed to negotiate a price for the remaining 
provincial lands and the B.C. provincial house accepted the report of the committee on 
Saturday the 10th of March, 1906, agreeing to the terms of $1 per acre.322
In all, the GTP had acquired approximately 24,000 acres at Prince Rupert, including 
virtually the entire water frontage along Kaien Island totalling 55 miles. This ensured 
that the GTP secured “virtual control of the port”, with any rivals to “experience 
considerable difficulty in gaining access to the water and thus set up a competition 
which in the case of railways is often disastrous to both rivals”.323
The harbour would have a perfectly straight entrance with a width of 2,000 feet at its 
narrowest point; it was completely rock free and had a minimum depth of 36 feet at low 
tide, with 1,500 feet still available at a 60 foot depth.324
Debates between the GTP, provincial and federal governments over land rights would 
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continue, often ending up in the courts, until Prince Rupert was declared a public 
harbour by the Privy Council on October 12, 1910.325 This “preposterous” declaration, 
according to Frank Leonard, “made the federal government rather than the Province 
proprietor of the foreshore”.326 The result was the immediate handover of 2,000 feet of 
waterfront property that the GTP had already leased to private interests, requiring the 
GTP to transfer 1,500 feet of city waterfront in another block as well as the adjacent 
block before the government would relinquish its reserve. All up, it took almost ten 
years for the GTP to secure the waterfront blocks that it had originally selected, during 
which time “the GTP had lost revenue from current leaseholders, been unable to 
enforce its traffic clause, and had not provided accommodation for other businesses 
wishing to locate on the waterfront”.327
The GTP, excluding the section of the waterfront now reserved for the federal 
government, had complete control over the port of Prince Rupert. While under the 
BNA. Act its activities still fell under federal jurisdiction and so good relations had to be 
maintained, it was still essentially a private endeavour (the large government stake in 
the GTP itself notwithstanding).328 This was an important institutional issue concerning 
the GTP: the potential of both federal and provincial interference in its operations. 
While the Provincial government had no jurisdiction over the GTP itself, it was in a 
position to influence virtually all of the firms that would use the line. In one such 
example, a potential pulp exporter responded to a request by the Prince Rupert Port 
Development Commission for it to relocate some of its business North by stating that “I 
do not know how the Government of British Columbia would feel if some tonnage were 
to be diverted… for shipment out of Prince Rupert. I have a feeling that… [it] would not 
325 Privy Council, Order in Council 1910-1966, Series A-1-D, Volume 2806, 1910.
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be exactly happy about such a change”.329
The competition between Prince Rupert and Vancouver was linked directly to that 
between the GTP and CPR. However, this competition did not manifest itself in 
innovations, lower prices, differing organisational structures or other attempts to “win” 
as we so often see in the private sector. The competition between these two railroads 
took place in Ottawa and in the offices of the Provincial governments. Transcontinental 
freight rates were fixed; entry and exit into the industry was restricted; and if any 
sphere of government was not taken into consideration by management then hold-up 
problems could occur.330
Thus both the GTP and CPR, as well as the ports of Vancouver and Prince Rupert, had
to conform to a certain governance structure to remain in the good graces of the State, 
if they wished to preserve their monopoly privileges, qualify for continued State funds 
and political support. The vertically integrated organisational structure of the railways 
was, in a sense, forced upon them by the institutional environment they operated within
as they had to “compete not just for resources and customers, but for political power 
and institutional legitimacy, for social as well as economic fitness”.331
The transcontinental Canadian railways were a product not of market forces but of 
political will and so that was the arena where competition took place. The structure of 
the institutional environment that they operated in was one with multiple groups of 
actors competing on various fronts, from private investors based mostly in the UK and 
railway operators in Canada to several layers of public authorities that were themselves
competing with each other (Provincial, Provincial-federal and local-Provincial-federal 
competition). The distribution of power among all of these actors changed with time, as 
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did the fortunes of the railways and ports.
One of the outcomes of this competition was a very vertically integrated structure 
where rail infrastructure, operations, ports and even steamships all fell within the same 
organisation. There are many reasons why a firm vertically integrates, from the risk of 
post-contractual opportunistic behaviour to the frequency of exchange and asset 
specificity.332 Railroads and ports have high levels of asset specificity; for private capital
to invest, there must be an appropriate balance between potential gains and potential 
losses (i.e., risk). 
High levels of asset specificity raise transaction costs because the exchange in 
question depends on a specific person, specific location, or specific physical assets. In 
the case of Prince Rupert, the port is in a fixed location, its assets are extremely 
difficult to liquidate or transfer, and its continued existence was dependent on the good 
graces of actors within both the GTP and government. Therefore the ability for the port 
to bargain ex post was low and the potential for opportunism high. Thus, it becomes 
efficient to either organise the port within a more hierarchical governance structure, or 
as Yoram Barzel points out, form long-term relationships using contractual guarantees, 
allowing for more precise measurement as a result of separate financial accounts, and 
for rights to be enforced through the courts (assuming a strong legal system, which 
Canada had).333
We saw both of these in the case of Prince Rupert: long-term contracts were 
established with the government in the form of significant guarantees (so that the 
government also had a large stake in the game, so to speak), monopoly privileges, and
various other concessions such as land grands, rate limits and service requirements. 
Additionally, the entire railway was vertically integrated from East to West, with every 
single town site, port or transhipment hub along the route owned and operated by the 
332 Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process.”
333 Y Barzel, “Organizational Forms and Measurement Costs,” Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics 161, no. 3 (2005): 357–73.
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railway or a subsidiary (e.g. the Grant Trunk Development Company).
Illustration 4.2: The Controlling Interests at Prince Rupert
The requirement for the vertical integration of the GTP (ports, town sites, and the rail 
line itself) was written into its mandate as part of Chapter 71 of the Statutes of Canada 
1903. In the agreement that was signed on the 29th of July 1903, a number of 
obligations were imposed that left Edson J. Chamberlin, the last President of the GTP, 
to describe the entire operation as “an impossibility… it was always impossible”.334 In 
the same interrogation, he went on to say that:
“We are bound to make the same rates from Halifax and St. John as are made 
to Boston and Portland, and we are bound to provide steamships on the 
Atlantic and on the Pacific to take care of any business offering.”
334 Henry L. Drayton and W.M. Acworth, Royal Commission to Inquire into Railways and 
Transportation in Canada Fonds, Re Grand Trunk Pacific Railway. (Ottawa, February 
1917), 166, RG33-12, Library and Archives Canada.
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“We can no more carry out that contract with the Government than anything in 
the World. How are we going to raise money to build those Steamships? How 
are we going to build Steamships? How are we going to carry the burden if we 
are forced to carry all that stuff all the way down there are Boston and Portland 
rates? It was always impossible.”335
The creation of the GTP and the port of Prince Rupert under such a complete contract 
was, in hindsight, a mistake. Forecasting is no easy task and the exuberance in 
Canada in the early 1900’s – from 1896 to 1914 Canada had the world’s fastest 
growing western economy, with GDP per capita increasing by nearly 80% – led the 
owners of the Grand Trunk into agreeing to terms that would barely be economically 
viable at the best of times.336
Figure 4.1: Growth in GDP Per Capita of the “Western Offshoots” and the United 
Kingdom, 1896 – 1914337
While the optimism concerning railways was prevalent throughout Canada at the time –
the Drayton-Acworth Commission of Inquiry Into Railways and Transportation in 
335 Ibid., 167.
336 Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden, “The First Update of the Maddison Project; Re-
Estimating Growth Before 1820,” Maddison Project Working Paper 4 (2013), 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm.
337 Ibid.
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Canada admitted that “at least it may be said for them [railway entrepreneurs] that 
almost the whole population of Canada shared their expectation”, there were also 
sounder heads highlighting the risks.338 One such person was Andrew Blair. Blair, who 
resigned from his post as Minister of Railways and Canals following the official 
announcement of the GTP in 1903, warned that “the idea… that the whole western 
country can be filled with railways… is not well founded”. He advised the government, 
but was ignored, not “to rush with headlong haste to authorize the construction at 
enormous cost of two lines of railway through the same country”.339
Indeed, the entire business model of the GTP rested on the monopoly privilege that it 
wrongly assumed it would have in North West Canada. Mr. Chamberlin noted that:
"[T]he Grand Trunk Pacific Officials of that day would never have gone into it if 
they had thought a competing line would be built alongside their line all the way
through. They thought they would have a chance to go ahead for fifteen years, 
year after year. If they had thought that instead they would have had 
competition immediately all the way through, I am sure they would never have 
entered into the agreement.
I say that the situation would not have been nearly as bad as it is now if the 
Government had not subsidized another line paralleling ours all the way 
through, to which they gave larger guarantees than they did to the Grand Trunk 
Pacific, and in addition gave them $18,000 a mile cash."340
Chamberlin was speaking about the competition his railway faced from the Canadian 
Northern, a railway that Lewis and MacKinnon noted was financed “almost exclusively 
with debt”; indeed, it was a railway deliberately designed by its promoters “to choose a 
338 Drayton and Acworth, Royal Commission to Inquire into Railways and Transportation in 
Canada Fonds, ixii.
339 Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 3rd Session, 9th Parliament, vol. 61 (Ottawa: 
R. Duhamel, 1867), 8433–8434.
340 Drayton and Acworth, Royal Commission to Inquire into Railways and Transportation in 
Canada Fonds, 169.
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debt-equity ratio which increased the likelihood of failure, because by doing so they 
increased the expected government transfers”.341
By using guaranteed bonds rather than outright subsidies to finance the second and 
third transcontinental railways the government transferred the risk of failure onto itself, 
effectively lowering the maximum loss potential for equity holders, increasing their 
expected net returns. This made the unprofitable railways profitable ex ante as private 
investors became willing to finance the undertakings with the knowledge that, in the 
scenario of insolvency, they would have their capital returned to them.342 It was a 
classic example of what can happen when poor contracting decisions leave a party 
open to the pitfalls of “moral hazard”.343
Thus it was understandable that investors showed, from the outset, “little interest in…
accountability”, as “they enjoy government guarantees”.344 According to one critic at the
time, the endeavours of the Canadian Northern and the GTP “has not been surpassed 
in shamelessness in the railway annals of any country”.345
From an institutional viewpoint, the problems at Prince Rupert began the moment the 
GTP’s contract with the government was signed. This was a long-term contract, the 
type of contract that Ronald Coase warned is “less possible and, indeed, the less 
desirable it is… to specify what the other contracting party is expected to do”.346 Unlike 
the State Agreement at Port Hedland which set the rate of State royalties but otherwise
left the mining companies free to go about their business, the GTP's contract was 
extremely complete and inflexible.
341 Frank Lewis and Mary MacKinnon, “Government Loan Guarantees and the Failure of the 
Canadian Northern Railway,” The Journal of Economic History 47, no. 1 (1987): 194.
342 This assumes, as was the case in Canada at the time, that the institutional structure is one 
where the guarantor – the federal government – has the credibility to honour its obligations.
343 Kenneth J. Arrow, “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,” The American
Economic Review 53, no. 6 (1963): 941–73; Mark V. Pauly, “The Economics of Moral 
Hazard: Comment,” The American Economic Review 58, no. 3 (1968): 531–37.
344 B Eichengreen, “Financing Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Lessons from the 
Railway Age,” The World Bank Research Observer, 1994, 21.
345 Biggar, The Canadian Railway Problem, 159.
346 Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” 21.
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This contractual feature made it almost impossible for the GTP to adjust strategy 
according to market demand. In just one example, when asked if the GTP could send 
traffic through Portland instead of through Halifax so as to make a profit on that route, 
Mr. Chamberlin replied that it could not, as a schedule in Chapter VI of the Statutes of 
Canada 1903 forced the GTP “to go on with all that tremendous outlay and to carry that
load, and yet not get a dollar of benefit from it”, or it would be a “fraud on the 
agreement”.347
The GTP found itself “trapped”; like so many other railways in Canada at the time, it 
was unlikely to ever turn a profit. But this was not a case of opportunism by the 
government. The contract was also poorly designed from the government’s point of 
view.348 By providing direct subsidies and especially by guaranteeing the debt of the 
railways, the government increased the attractiveness of these projects but also 
created a set of perverse incentives that doomed them to failure. As George 
Glazebrook concluded, neither the GTP nor CPR would have been possible without 
government guarantees as investors knew that the returns were simply not there.349 
They were not built for economic reasons but for normative ones (i.e., Canadian 
unification). But the only way this could happen was if the Canadian government could 
attract capital – Canada herself a relatively new nation was heavily reliant on foreign, 
especially British, capital – was to guarantee the returns on it so as to divert that capital
from more productive uses and into Canadian railways.
Investors rightly believed that the Privy Council would force the Canadian government 
to honour any contracts it signed and so were more than happy to invest in the 
endeavour, regardless of the fact there was no virtually no hope of generating the traffic
required to service the debt.
347 Drayton and Acworth, Royal Commission to Inquire into Railways and Transportation in 
Canada Fonds, 163.
348 Assuming good intentions on the part of the government officials.
349 George Parkin de Twenebroker Glazebrook, A History of Transportation in Canada 
(California: Greenwood Press, 1969).
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Investors had almost no incentive to monitor their investments as the rate of return was
guaranteed: success or failure was irrelevant; they would achieve the same returns 
regardless. Likewise those involved in the promotion, construction and operation of the 
railways not only had no incentive to be frugal, but in fact faced the opposite incentive: 
the incentive to allow costs to blow-out as much as possible to maximise their private 
gains. They were also contractually insulated from private losses; as Currie noted:
“As the Government would guarantee bonds up to one-half the cost of the road,
hard-pressed promoters were tempted to inflate their costs, effectively force the
Government to assume responsibility for more than its proper share of the 
actual expenditure, and reduce the real value of the assets against which, 
under the Guarantee Act, the Government held a first mortgage.”350
The entire saga was one that, given a different institutional environment, would not 
have failed on the scale that it did. The construction of the CPR, while economically 
premature, was justified on normative, nationalistic grounds from a ‘Canadian’ point of 
view. However, the construction of the railways that followed it – especially the GTP 
and its port of Prince Rupert – was certainly a waste of resources.
4.5. "The Greatest Next Year Town in the World", 1917 – 1939351
Following the collapse of the GTP and the recommendations of the Drayton-Acworth 
Report, every railway in Canada other than the CPR and provincially-owned railways 
were nationalised and merged into the Canadian National Railway (CNR) under the 
CNR Act 1919.352 In what would be an important decision for Prince Rupert, the CNR 
decided to use its Vancouver terminal rather than the GTP’s terminal at Prince Rupert, 
downgrading it to a branch line. One of the key reasons was that, in spite of being 
closer to the Orient as far as ocean shipping time was concerned, Prince Rupert was 
350 Archibald William Currie, The Grand Trunk Railway of Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1975), 9.
351 W.J. Scott, “Draft Speech” (Prince Rupert Port Development Commission, Undated), 4, 
983-13, Prince Rupert City & Regional Archives.
352 Angus MacMurchy, John David Spence, and John Shirley Denison, The Canadian Railway 
Act, 1919 (Toronto: Canada Law Book Co., 1922).
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272km further away by rail from the grain farmers in the Prairies.
Canada had on September 6, 1897 implemented what was known as the “Crow” rates, 
a law that capped Eastbound rates on grain and Westbound rates on a variety of 
products in exchange for a subsidy to the CPR to build a line from Lethbridge in Alberta
through the ‘Crow's Nest Pass’ to Nelson in British Columbia. This was a line that was 
at the time economically unviable but politically valuable. Initially this rate did not cause
any major distortions; indeed, competition between the railways would actually push 
the market rate below the Crow Rate’s cap until the First World War arrived, which in 
1918 saw the law suspended due to rampant inflation as the government struggled to 
finance its war efforts with traditional means.353
However once inflation had subsided and the worldwide 1920s post-war boom – the 
“Roaring Twenties” – had arrived, the agreement was partially reimposed in 1922. It 
came into full effect in 1924, only to be scrapped in 1925 and replaced with a statute 
that set all rates on grain and flour moving from all points on all lines West of Thunder 
Bay at their 1899 level, even for lines that did not exist at the time.354 By 1983, over 50 
commodities were still moving West at the statutory 1899 rate.355
The results of this policy were as an economist would expect: that price controls would 
leave the railways unable to operate certain Westward lines at even break-even levels, 
the lines would be abandoned or if legally required to operate them, left in a state of 
disrepair, in much the same way that rental price control distorts the market for 
housing.356 Indeed, the railways were left with “no incentive to invest in new facilities 
and equipment linked to the grain trade, or even to maintain existing ones”.357
353 K.H. Norrie, “Not Much to Crow about: A Primer on the Statutory Grain Freight Rate Issue,” 
Canadian Public Policy 9, no. 4 (1983): 435.
354 Roger W Garrison, “The Roaring Twenties and the Bullish Eighties: The Role of 
Government in Boom and Bust,” Critical Review 7, no. 2–3 (1993): 259–76.
355 Norrie, “Not Much to Crow about: A Primer on the Statutory Grain Freight Rate Issue,” 435.
356 E.O. Olsen, “An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control,” The Journal of Political Economy 
80, no. 6 (1972): 1081–1100.
357 Norrie, “Not Much to Crow about: A Primer on the Statutory Grain Freight Rate Issue,” 436.
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What this meant for Prince Rupert was that suddenly the additional 272km in distance 
relative to Vancouver from the Prairies became a cost that the railways were not willing 
to bear at an identical freight rate, even if the shipping costs to the orient were lower 
and overall transport efficiency would have been greater. Thus, the CNR virtually 
abandoned the Prince Rupert line. To make matters worse, the construction and 
operation of a grain terminal at Prince Rupert, undertaken by the federal government 
and opening on 29 January 1926, ironically created yet another reason not to use the 
port. This was because the Prairie grain syndicate (the Canadian Co-operative Wheat 
Producers Limited), established by grain growers to be their sales agent, used a 
system of 5-year contracts whereby all wheat was turned over “to the Pools under 
arrangements which left little room for the private trader”.358
As described by Mr. J. Spicer, Vice President of the CNR’s Mountain Region, the major 
problem with the Prince Rupert grain elevator was that it had always been government 
owned and was thus ineligible to join the private grain syndicate that had been 
controlling grain exports since 1923. According to Spicer, the Board of Grain 
Commissioners and the Canadian Wheat Board were well aware of this, but were 
“reluctant to take business away from the [syndicated] elevator companies”, adding that
“the elevator would receive more use if owned or leased by one of the elevator 
companies”.359
The government elevator at Prince Rupert was described in the House of Commons as
“just about as useful as a fifth wheel on a wagon”, given that it cost the federal 
government $1,329,000 to construct at a port that in 1924 moved only 26,237 tonnes of
freight, 4% that of Vancouver (676,942 tonnes).360 Another member regarded it as 
having “at present… absolutely no justification”.361
358 Easterbrook and Aitken, Canadian Economic History, 501.
359 J Spicer, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Prince Rupert Port Development Commission” 
(Prince Rupert Port Development Commission, October 19, 1971), 983-13, Prince Rupert 
City & Regional Archives.
360 Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 4th Session, 14th Parliament (Ottawa, 1925), 
3696.
361 Ibid., 3527.
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There were also doubts about whether the government should have ever got involved. 
“Nearly all the elevators comprising the 65,000,000 bushel capacity at the head of the 
lakes were built by private capital, noted Mr. Manion, and “wherever grain elevators 
have been required for the business of the country, private capital has been only too 
happy to build them… if there was really demand for an elevator at Prince Rupert 
private capital would have come forward for that purpose”.362
History would prove them correct; the grain elevator at Prince Rupert only loaded nine 
ships from 1937 – 1951 for a total of 63,382 tonnes of grain, serving primarily as an 
overload facility for Vancouver.363
Table 4.2: Grain Received at the Prince Rupert Elevator, 1927 – 1936 and Prince 
Rupert Imports and Exports, 1921 – 1934364
Year Bushels Received Total Imports Total Exports
1921 -  $        1,800,000  $          2,200,000 
1922 -  $        1,300,000  $          7,000,000 
1923 -  $        1,400,000  $          9,700,000 
1924 -  $        1,700,000  $        15,700,000 
1925 -  $        1,300,000  $        15,800,000 
1926 -  $        1,400,000  $        15,400,000 
1927          5,643,074  $        1,500,000  $        20,600,000 
1928          8,005,918  $        1,000,000  $        27,000,000 
1929          2,501,046  $        1,100,000  $        19,700,000 
1930          1,118,835  $        1,400,000  $        11,100,000 
1931              373,638  $            900,000  $          8,000,000 
1932          1,151,096  $            550,000  $          8,100,000 
1933              139,278  $            450,000  $          5,200,000 
362 Ibid., 3528.
363 Hick, Hays’ Orphan: The Story of the Port of Prince Rupert, 39.
364 Canadian Bureau of Economics and C.N.R., “Notes RE: Grand Trunk Pacific Railway (Now 
C.N.R.) And Prince Rupert, B.C.” (Montreal, July 21, 1936), 2–3, RG66, Library and 
Archives Canada.
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Year Bushels Received Total Imports Total Exports
1934          1,091,904  $            470,000  $          4,200,000 
1935          1,229,888 - -
1936              998,887 - -
The CNR owned almost the entire waterfront at Prince Rupert, and given the “Crow 
Rates”, there was little incentive for either the CNR to develop Prince Rupert 
themselves nor for any investors to buy or lease the land and take up the task given 
the those incentives. There was also no incentive for the Province to encourage the 
utilisation of Prince Rupert, with a study by M.W. Menzies Group Ltd. estimating that 
development at Prince Rupert could cost the Province’s BC Rail up to 80% of its traffic 
to the CNR.365 
Finally, the risk involved in an investment at Prince Rupert was significant; the State’s 
(both provincial and federal) susceptibility to interest group pressure was high, 
especially concerning railways and ports, the result of which was higher transaction 
costs and inefficient institutions governing Prince Rupert.366 The institutions governing 
Prince Rupert were more heavily influenced by social and political factors than 
economic ones and since the cost of transacting in a political market is high, political 
actors maintain a large degree of discretion, meaning that unless a project was backed 
by a powerful political actor or actors, the transaction costs would likely be too high for 
it to succeed.367
As John F. Young pointed out, the federal government did not do much to offset the 
365 Hick, Hays’ Orphan: The Story of the Port of Prince Rupert, 43.
366 North, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History; North, Institutions, 
Institutional Change, and Economic Performance; Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: 
Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities; Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic 
Behavior and Institutions: Principles of Neoinstitutional Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990).
367 North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, chap. 2; Robert H. 
Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development 
in Kenya, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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high transaction costs that prevailed at Prince Rupert.368 It played it safe, when in 
Young’s opinion even “a federal endorsement of the status quo for a seven year period 
might have been sufficient to encourage investment from private sources… since any 
alteration of the existing regulations or shifts in federal involvement could seriously 
jeopardize the potential for earnings”.369
The federal government and the CNR (a federal government railway) were either 
unwilling or simply unaware of the need to credibly commit not to expropriate rents ex-
post from any investment at Prince Rupert. With the Province facing disincentives to 
any expansion at the port, Prince Rupert would fade into obscurity. As W.J Scott put it, 
by “1939 our fine natural harbour was still undisturbed by deep-sea shipping, still 500 
closer to the Orient than Vancouver, still the terminus of a Trans-Continental Railway 
but still a fishing community, the Halibut capital of the World”.370
4.6. The War Boom, 1939 – 1945
By 1939, the port of Prince Rupert lay in a state of disrepair, “plans for docks, hotels 
and other projects… shelved or scrapped”, with the town having become “a fishing 
village”.371
The global price of wheat had fallen over 80 percent from its peak and Canada’s 
railroads, once a source of euphoric national optimism, had saddled the nation with 
debt.372
According to Mr. E.W. Beatty, Chairman and President of the CPR at the time, the 
“experiments of the past have left us with a publicly owned system which has a debt of 
no less than $2,895,799,134, as of December 31, 1933… No serious student of 
economics – not even those who warmly advocate great expenditures of public funds 
368 J.F. Young, “Alberta’s Port? Networked Federalism and the Port Development in Prince 
Rupert,” Canadian Political Science Review 2, no. 4 (2008): 51–59.
369 Ibid., 53.
370 Scott, “Draft Speech,” 2.
371 Ibid.
372 Hick, Hays’ Orphan: The Story of the Port of Prince Rupert, 35.
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as the road to the revival of business – has ever suggested that anyone can benefit by 
the operation of publicly owned utilities at a great loss”.373
However with the advent of World War Two, suddenly there was another nationalistic 
rather than economic justification for the railroads: the transport of U.S. and Canadian 
troops to the Pacific along with supplies to aid in the war effort.374 In a personal 
account, Richard Neuberger describes the scene as one where:
“Over the once-glorious Grand Trunk Pacific route to Prince Rupert were 
carried the men and equipment to repel the first invasion of North American soil
since 1812. Soon the hillsides were covered with barracks. The docks were 
choked with bulldozers, power shovels, field artillery and emergency rations. 
Fuel drums stood everywhere.”375
The arrival of the war saw the Prince Rupert taken over by the military and the dry dock
– first constructed by the GTP in 1915 with a 20,000-ton floating dock – was once 
again put to work, it having been “used partly as a cow pasture” prior to the war.376 
During the war effort, the Prince Rupert dry dock not only provided repairs for Pacific 
vessels (over 400) but also assembled corvettes to 10,000 ton freighters (15 freighters 
in total) in addition to assembling four minesweepers for the Royal Canadian Navy.377
But the problems at Prince Rupert were never about a lack technical expertise. It was 
the mix of incentives established by its institutional environment – from the BNA Act 
bestowing jurisdiction of the port to Ottawa, the CNR’s incentives not to use its line due
to the Crow Rates (again related to the BNA Act), all the way down to the vested 
interests at Vancouver and the Province’s competition with Ottawa and therefore 
refusal to consider Prince Rupert as a Pacific Terminal, else ruin its BC Rail.
373 John J. Cornwell to The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, Public Relations 
Department, December 21, 1934, RG33-12, Library and Archives Canada.
374 Barman, The West beyond the West, 278.
375 Richard L. Neuberger, “Frontier Railroads,” Railway Progress, October 1951, 7.
376 Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 1st Session, 20th Parliament (Ottawa, 1945), 
150.
377 Ibid.; Hick, Hays’ Orphan: The Story of the Port of Prince Rupert, 36.
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The war boom at the port would prove to be temporary; as soon as the war was over, 
whatever assets could be salvaged were dismantled and moved out of Prince Rupert. 
The United States’ Jones Act, which had been suspended during the war, was put back
in place and meant that foreign vessels (Canadian) could no longer carry materials 
between Alaskan harbours, ruling Prince Rupert out as a transhipment port to send 
goods to and from Alaska. By one estimate, this raised shipping costs to Alaska by 
112.5% – $40.80 from Prince Rupert as opposed to $86.70 from Seattle – although 
even without the Jones Act, the CNR would not have been on board unless provided 
with concessions given the rail rates were identical at the time.378
The drydock reverted to CNR ownership, although it still had no interest in developing 
the port; it was focused on its other, more profitable (due to below-cost fixed Western 
rates379) and politically valuable lines.380 Outsiders were not even able to discern who 
actually had day to day control of the port, such was the indifference shown by the 
CNR and the State. As Mr. Archibald put it in the House of Commons, “When you 
approach the government they tell you to go to the CNR, and when you go to the CNR 
they tell you to go to the government”.381
“Each time there has been an attempt of any kind at port development in the city of 
Prince Rupert in one of the finest harbours on the west coast”, described Mr. Howard in
the House of Commons, “it has been blocked by the Canadian National. Each time a 
proposal has been put forward to do something worth while with that port, the 
Canadian National, which controls the waterfront, has said, “We are not interested in 
doing anything – in assisting, in giving up prerogative right or doing anything at all 
worth while to develop the port”.382
378 Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 2nd Session, 20th Parliament (Ottawa, 1946),
3356; Richard L. Neuberger, “Destiny’s Railroad,” Railroad Magazine, May 1950, 23.
379 The “Crow Rates” were still in effect and had become even more severe with the wartime 
inflation.
380 Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 2nd Session, 20th Parliament, 360.
381 Ibid., 244.
382 Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 4th Session, 28th Parliament (Ottawa, 1972), 
699.
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For while the CNR did not want to give up the valuable land it had at Prince Rupert, it 
was not particularly keen on it developing either, as the Westbound rail rates had been 
made artificially unprofitable by the federal government.
4.7. Institutional Changes and a Chance for a Revival, 1945 – 1985
Following the war little occurred at Prince Rupert. The Celanese Corporation of 
America through its Canadian subsidiary Columbia Cellulose Limited constructed a 
pulp mill at the site in 1947 but, other than the rather dormant government grain 
terminal which in the decade from 1960-1970 loaded an average of just 17 ships per 
annum, nothing much changed, other than a further dismantling of infrastructure and 
the sale of the CNR’s dry dock to Seattle in 1955 as there “did not seem to be anybody 
else available who was interested in taking over the dry dock”.383
However while the port itself remained much unchanged, there was a slow institutional 
change occurring in Canada which would eventually see Prince Rupert capitalise on 
the opportunity presented and emerge as a potential export powerhouse.
The first such change was that of the central government’s jurisdiction over “national 
harbours”, as defined by the BNA Act. The Prince Rupert foreshore was still largely 
owned by the CNR. However, while technically a “public harbour” under the BNA Act, 
Prince Rupert did not fall under the jurisdiction of Canada's National Harbours Board 
(NHB) but rather the Department of Transport, although at that stage this fact was 
largely irrelevant. For the NHB was a body that interests in Vancouver believed in 1952
was “not being carried on in the manner intended by the original act”.384 While “various 
public bodies, including the city council, have united to urge that this additional 
dredging be done without further delay”, the NHB was deaf to their needs, even as 
some “vessels have had to wait outside the harbour until the tide was right to permit 
383 Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 3rd Session, 22nd Parliament (Ottawa, 1956),
3351.
384 Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 6th Session, 21st Parliament (Ottawa, 1952), 
2286.
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them to come in”.385 This was because, according to Mr. Green in the House of 
Commons, “With the setting up of the national harbours board the local people lost 
control… I do not believe the present difficulty would have arisen in Vancouver harbour 
if there had been a local advisory council operating”.386
According to a 1932 report by eminent British port engineer Sir Alexander Gibb that 
provided the foundations of the NHB:
“I strongly advocate a local advisory council… It is essential to avoid 
emasculating the local administration, since no centralized control can replace 
an efficient and active local administration, or the special knowledge and 
initiative of the local business community, both of which are vital to a port’s 
prosperity.
It is invaluable in exploring the possibilities of local markets, in carrying out 
advertisements and propaganda and in co-operation with interests likely to 
promote industrial developments. Finally, a local council provides a useful 
check on the tendency of more or less permanent officials to become 
stereotyped or arbitrary.”387
This recommendation was not implemented when the NHB was created; full control 
remained in Ottawa and Pacific ports, especially Vancouver, grew increasingly 
frustrated. Finally in 1952, actors at Vancouver began what would be the first step 
towards regaining local control, getting approval from Ottawa to establish “a voluntary 
committee” at the port of Vancouver, “made up of various bodies such as the 
merchants’ exchange, the board of trade, the Canadian Manufacturers Association and 
the shipping people”. While this committee would have “no legal status”, it was the first 
step to achieving a change in the institutions that had governed Canada’s ports since 
385 Ibid., 2287.
386 Ibid.
387 Ibid.
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the BNA Act was first signed in 1867.388
Indeed, by 1957 Vancouver had 31,433 vessels arrive, some 60% of the total number 
of arrivals at all ports under NHB control (49,421), comprising some 40% of the total 
tonnage arriving and departing in Canada. Yet only 6% of the NHB’s annual 
maintenance budget was spent at Vancouver and just 5% of total spending on capital 
development was allocated there.389 The sum of $207,860 spent on maintenance at 
Vancouver was less than that at the port of Churchill, a port which is only ice-free for 88
days a year and handled a total of 132 vessels in 1957; Churchill was, however, heavily
promoted in Ottawa by the influential provincial government of Manitoba.390 According 
to Mr. Payne in the House of Commons, Vancouver was Canada’s “Cinderella port. As 
far as the former minister of transport was concerned, it was hidden 3,000 miles from 
Ottawa and across the Rocky mountains. That was the measure of concern that was 
given to this industrial and commercial facility…”391
Out of the 18 British Columbian seats in the 1945 federal Parliament, Prince Rupert 
(Skeena) was represented by one member.392 By comparison, Vancouver had six 
members in the Vancouver area alone, with two more in the immediate vicinity 
(Vancouver Island). It is then no surprise that if Vancouver was having trouble 
influencing Ottawa – federal Parliament had 263 members in 1945, so the Vancouver 
voice represented just over 2% of the elected Parliamentarians – Prince Rupert was 
not even on the radar.
Arguably the number of Parliamentarians a region has should not affect the 
development of a port; however, ports were institutionally locked in the jurisdiction of 
the federal government. Thus without a significant voice in Ottawa pushing for port 
388 Ibid., 2547–2548.
389 Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 2nd Session, 24th Parliament (Ottawa, 1959),
2764.
390 Ibid.
391 Ibid.
392 Parliament of Canada, “List of Parliamentarians 1945,” accessed October 11, 2013, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/Pages/Occupations.aspx.
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reform or local development, it was unlikely that anything would change.
However, post-WW2 Canada was in the process of transforming her institutions in a 
direction contrary to other Western nations such as Australia and the US. While the 
federal governments of all three nations grew in wealth and power relative to the 
Provinces (or States) during the war, the balance of power in Canada moved far more 
in the direction of the Provinces than in Australia or the US in the post-war period.393 
The point is, according to Canadian legal historian Peter Hogg, “that the distribution of 
powers in the Constitution of Canada is much less favourable to federal power than 
would be suggested merely by comparing the text with that of the American or 
Australian Constitutions”.394
The power gained by the Provinces at the expense of Ottawa was achieved through 
the judiciary rather than through legislation passed in Ottawa. It was this, according to 
David E. Smith, “which slackened the federal political sail and empowered the 
provincial governments… [today] of the unit governments in the three Anglo-American 
federations (Canada, Australia and the US) the Canadian Provinces are by far the most
powerful”.395
While the federal government today still maintains the power to confiscate assets “for 
the general advantage of Canada”, this power was used less frequently post-war and 
was last used in the Teleglobe Canada Reorganization and Divestiture Act 1987, c.12, 
s. 9.396
Admiring the success of Vancouver’s Port Committee which had at least aroused 
Ottawa’s attention, Prince Rupert established its own committee in 1966 called the 
“Prince Rupert Port Commission”. One of its first aims was to have a representative of 
the NHB visit the port as since its inception in 1936, not a single official from the NHB 
393 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 105.
394 Ibid., 120.
395 Smith, The Invisible Crown: The First Principle of Canadian Government, 13.
396 Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, sec. 22.8.
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had set foot in Prince Rupert.397 However, it was not long until Mr. Pickersgill, the 
Minister for Transport, was invited to visit and he promptly expressed his dismay at the 
state of the port:
“I don't think, as a Canadian, I am very proud of the look of the waterfront in 
Prince Rupert and as Minister of Transport I am not proud of it. I want to be 
proud of it and I want to have a better looking waterfront there or at any rate 
plans in being and being carried out for a better looking waterfront there before 
I come back again and I want to come back again soon.”398
There was still a financial incentive to use Prince Rupert, with freight costs for 
industries in the North significantly lower than those to Vancouver (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: 1966 Freight Costs (per 100lb), Vancouver vs. Prince Rupert399
From To 
Vancouver Prince Rupert
Vanderhoof $0.48 $0.32
Prince George $0.45 $0.31
Houston $0.51 $0.29
Smithers $0.53 $0.27
Terrace $0.59 $0.15
Wharfage and handling fees were also “not too much different here [Prince Rupert] 
from Vancouver”, the only thing lacking were the facilities to handle it.400
It would not be until after 17 February 1970 when a public announcement was made 
about plans to establish a Port Authority in Vancouver that things in Prince Rupert 
began to look up.401
397 Jack Pickersgill, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Prince Rupert Port Development 
Commission” (Prince Rupert Port Development Commission, April 20, 1967), 983-13, 
Prince Rupert City & Regional Archives.
398 Ibid.
399 R.O. Clefstad et al., “Memo on Meeting Held at Crest Hotel” (Prince Rupert Port 
Development Commission, October 1, 1966), 983-13, Prince Rupert City & Regional 
Archives.
400 Ibid.
401 Mr. Mark Rose, Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 2nd Session, 28th Parliament
(Ottawa, 1970), 8651.
133
Vancouver had been officially lobbying the federal government for local autonomy since
1952 and finally succeeded nearly twenty years later when it became a Port Authority. 
This was something originally recommended in the 1963 Glassco Royal Commission, 
which was critical of Ottawa’s management of Canadian ports. The report stated that:
“Control of the seaports and airports now under review is centralized in Ottawa.
This results in criticism of standards adopted for capital works – too lavish to be
economic but short of what local pride demands – of services provided, and of 
charges therefor... The geography of Canada being what it is, your 
Commissioners are of the opinion that the aim should be to foster local pride 
and promote local participation.”402
This all came to a head in 1971, by which time Vancouver was the busiest port on the 
West coast of North America, exporting mostly bulk commodities. This throughput 
created problems that become very well known, even in Ottawa, when for example due
to a lack of berths over 20 ships had to lay idle in English Bay for weeks. “Vancouver 
can’t do anything without a nod from Ottawa”, reported John Clarke, and “[we] are 
puzzled by what they regard as a persistent lack of urgency in Ottawa’s attitude... [We] 
have sought dock improvements, more up-to-date equipment, more container facilities 
not only as local amenities but as vital necessities for the good of the country as a 
whole”.403
The Prince Rupert Development Commission, seeing Vancouver gain some autonomy 
as a Port Authority, began lobbying for inclusion under the NHB so as to achieve Port 
Authority status for itself. As a letter to the Vancouver Port Authority makes clear, “our 
group is attempting to gather information on how a Port Authority, such as the one at 
Vancouver could be established here in Prince Rupert”. If Prince Rupert had a Port 
Authority, the Commission thought, “we feel that the present degregated [sic] condition 
402 J. Grant Glassco, Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, Volume 5:
The Organization of the Government of Canada (Ottawa, 1963), 87, http://epe.lac-
bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions-ef/glassco1962-eng/glassco1962-eng.htm.
403 Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 4th Session, 28th Parliament, 818.
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of our harbour could be cleared up and laws enforced to help keep the harbour clean of
debris”.404
So it was to be when on 23 March, 1972, the Hon. Donald C. Jamieson, Minister of 
Transport, announced in the House of Commons that “the port of Prince Rupert will 
become the tenth National Harbours Board port… I am looking forward to inviting 
representatives of the community to serve as members of the Port of Prince Rupert 
Authority, which will be created at the earliest possible opportunity”.405
In addition to committing to form the Prince Rupert Port Authority, the NHB established 
for the first time an office in Winnipeg to “serve western Canadian requirements”, 
having had up until that point no office west of Ottawa, some 4,847km away from 
Prince Rupert and 4,358km from Vancouver.406
These developments and institutional changes were driven by new exogenous as well 
as endogenous circumstances: the former involving the emergence of Japan as a 
source of exports as well as the mass adoption of containerisation; and for the latter, an
institutional shift in Canada away from centralised control in Ottawa towards a more 
distributed, decentralised system where the Provinces increasingly held power.407
Pressure from entrepreneurs eager to export to Japan in the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s was a key factor in forcing the federal government’s hand to include Prince 
Rupert into the NHB. Investors were lining up to invest at Prince Rupert, with Prince 
Rupert Port Commission documents revealing letters of interest from Sumitomo Shoji 
Canada Ltd. to those from McLean’s Shipyard Ltd., the Foundation of Canada 
Engineering Corporation Ltd. (undertaking a feasibility study for a Japanese interest), 
Mitsui and Company (Canada) Ltd., Bunge Corporation (a grain exporter), McIntyre 
404 E.R. Gordon to Brian Gardiner, August 4, 1971, 983-13, Prince Rupert City & Regional 
Archives.
405 Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 4th Session, 28th Parliament, 1071–1072.
406 Ibid., 1072.
407 The “delay in providing adequate common-user facilities at Vancouver… resulted in 
substantial loss of container traffic to Seattle”. I Wallace, “Containerization at Canadian 
Ports,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 65, no. 3 (1975): 433.
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Porcupine Mines Ltd. (bulk loading facilities), Rocklen Development Corp. Ltd. (bulk 
loading facilities), and Western Wharves Ltd. (deep sea shipping facilities).408
There was also pressure from the Province, with Premier Bennett remarking in 1968 
that: “if the CNR would sell that rail line to British Columbia, we would see to it that 
Prince Rupert had a port like no other port anywhere.”409
Bennett’s ‘unofficial’ offers continued until 1971, when the CNR finally responded by 
stating:
“They suggest they would buy our main line between Prince George and Prince
Rupert for a dollar. But it isn’t for sale for a dollar. We aren’t likely to entertain a 
proposal which disposes of an integral part of our main line in northern B.C.”410
In addition, it reminded the Premier that:
“A takeover by the B.C. government is impossible because the line falls within 
federal jurisdiction. Statutes prevent such action.”
Concerning the private interest, McIntyre Porcupine Mines Ltd came closest to actually 
succeeding where so many before had failed. McIntyre Porcupine Mines Ltd., “would, if
it was decided to go ahead [development of Ridley Island], do its own financing and 
operation of the facilities. These facilities would be designed for bulk loading of coal, 
mineral concentrates, and similar products and pulp, paper, and lumber products were 
not compatible”.411
In addition, McIntyre “will welcome any monies spent on access and services but would
rather spend their own money on actual site to keep their own engineering etc [sic] 
408 to Prince Rupert Port Development Commission, “Various Letters,” n.d., 983-13, Prince 
Rupert City & Regional Archives.
409 Monte Roberts, Daily News Victoria, April 10, 1968.
410 Unnamed Newspaper, May 31, 1971, RG30, Library and Archives Canada.
411 W. Killbourne and McIntyre Porcupine Ltd., “Minutes of the Meeting of the Prince Rupert 
Port Development Commission” (Prince Rupert Port Development Commission, August 7, 
1970), 983-13, Prince Rupert City & Regional Archives.
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from being interfered with”.412
Its offer was to build a facility with a capacity of 3 million tons of coal annually, capable 
of handling 10 million tons without additional capital expenditure. Vessels up to 200,000
tons deadweight would be handled at the proposed facility (drawing around sixty feet) 
and McIntyre wanted to finance the entire site preparation, equipment and docks 
costing an estimated $14 million, but would require the government to supply an 
access road.413
Unfortunately for Prince Rupert, by 1972 the deal fell through when the Japanese client
at the other side of the deal halved the amount of coal originally required in the face of 
an economic slowdown.
Figure 4.2: Japanese Crude Steel Production, 1967 – 1987414
“It did not look good for Prince Rupert”, according to Mr. Scott, “as this quantity was not
feasible for development of a bulk loading facility at Ridley Island, unless there was 
[sic] other participants… unless there was Federal Government subsidization or others 
could be found to utilize a facility the shipments would be made through Neptune 
412 Ibid.
413 Ibid.
414 World Steel Association, “Steel Statistical Yearbooks, 1978 - 1988,” accessed January 21, 
2014, http://www.worldsteel.org/statistics/statistics-archive/yearbook-archive.html.
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Terminals in Vancouver”.415
Although this development was ultimately unsuccessful, the attention given to Prince 
Rupert from numerous private interests, the ever-improving lobbying abilities of the 
Prince Rupert Port Commission and an increasingly anxious Province – British 
Columbia had announced the intention to construct a coal handling facility on Howe 
Sound against the wishes of the federal government – saw the NHB finally take control 
of the port, and this would prove to only be the beginning.416 The institutional “lock-in” 
that had prevented development at Prince Rupert since the Second World War had 
been partially broken, only to be replaced with what would turn out to be an equally 
poor outcome.417
The first step in the transformation was the federal government's purchase of the 
remaining private land at Prince Rupert, owned by Western Wharves Ltd. This was 
completed in July 29, 1970 and helped facilitate the NHB's takeover of the port.418
The move to an NHB Port Authority saw an immediate resurgence in Prince Rupert, not
in demand for services but in federal attention, with the government allocating an initial 
$5m to improve the infrastructure at the port.419 However, the value of this investment 
was questionable at best. There was a “lack of planning in connection with the takeover
by the NHB”. No one knew “who and what was to be taken over… Coupled with this 
the planning for new facilities, the fire, the setting up of a new administration and the 
CN involvement were making it difficult for them to get straightened out let alone keep 
415 W.J. Scott, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Prince Rupert Port Development Commission” 
(Prince Rupert Port Development Commission, June 26, 1972), 983-13, Prince Rupert City 
& Regional Archives.
416 W.J. Scott, “W.J. Scott to Dave Barrett,” Private Letter, (February 12, 1973), 983-13, Prince 
Rupert City & Regional Archives.
417 Arthur, “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events.”
418 Hick, Hays’ Orphan: The Story of the Port of Prince Rupert, 58.
419 Mr. Jamieson, Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 4th Session, 28th Parliament, 
1072.
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us properly informed”.420 421
Nonetheless, there was a renewed optimism at Prince Rupert, with one magazine 
titling an article “The Port with a Future”, with the rather optimistic subtitle of “In fact, 
things are happening so quickly that it is expected further developments will be 
announced before this article is printed and circulated”.422
The provincial government had also agreed to join what was called a “joint 
transportation development program”, a “framework of federal-provincial co-
operation”.423 The idea was to provide joint financial aid for railways, ports and 
highways, with Prince Rupert being the subject of a “comprehensive joint program for 
port development… including the location, size, type and timing, general cargo and 
bulk commodity terminal facilities… [with] port authority or port commission operating 
arrangements… required as soon as possible”.424
But NHB control was hardly an improvement; its interests were firmly established in 
Ottawa and the governance rules for NHB-controlled ports saw very little room for local 
input or autonomy. Any expenditures over $50,000 would require approval from Ottawa
and decisions regarding tolls, storage rates, new construction, property management 
and personnel would also be run out of Ottawa.425
At Prince Rupert the period between 1973 – 1977 had seen three phases of 
construction lead to the creation of the 46-acre Fairview breakbulk terminal for the 
export of various commodities, from frozen fish to lumber. Located alongside CNR 
track, it consisted of a 1,400 foot-long dock offering 45 feet of water at low tide, and a 
420 There was a fire on 10 June 1972, which destroyed the 1,600 foot wooden ocean dock 
initially constructed in 1920. Hick, Hays’ Orphan: The Story of the Port of Prince Rupert, 
38–39.
421 W.J. Scott, “W.J. Scott to W.G. Rathie,” Private Letter, (November 30, 1972), 983-13, Prince
Rupert City & Regional Archives.
422 “Focus on British Columbia,” Trade and Commerce Magazine, April 1973.
423 Mr. Guay, Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 1st Session, 29th Parliament 
(Ottawa, 1973), 4917.
424 Mr. Guay, ibid.
425 David Birnbaum, “Ports Glad to Have Bigger Say,” The GAZETTE, August 2, 1982, D–3.
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63,000 square foot cargo transit shed at a cost of $28.6 million.426 But the real 
development was to come from the Province's promise of a “super port” at Prince 
Rupert to cater to both coal and grain.427
On the coal side, although the McIntyre Porcupine Mines Ltd., coal facility at Prince 
Rupert in the late 1960s – early 1970s had failed to eventuate, by the late 1970s the 
demand for coal from Japan was booming again and interest had been rekindled in the 
region.
Figure 4.3: Real Coal Prices, 1959 – 1979428
British Columbia had a large supply of coal and so the higher world prices led to 
discussions between miners, the Province, the federal government and the CNR about 
the idea of Prince Rupert becoming the chief beneficiary of the Canadian coal 
expansion. It was the most economical option available, with the University of British 
Columbia estimating that coal movement along the Province's BC Rail to Vancouver 
would cost as much as 50% more than a comparable movement along the CNR's 
426 Mark Wilson, “Tonnages Tumble, But Western Canada Prepares for Recovery and 
Beyond,” Harbour & Shipping, October 1975, 36, RG30, Library and Archives Canada.
427 Laurie Jones, “Ridley Island a Coal Port...maybe...,” The Daily News, September 27, 1976, 
RG30, Library and Archives Canada.
428 U.S. Department of Energy: Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Review,” 
accessed January 23, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/index.cfm.
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Prince Rupert line.429 So began the planning for a coal terminal on Ridley Island, just 
South of Prince Rupert.
At the same time, a six company consortium of grain exporters was negotiating with the
federal government for the development of a terminal on either Ridley Island or Kaien 
Island. On July 30, 1979 a “memorandum of understanding” was signed by the 
consortium and the federal government, pledging to develop a $120 million terminal, 
with construction to begin in 1981.430
The consortium, led by the Alberta Wheat Pool and Cargill Grain working with the 
British Columbia Development Corporation (BCDC) had in 1977 earmarked a site at 
Casey Point for a new grain terminal. However, the NHB disagreed and in 1978 
released a “Master Plan for Ridley Island”, prepared by CBA Engineering and Carr and 
Donald Associates, allowing for two grain terminals and a coal terminal on Ridley 
Island.431
The plan was immediately condemned by the BCDC as it would cost $30 million more 
than the site it had decided upon and take 1-3 years longer to construct. The two 
groups involved, the NHB and the consortium, both had strong reasons to avoid the 
others' site: the consortium because the BCDC site would ship grain sooner, cost less, 
and put it in control of “a private fiefdom in the NHB-administered port”; and the NHB 
because development at Ridley Island would allow it to maintain full control over the 
activities in the port.432
The issue was eventually settled by the newly established Grain Transportation 
Authority, which gave control of the old government grain terminal to the Alberta Wheat 
Pool and recommended Ridley Island as the site for the new grain and coal terminals. 
The estimated additional cost was $20 million with a delay of 6 months. The consortium
429 Mark Wilson, “Carrying Coals Will Fuel B.C. Port Growth,” Harbour & Shipping, October 
1976, 36, RG30, Library and Archives Canada.
430 “Construction of B.C. Grain Terminal to Start by 1981,” The Citizen, August 1, 1979, 36.
431 Hick, Hays’ Orphan: The Story of the Port of Prince Rupert, 98.
432 Ibid., 108.
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(now “Prince Rupert Grain Ltd.”) accepted the Ridley Island site but only after the 
federal government had agreed to meet all additional costs over the BCDC site.433 
There were a number of problems to follow due to inflation and low quality foundational
material which raised construction costs. These issues resulted in the need for the 
Alberta government to fund over 80% of the total costs, an amount of $240 million 
compared to just $26 million by the federal government and $60 million by the 
consortium. In addition, it would have to pay 40% of any overrun in costs, with British 
Columbia paying 60%.434 Despite these cost overruns, the new grain terminal was 
eventually opened on May 16, 1985, with the old terminal shut down shortly 
thereafter.435
The coal port took a while longer to be constructed. The first contract – a conditional 
letter of intent – was signed by Denison Mines Ltd., of Toronto on September 25, 1976 
for five million tons of coal from a Japanese steel making consortium. However, for the 
Province to agree to provide the infrastructure upgrades necessary – it had agreed to 
fulfil the federal government's road access commitment – it required an assured 
contract for ten million tons.436
At the time, the 150-acre Ridley Island location was operated by Neptune Terminals 
Ltd., who in 1975 acquired it in the form of a lease from the federal government, which 
had previously acquired the Ridley site from the Province using its constitutional power 
for port development “for the general advantage of Canada”. Neptune had an option for
a two year extension, but beyond that it was up to the NHB to decide what happened at
the port.
But by 1979, Denison and Teck were quite concerned. They wanted to build and 
operate the new terminal themselves but the NHB was refusing to negotiate, insisting 
433 Ibid., 109; Mark Wilson, “It’s a Rough Ride on the Rails to Prince Rupert,” The GAZETTE, 
March 8, 1982, F15.
434 “Alberta Cash Clears Way for Ridley Terminal,” The GAZETTE, July 19, 1982, D–2.
435 “Ridley Island: Old Dream Becoming Reality,” The GAZETTE, September 28, 1981, M–4; 
“Alberta Cash Clears Way for Ridley Terminal,” D–2.
436 Wilson, “Carrying Coals Will Fuel B.C. Port Growth.”
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on the port operations being managed by the federal government. According to BC 
Industry Minister Don Phillips:
“The problem is the National Harbours Board and Federal Commerce each 
want to create a profit centre at the port, while the coal producers are willing to 
do the shipping for cost.”437
The NHB was insisting that its operator of choice run the port so as to recuperate the 
entire amount of federal infrastructure investment.
Meanwhile, Denison had joined with Teck Corp., BP Coal, Petro Canada and Minalta in
1980 with the hope of signing a 15-year, $3.5 – $5 billion deal with the Japanese steel 
industry, contingent on the coal terminal at Ridley Island being ready.438 
On February 8, 1981, this hope was realised when Denison and Teck signed a 15-year,
7.7 million tonne (6.7 tonnes of coking coal; 1 million tonnes of thermal coal) deal with 
a Japanese steel mill consortium, with the contract specifying that exports must begin 
out of Prince Rupert by October, 1983.439 This forced the NHB to act and it immediately 
called for proposals from parties interested in constructing the new terminal, with the 
condition that the operator recoup the full infrastructure costs.
The NHB eventually decided on Federal Navigation and Commerce Ltd. (FedNav), of 
Montreal, to construct the terminal. However, the NHB announced this before it had 
agreed to terms with the coal miners, leaving Denison and Teck frustrated and looking 
elsewhere. The BC government, keen to see development start as soon as possible 
and also frustrated with the delays and the NHB, offered the coal companies the 
provincially-owned Kaien Island site for its coal terminal.440
437 Sid Tafler, “Squabble over Port Site Stalls B.C. Coal Contract,” The GAZETTE, September 
23, 1981, 23.
438 “B.C. Coal Deal Depends on ‘Reasonable Price,’” The GAZETTE, June 18, 1980, 110.
439 “B.C. Coal Deal Will Be a Succcess Basford Predicts,” The GAZETTE, June 6, 1981, A–8; 
“Teck, Afton Plan Merger,” The GAZETTE, February 2, 1981, 31.
440 Tafler, “Squabble over Port Site Stalls B.C. Coal Contract,” 23.
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Don Phillips at the time said the “NHB ignored the realities of the terms of the coal 
contracts and ignored the coal companies themselves. The result is we have a 
nominated operator (Federal Commerce) who can't come to terms with Teck and 
Denison. Is this a reasonable way to handle economic development in this country?”441
This led to the NHB – unwilling to call for new proposals and as it would turn out, about 
to be made obsolete – to compromise and eventually sign a new deal with FedNav and
the coal companies in October 30, 1981.442 443 By 1984, the Ridley Island coal terminal 
was to have a guaranteed throughput capacity of 7.7 million tonnes and the capacity to 
move 22 million by 1990.444 While the deal had finally been signed and coal would soon
be exported, the troubles at the Ridley Island coal terminal were just beginning.
The NHB had formed Ridley Terminals Inc., to operate the terminal, to be 90% owned 
by the federal government and 10% by FedNav. However, the terms agreed to – 
described by Hick as achievable only because of FedNav's “friends of the government 
and especially the NHB” – were “quite incredible”.445 
FedNav borrowed the entirety of its $23 million 10% stake in Ridley Terminals, with 
80% of it guaranteed by the federal government and the remaining 20% by the NHB. It 
would receive a guaranteed 20% after tax dividend per annum on this investment, 
regardless of the port's performance, and was entitled to 70% of port profits if any were
made. Finally, it would be an equal shareholder and if the federal government wanted 
to buy it out of this contract, it could do so at a cost to the federal government of its 
entire $23 million investment plus all unpaid dividends compounded annually, resulting 
in a growth in the buyout cost of over $700,000 a month.446
441 Ibid.
442 Parliament was debating the Canada Ports Corporation Act, which would have abolished 
the National Harbours Board.
443 Hick, Hays’ Orphan: The Story of the Port of Prince Rupert, 145.
444 Mark Wilson, “U.S. Coal Moves a Worry to B.C.,” The GAZETTE, March 15, 1982, F12.
445 Hick, Hays’ Orphan: The Story of the Port of Prince Rupert, 145.
446 Robert Lee, “Firm Could Force Govt. into Multi-Million-Dollar Coal Terminal Buyout,” Ottawa
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This created the incentive for FedNav to prevent progress at Ridley Island, operating 
the terminal “inefficiently and [sic] force the federal government to buy out its shares at 
a high price”.447 Despite the newly-formed Ports Canada wanting the contract to be 
bought out in 1985 and a Commons Transport Committee recommending it be bought 
out in 1987, it wouldn't be until 1991 when FedNav forcibly exercised its put option on 
the deal that control was restored to Ports Canada, with FedNav receiving a final 
payout of $60 million on its no-risk 10 year investment.448
Ultimately the NHB's control over Prince Rupert would not last long. Other ports in 
Canada, particularly Vancouver, had also been growing increasingly frustrated with the 
NHB. It was the growing political influence coming from Vancouver and the fact that 
independent ports under the Harbour Commissions Act 1964 were out performing the 
ports that were under the “stultifying control” of the NHB that pressure began to mount 
in the Canadian parliament. This, as well as competition from “the vigorous Port of 
Seattle, [where] decision making is concentrated within a few hands, all of them to be 
found in Seattle… which has tax raising powers, is free to go to the money market or 
can finance growth out of revenues”, forced Ottawa to begin working on delegating 
control over the nation’s ports to local authorities.449
Under the proposed changes, “overall control of the ports will still rest with Ottawa, if 
only in order to see that developments hang together in the furtherance of national 
goals and are not in conflict”, but autonomy would finally be granted first in the form of 
local Port Authorities under the NHB and later with the Canada Ports Corporation Act 
1983, which allowed former NHB ports to become Local Port Corporations (LPCs).450
Mr. Jamieson, the Minister of Transport, admitted that the current system was not 
working when he said, while announcing the changes:
447 Jim Fulton, “Question Time,” December 18, 1986, Prince Rupert City & Regional Archives.
448 Hick, Hays’ Orphan: The Story of the Port of Prince Rupert, 147.
449 Wilson, “Tonnages Tumble, But Western Canada Prepares for Recovery and Beyond,” 33.
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“All Canadian ports have different problems and decentralization would enable 
local authorities to deal with their own special problems in each area.”451
This change of attitude was not down to one individual; it was the result of the factors 
discussed earlier that broke the institutional “lock-in” at Prince Rupert – indeed, in 
Canada – and forced an institutional response by the federal government. It was only 
because of “several major industrial developments in central and northern British 
Columbia, and… an acute lack of facilities at the port of Prince Rupert”, as well as the 
problems at Vancouver which resulted from the NHB’s inability to respond to 
containerisation that the institutions governing Prince Rupert were able to be 
changed.452
The disastrous management of Ridley Point was one of the last acts undertaken by the
NHB. On February 24, 1983, the Canada Ports Corporation Act was passed and by 
late 1983, Prince Rupert had been given assurances that it would be granted Local 
Port Corporation (LPC) status in 1984. This would create, as Ken Krauter, the Prince 
Rupert port manager at the time described, “a port operation [at Prince Rupert] which is
able to respond quicker to changing markets and operating conditions”, and that it “will 
be more responsive to existing and future clients”.453
LPC status provided a port with local autonomy, as opposed to the previous 
organisational structure where management was controlled by Ottawa, provided it was 
financially self-sufficient.454 LPC ports had five to seven local members on their board 
and were allowed to issue contracts for up to $10 million without approval from Ottawa,
engage in property management, new construction, contract and tendering, setting of 
451 Mr. Forrestall quoting Mr. Jamieson, Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 4th 
Session, 28th Parliament, 816.
452 Ibid.
453 Ports Canada, “New Autonomy for Growing Port,” Currents, September 1983, 987-39, 
Prince Rupert City & Regional Archives.
454 The debts of NHB ports, amounting to some $742 million, were assumed by the federal 
government by order in council on January 15, 1981. This made it easier for the former 
NHB ports to become financially self-sufficient and qualify for LPC status. Mr. Pepin, 
Canada, Debates of the House of Commons, 1st Session, 32nd Parliament (Ottawa, 1982),
19689.
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rates, personnel and other administrative freedoms not previously afforded to them.455 
While still maintaining a “balance between autonomy and accountability”, i.e. Ottawa 
still had ultimate control, it was viewed positively by virtually every Canadian port with 
Joe Scott, chairman of the Prince Rupert Port Authority, noting that while not ideal “it's 
certainly a start in the right direction, and we have an opportunity to work toward a far 
superior system”.456
The end of the NHB's reign, described by BC Economic Development Minister Don 
Phillips as one which “reflects a history of confrontation and sluggishness rather than 
co-operative and responsiveness”, had arrived and finally Prince Rupert would get 
some autonomy.457
4.8. Realised Potential, 1985 – 2012
The abolition of the NHB and grant of local autonomy to Prince Rupert in 1984 saw for 
the first time local control established at the port of Prince Rupert. This was the result 
of a change in the institutional environment in Canada as a nation, a move in the 
direction “closer to that of the Reagan government in the US”, than what had existed 
when the NHB was in power.458 
However, at the same time these institutional changes were taking place, the global 
price of coal began to fall on the back of increased supply and falling demand for steel 
in Japan, with Prince Rupert's coal exports peaking in 1985.
455 Ports Canada, “New Autonomy for Growing Port.”
456 Birnbaum, “Ports Glad to Have Bigger Say,” D–3.
457 Mark Wilson, “Unhappiness with Federal Policy Expressed in B.C.,” The GAZETTE, April 
12, 1982, F–12.
458 Mary R. Brooks, “Port Devolution and Governance in Canada,” Devolution, Port 
Governance and Port Performance 17 (2006): 242.
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Figure 4.4: Real Coal Prices (US$ per Short Ton), 1949 – 2011459
In addition, there was still the lack of waterfront control causing problems for Prince 
Rupert with the CNR owning the majority of it. “I'm rather embarrassed to see we at the
port are responsible for the water-front development”, noted Bob Tytaneck, Prince 
Rupert General Manager and CEO, as “we own only 10 per cent of the inner waterfront
property”.460
Canada continued to move further towards a smaller-government model in the 1990s, 
with deregulation in 1987 and then the full privatisation of the CNR in 1995 taking 
place.461 This brought about a change in attitude from the railway, one that saw it start 
to slowly cooperate with Prince Rupert port and begin to utilise its assets in the region 
for profit.
Nevertheless, the port of Prince Rupert continued to meander along as slumping coal 
prices and stalling grain exports reduced the demand for and further port upgrades. 
There were a number of proposals throughout the 1990s to move the Kaien terminal 
459 U.S. Department of Energy: Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Review.”
460 Surj Rattan, “Port Wants City Waterfront,” November 2, 1988, 987-39, Prince Rupert City & 
Regional Archives.
461 Harvey B. Feigenbaum, Jeffrey R. Henig, and Chris Hamnett, Shrinking the State: The 
Political Underprinnings of Privatization (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge university 
press, 1998); Anthony Boardman and Aidan Vining, “A Review and Assessment of 
Privatization in Canada,” SPP Research Papers, University of Calgary, 5, no. 4 (January 
2012): 4.
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closer to the Prince Rupert township, but none of these “rather grandiose plans” ever 
came to fruition.462 It would not be until the mid 2000s that a rapidly developing China 
would see the increased demand for coal and wheat once again reignite the prospects 
of Prince Rupert as a major port.
In another change to the institutional environment that Prince Rupert operated within, 
the federal government provided Prince Rupert with further independence by changing 
it from a Port Corporation to a Port Authority with the Canada Marine Act 1998, 
effective from May 1, 1999. Table 4.4 highlights the main changes.
Table 4.4: Canada Marine Act Key Changes463
Canada Ports Corporation Act Canada Marine Act
7-person federally-appointed Board of 
Directors.
Board of 7-9 members, with a majority chosen 
by the government in consultation with users.
Federal approval needed to develop and 
implement projects over $10 million or to 
award service contracts over $1 million.
Free to sign contracts and leases with 
interested parties to operate ports (railways, 
road easements, licences for utilities, other 
services).
Free to set tariffs and fees for any ships, 
vehicles, persons or aircraft using the port, 
plus all goods loaded, unloaded or 
transhipped at the port. May also set rates for 
Port Authority services such as wharfage, 
berthage and harbour dues.
Had to lobby for government infrastructure 
subsidies
No government guarantees or subsidies 
available; free to seek funds on private capital 
markets to finance projects.
Dividends paid to the federal government A proportion of gross income paid as a stipend
to the crown.
This change in governance combined with a now-cooperative CNR allowed the Prince 
Rupert Port Authority (PRPA) to move forward and take advantage of the unique 
situation it found itself in. For Prince Rupert was in the fortunate position in that it 
already had a 53 acre terminal at Fairview for container storage that could, for a 
relatively low cost compared to other ports, be modified to provide in-demand container
handling capacity.464 In 2005, this was exactly what happened, with the PRPA and CNR
working jointly on the Fairview Terminal Conversion Project, a $170 million dollar 
462 Hick, Hays’ Orphan: The Story of the Port of Prince Rupert, 174.
463 Canada, Canada Marine Act, 1998, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-6.7/index.html.
464 Hick, Hays’ Orphan: The Story of the Port of Prince Rupert, 198.
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expansion to create a handling capacity of 500,000 TEUs per annum at Fairview 
(expanded to 59 acres). Phase 1 was completed in October 31, 2007, with Phase 2 
due to be completed by 2015 at an estimated cost of $650 million, having recently 
received environmental approval.465 Phase 2 will expand Fairview to 80 acres and 
provide a capacity of 2 million TEUs per annum along with upgraded rail facilities and 
an expanded wharf.466
From the start, the Fairview expansion was “a joint project”, according to Mr. Andrew 
Mayer (Vice-President, Commercial and Regulatory Affairs, PRPA). It was funded “from
the federal government, the provincial government, a substantial contribution from CN 
Rail, and the Prince Rupert Port Authority”.467
Today, the organisational structure at Prince Rupert is quite diverse. The Port Authority 
operates under what could best be described as a “landlord” model, leasing its land to 
private (and public) users for long periods of time with the goal of making a profit.468 
The Fairview Container Terminal land is owned by the PRPA but the terminal itself is 
operated by Maher Terminals, a private company, under a 30 year lease agreement.469
Ridley Terminals Inc., is a federal crown corporation operating the coal terminal on 
Ridley Island, dealing directly with the CNR as coal arrives on rail from afar. It has a 30 
year lease which expires on March 31, 2039, with an option for another 20 years.470
Finally, the grain terminal at Ridley Island is owned and operated by Prince Rupert 
465 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Environment Canada, and Canadian Transport Agency, 
Comprehensive Study Report Pursuant to the Canadian Envrionmental Assessment Act for
the Proposed Fairview Terminal Phase II Expansion Project, Environmental Assessment 
Report (Prince Rupert: Prince Rupert Port Authority and Canadian National Railway 
Company, September 2012), 6, http://www.rupertport.com/media/fairview-terminal-phase-ii-
comprehensive-study-report-en.pdf.
466 Prince Rupert Port Authority, “Prince Rupert Container Terminal,” accessed September 15, 
2013, http://www.rupertport.com/facilities/fairview.
467 Mr. Andrew Mayer, House of Commons, Canada, 2013: 1st Session, 41st Parliament 
(Ottawa, 2013), 1535–1540.
468 Brooks, “The Governance Structure of Ports.”
469 Mr. Andrew Mayer, House of Commons, Canada, 2013: 1st Session, 41st Parliament, 
1535–1540.
470 Ridley Terminals Inc., Annual Report (Prince Rupert, 2010), 6, 
http://www.rti.ca/sites/default/files/annualreport/RTI_AR2010_English_V3.pdf.
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Grain Ltd., itself owned by a consortium of exporters.471
It would appear that Prince Rupert, 100 years after Sir Wilfrid Laurier had declared it 
was destined for great things, is beginning to live up to its potential. But this was only 
possible through a change of institutions at the federal level. Unlike Port Hedland 
where there was under-development due to the inability of the State to credibly commit 
prior to State Agreements with the mining companies, or Tauranga where the political 
influence exerted by Auckland stifled progress, Prince Rupert suffered from over-
development and then neglect for the better part of a century. The institutions that 
governed Prince Rupert simply did not create the incentives for an efficient port. It 
would take 30 years of institutional change, driven largely by exogenous factors 
unrelated to the port, for the right institutional structure to be in place to accommodate 
a successful port at Prince Rupert.472
Favourable natural endowments and a great deal of infrastructure investment went only
so far; without the right institutional structure – the framework that shapes the 
interactions between people and the development of society – even an immense 
amount of public and private investment in a port can result in failure and ultimately 
avoidable costs that society has to bear. 
471 Alberta Wheat Pool, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, United Grain Growers Ltd., James 
Richardson & Son, Ltd., Cargill Ltd., Manitoba Pool Elevators.
472 The 'right' institutional structure does not mean 'optimal'; rather, we are seeking the least-
worst structure that is possible given current constraints. Williams and Coase, “Discussion,”
195.
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Chapter 5: Tauranga 1860 – 2012
Forging a New Path
5.1. Introduction
Located in New Zealand's Bay of Plenty, the port of Tauranga is New Zealand's largest 
port in terms of volume, with a throughput of over 19 million tonnes of cargo and nearly 
a million TEUs in 2013.473 The harbour itself covers a vast area of over 200km2, with 
274km of shoreline.474
Illustration 5.1: Port of Tauranga Location475
Originally used by the Maori people prior to the arrival of Europeans at Tauranga on 
board Captain Gilbert Mair's Herald in 1826, the port has a long history of both 
successes and failures; there was certainly no guarantee that it would today be New 
Zealand's largest port.476
In the early days of colonisation New Zealand's institutions were very immature. The 
nation was initially proclaimed a colony of Great Britain in 1841 following the 1840 
Treaty of Waitangi,477 constituted in 1852, achieved sovereignty in 1857 but was still 
473 Port of Tauranga, Port Trade and Statistic Information (Tauranga, August 2013), 3–4, 
http://www.port-tauranga.co.nz/images.php?oid=1188.
474 Hansen, History of Tauranga Harbour & Port, 9.
475 Port of Tauranga, “About Us,” accessed February 18, 2014, http://www.port-
tauranga.co.nz/About-Us/.
476 Hansen, History of Tauranga Harbour & Port, 11.
477 Approximately 240 Maori chiefs signed the agreement with the British, granting “to Her 
Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers 
of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or 
possess, or may be supposed to exercise or possess over their respective Territories as the
sole Sovereigns thereof”, and reserving the Maori “full exclusive and undisturbed 
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legally subordinate to the United Kingdom until 1947.
Both New Zealand and Tauranga underwent numerous institutional changes between 
1860 and 2012; changes that would both directly and indirectly shape the fate of the 
port of Tauranga. The port changed hands from its original use by the Maori prior to 
1860; European takeover during the Maori land wars in 1864 which even saw the port 
temporarily blockaded; to private and local council ownership; various harbour boards; 
and eventually in 1988 it became the Port Corporation we see today.478
5.2. The Early Days, 1860 – 1912
By 1860, New Zealand had its own constitution and had been a sovereign nation for 
three years. Like Australia and Canada, New Zealand's constitution was determined by
the extension of sovereignty from Britain.479 Table 5.1 on the following page highlights 
New Zealand's transition from colony to Dominion.
possession of their Land and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties”. New Zealand
History, Waitangi Treaty, accessed December 20, 2013, 
http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/media/interactive/waitangi-treaty-copy.
478 Hansen, History of Tauranga Harbour & Port, 10.
479 Philip Austin Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Law Book 
Company Sydney, 1993), 30.
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Table 5.1: New Zealand's Constitutional Evolution, 1840 – 1987480
Date Event
1840 Treaty of Waitangi signed.
1841 Proclaimed a Colony of Great Britain.
1846 New Zealand Constitution Act enacted then suspended by the Gov. General.
1852 New Zealand Constitution Act enacted.
1857 Responsible government granted; NZ Parliament can modify the Constitution.
1858 English Laws Act enacted.
1907 “Colony of New Zealand” became “Dominion of New Zealand”.
1923 New Zealand permitted to conduct its own international trade negotiations.
1931 Statute of Westminster Act tabled.
1947 Statute of Westminster Adoption Act enacted.
1987 Constitution Act enacted.
New Zealand's original constitution, first enacted in 1852 following the initial 1846 Act's 
passing and immediate suspension by the then Governor General Sir George Grey, 
created for New Zealand a General Assembly including the Governor, Legislative 
Council (appointed), and a House of Representatives (elected).481
This constitution was not open to amendments through the General Assembly, a rule 
that was changed by the Imperial Parliament with the passing of the New Zealand 
Constitutional Amendment Act 1857.
The most important fact about the events above was that even though New Zealand 
had officially become an independent Dominion in 1907, power ultimately rested in 
Britain until 1947. Up until that point, the British-appointed Governor-General had 
enormous responsibilities: the ability to act as representative of both the British and be 
the sole voice of New Zealand's views towards the Imperial government; to hold the 
480 NZ Parliamentary Library, New Zealand Sovereignty: 1857, 1907, 1947, or 1987?, 
Parliamentary Research Paper (Wellington: Parliamentary Service New Zealand, August 
28, 2007), http://www.parliament.nz/resource/0000113883.
481 Peter Crawford Oliver, The Constitution of Independence: The Development of 
Constitutional Theory in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 36.
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official coding ciphers; and exercise sole discretion over what information from Britain 
was passed on to the New Zealand parliament.482
The uncertainty around New Zealand's independence was demonstrated by the fact 
she was mentioned in the 1898 Australasian Federation Conference, with Australia 
considering her a State of Australia in the constitution:
“The States” shall mean such of the Colonies of New South Wales, New 
Zealand, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia, and South 
Australia, including the Northern Territory of South Australia, as for the time 
being are parts of the Commonwealth, and such Colonies or Territories as may 
be admitted into or established by the Commonwealth as States; and each of 
such parts of the Commonwealth shall be called a “State.”483
New Zealand began the process towards federation and true sovereignty before both 
Australia and Canada, but was the last nation to achieve that end. This was because 
those in positions of influence in New Zealand were well aware that abandoning ties 
with Britain too early would result in transaction costs that would prove to be 
insurmountable for foreign capital to invest. Without the assurance that any disputes 
would be settled in British courts under British law, foreign investors would face 
increased costs of transacting in New Zealand in the form of regime uncertainty, raising
the risk of the investments and the ex ante returns necessary to invest. The small 
nation with an immature government would simply be unable to credibly commit not to 
expropriate any capital invested on its shores. Mutual gains from trade are then not 
exploited and both the British investors and New Zealand people would be worse off.484
As Mr. Justice Richmond, a Supreme Court of New Zealand judge for 29 years wrote in
482 NZ Parliamentary Library, New Zealand Sovereignty.
483 E.G. Blackmore and C.C. Kingston, The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1898,
sec. VI.
484 These transaction costs were so high that, despite the “large outlay in travelling expenses 
[that] would be apparently inevitable”, transaction costs were so prohibitive that it was still 
considered worthwhile. Australasian Federation Conference, Debates, 1st Session, 
Constitution Conventions (Adelaide: Parliament of Australia, 1897), 972.
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a March 11, 1891 letter to Sir Henry Parkes:
“British capital is, and it is to be hoped will continue to be, largely invested in 
these colonies... However fair colonial judges and juries may have shown 
themselves, it is inevitable that persons resident in the United Kingdom, or in 
other colonies, who should find themselves worsted in litigation before a 
colonial court from which there was no appeal [to a British court], would, in 
many cases, both feel and express a doubt that justice had not been done 
them, and would be ready to impute the decision against them to local 
prejudice and favoritism.
The confidence with which investments of all sorts are now made in Australasia
by people at home must be largely due to the knowledge that rights of property 
will be dealt with here by the Law Courts on British principles of justice, and 
subject to final review by one of the highest English courts. I conceive that this 
confidence must certainly be impaired if we constitute ourselves a foreign 
country in regard to the administration of justice.”485
The delay in achieving independence was not because of a lack of desire to become a 
sovereign nation, but out of a desire to keep transaction costs low so that foreign 
capital would remain confident in the new colony of New Zealand.
485 Sir Joseph Abbott, ibid., 970.
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Figure 5.1: New Zealand's Balance of Trade (Imports - Exports), 1853 – 1867486
The 1927 Yearbook concluded that:
“With the settlement of the regular colony in 1840 there was evident an inflation
of imports, occasioned by the amount of capital the new colonists brought in for
the development of the country... the value of imports continued to be greater 
than exports until 1886... [from which point] exports began to form a 
preponderating feature of the total trade.
The excess of imports from 1853 to 1870, and again from 1872 to 1886, can 
definitely be traced to the importation of capital in those periods.”487
Maintaining the ability to credibly commit was essential; without that knowledge 
investors would have been less willing to commit to development projects in New 
Zealand at the prices (interest rates) that actually occurred. This can, of course, be 
taken too far, as happened in Canada with the over-investment in its transcontinental 
railway system. If a government artificially reduces the ex ante returns required for an 
investment by, as in Canada, guaranteeing the debt of investors while able to credibly 
commit to repay any losses, investors are far more likely to get involved in projects that
486 Registrar-General of New Zealand, Census Results and General Statistics of New Zealand,
Statistics of New Zealand (Wellington, February 25, 1869), pt. II, no. 14.
487 Fraser, Malcolm, The New Zealand Official Year-Book (Wellington: New Zealand Census 
and Statistics Office, December 15, 1926), sec. XI–A.
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are economically wasteful.
These were all important developments for the port of Tauranga. In Canada, the 
constitution delegated control of Prince Rupert to the federal government while in 
Australia, the land at Port Hedland was governed by the State of Western Australia. 
Prior to the implementation of the Constitution Act 1852, New Zealand's wharves were 
owned and operated by local councils as well as private individuals and organisations. 
The constitution created six Provinces but in relation to shipping and ports maintained 
federal control of:
• Imposition or regulation of custom duties “of any goods at any port or place in 
the Province”.
• “Imposition of any clues or other charges on shipping at any port or harbour in 
the Province”.488
Under the terms of the constitution the Provinces would be responsible for the land 
around the port. The Waste Lands Act, 1858 further solidified this power and 
recommended general land management and sale practices for the Provinces as well 
as granting both land control and revenue to the Provincial councils.
These powers were strengthened by the Marine Act, 1867 which gave the Provinces 
the power to define the limits and boundaries of any wharf, quay, pier, or dock within 
the Province.489 However, mismanagement by the Provinces which saw money “poured
out… with a lavish hand”, leaving the finances of the Provinces in “hopeless 
disorder”.490 This created the political opportunity for the federal government – which 
had always seen itself and the Provinces “as rivals rather than co-operating powers”491 
– the impetus needed to take power away from the Provinces. The financial state of the
Provinces were not aided by the North Island Maori wars fought throughout the 1860s, 
488 New Zealand Government, The New Zealand Constitution Act, 15 and 16 Vic., Cap. 72, 
1852, sec. 19.1; 19.8.
489 Governor J. Ballance, “A Proclamation: Boundaries of Victoria Wharf at Tauranga Defined,” 
1878, R19980408, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
490 W. J. Gardner, “The Effect of the Abolition of the Provinces on Political Parties in the New 
Zealand House of Representatives, 1876-7,” 1936, 43.
491 William Parker Morrell, New Zealand (London: Ernest Benn, 1935), 35.
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further depleting the Province's coffers.492 The Provinces of the South island, even 
though not involved in the Northern wars, had by 1868 paid far more towards the war 
than the North and began to protest. The threat of secession was a very real possibility,
further adding to the incentives to either strengthen the federal government or abandon
the idea of a unified New Zealand.493
With the election of 1870 looming, New Zealand's Treasurer under Premier William 
Fox, Julius Vogel, promoted a “policy of public works” as the solution to New Zealand's 
woes.494 Originally a proponent of Provincialism as a member of the Otago Provincial 
council before joining the House of Representatives,495 he had once proclaimed:
“New Zealand is a peculiar country. You cannot go over its geographical 
configuration. You cannot bring the two ends nearer than they are. There will 
always be a certain amount of isolation in different parts until the iron horse 
runs through the two Islands.”496
Vogel, having worked his way into a federal position of power, sought to achieve that 
goal. The idea was to attract immigrants by making the colony attractive through 
transportation infrastructure (railways) financed through State borrowing. Vogel largely 
succeeded, with New Zealand's public debt between 1870 – 1898 increasing six-fold 
as “hundreds of miles of railways and roads were made, [and] immigrants were 
imported by State or poured in of their own accord”.497 It was the first case of “State 
Socialism” in New Zealand, something that also occurred in Western Australia.498
The voters of New Zealand clearly agreed: the 1870 elections saw Vogel's party 
492 William Parker Morrell, The Provincial System in New Zealand, 1852-76, 2nd ed. 
(Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1964), 143.
493 Alan Ward, “The Origins of the Anglo-Maori Wars: A Reconsideration,” New Zealand 
Journal of History 1, no. 2 (1967): 150.
494 New Zealand Herald, September 3, 1874, 2.
495 He had previously described the idea of abolishing the Provinces as a “clap-trap argument”.
“Mr Vogel On Provincialism,” Auckland Star, September 18, 1874, 3, National Library of 
New Zealand.
496 Ibid.
497 William Pember Reeves, The Long White Cloud: Ao Tea Roa (H. Marshall & Son, 1899), 
326.
498 Robertson, “The Foundations of State Socialism in Western Australia: 1911--16.”
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conclusively retain power.499 However, the wealthier Southern Provinces of Otago and 
Canterbury were not willing to take part in what amounted to a subsidy to the 
“impoverished northern Provinces”, and it was that opposition as well as the “position of
pensioners of the Central Government”, that most of the Northern Provinces found 
themselves in, that would prove to be decisive in changing New Zealand's institutional 
structure.500 Thus the political theme in New Zealand shifted again and became a battle
between the 'Abolitionists' and the 'Provincialists', with the 'Abolitionists' eventually 
prevailing with the passing of Abolition of Provinces Act 1875 under the now-Prime 
Minister Vogel.501
Meanwhile at Tauranga, a Mr. John Chadwick had, with permission from the 
government, constructed the second wharf at Tauranga, dubbed “Chadwick's Wharf” by
the Department of Public Works. This was a privately funded and operated wharf which
Mr. Chadwick and some of his neighbours constructed only after receiving “the 
requisite authority to collect the usual tolls and dues”.502 This permission he sought 
from the Commissioner of Customs in Wellington, as well as the Town Board of 
Tauranga and Marine Department. The wharf was eventually proclaimed “Victoria 
Wharf” by the Governor and Mr. Chadwick's authority to collect tolls and dues was 
officially gazetted in 1878.503
Mr. Chadwick's wharf was not of the highest quality. It was rapidly assembled on the 
back of a petition from Tauranga residents and was regarded as a project of 
“considerable importance to this district”, as it was having trouble receiving supplies 
from Auckland.504 While it served a purpose, one commenter noted at the time that it “is
notoriously not worth more than the bare materials of which it is composed”.505
499 Gardner, “The Effect of the Abolition of the Provinces on Political Parties in the New 
Zealand House of Representatives, 1876-7,” 45.
500 Ibid., 46.
501 The Act did not take effect until January 1, 1877.
502 John Chadwick to G. McLean, 1877, R19980408, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
503 Governor J. Ballance, “A Proclamation: Boundaries of Victoria Wharf at Tauranga Defined.”
504 Chadwick to McLean, 1877.
505 “The English Language in Relation to the Victoria Wharf,” Bay of Plenty Times, 1885, 
R19980408, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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The passing of the Abolition of Provinces Act 1875 and the Land Act 1877, which 
altered the institutional environment in which New Zealand's ports operated by 
abolishing Provincial control, replacing it with local Land Boards and other authorities, 
changed the development path of the port of Tauranga again.
The former operations of the Provinces were not replaced by management out of 
Wellington as seen in Canada with numerous Ottawa-based bureaucracies. Instead of 
centralising, New Zealand subdivided the duties of the former Provinces – something 
that was already under way with the creation of various local authorities such as road, 
harbour and river boards – to “some hundreds of boards and councils”.506
Table 5.2: Number of harbour boards and local authorities in New Zealand, 1875 
– 1920507
Year Harbour Boards Total Local Boards # of Vessels
1875 - 23 -
1880 24 72 -
1885 24 93 1,556
1890 21 116 1,489
1895 23 190 1,208
1900 26 217 1,229
1905 39 270 1,254
1910 33 297 1,197
1915 45 332 1,287
1920 42 352 1,451
This was not without controversy; critics noted that they were not bastions of innovation
506 Christopher Wilkes, “The State as an Historical Subject: A Periodization of State Formation 
in New Zealand,” ed. Brian Roper and Chris Rudd, State and Economy in New Zealand, 
1993, 195; Reeves, The Long White Cloud, 329.
507 Gerald T. Bloomfield, New Zealand, A Handbook of Historical Statistics (Boston: GK Hall, 
1984), 349; E.J. von Dadelszen, The New Zealand Official Year-Book (Wellington: 
Registrar-General’s Office, August 25, 1893); E.J. von Dadelszen, The New Zealand 
Official Year-Book (Wellington: Registrar-General’s Office, August 23, 1900); E.J. von 
Dadelszen, The New Zealand Official Year-Book (Wellington: Registrar-General’s Office, 
October 7, 1901); E.J. von Dadelszen, The New Zealand Official Year-Book (Wellington: 
Registrar-General’s Office, September 29, 1906); Fraser, Malcolm, The New Zealand 
Official Year-Book.
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and experiment and in fact lagged “far behind the central authority”, creating “so many 
stumbling-blocks”, with the problem being that the “rate-payers' franchise is more 
restricted”, than what councils in England faced at the time.508
This was an issue of institutional design; without an appropriate governance structure 
that considers political representation, control and enforcement, efficiency, and local 
self-determination, local public bodies can be just as inefficient as the worst central 
government.509
At Tauranga, one of the first acts of the empowered Tauranga Borough Council was to 
attempt to purchase Victoria Wharf from Mr. Chadwick. This was partially achieved in 
1878 but took until 1890 for the matter to be settled, with Mr. Chadwick seeking 
arbitration and eventually being awarded £777. 12s. 3d. in compensation.510 But this 
was only the beginning of the problems the wharf would cause the Borough.
The Borough, now managing both the Victoria Wharf and the original 1870 Town Wharf
but not in possession of either as the Marine Department had taken ownership,511 
believed it could charge any goods landed on the crown-owned foreshore whether or 
not they used the wharf. However, legal advice concluded that the law did not empower
the Borough “to make a bylaw providing for the levying of dues on anything landed on 
the foreshore”.512
Not only did the Borough have to make restitutions for the erroneous charges it had 
levied on people unloading on the foreshore, but the lack of ownership of the two 
508 Reeves, The Long White Cloud, 330.
509 Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren, “The Organization of Government
in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry,” The American Political Science Review, 1961, 
831–42.
510 George Allport to H.A. Sharp, June 24, 1904, R19980408, Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington; Unsigned, “Particulars of Tauranga Wharves” (Marine Department, Wellington, 
November 4, 1913), R19980408, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
511 As part of the Abolition of Provinces Act, the Marine Department became superintendent 
(owner) of all harbours except those with a Harbour Board. William Seed, Appendix to the 
Journals of the House of Representatives, Session I, H-29: Twelfth Report of the Marine 
Department for the Year Ended 30th June, 1877 (Wellington: Government House, 1877), 3, 
http://atojs.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/atojs?a=d&d=AJHR1877-I.2.2.3.33.
512 George Allport to H.A. Sharp, October 18, 1904, R19980408, Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington; George Allport to R. Howell, August 9, 1905, R19980408, Archives New 
Zealand, Wellington.
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wharves meant that it was impossible to acquire finance to upgrade either in the face of
surging demand. It “would be difficult for the Council to raise this amount [£2000 – 
£3000] with the wharf owned by the Government”, one Borough Council member told 
the Minister of Marine, noting that “large quantities of goods were landed thereon [the 
foreshore] without paying dues”. 513
Even the Minister of Marine himself considered “no Government lending department 
would advance money on the wharves as the administration stood at present, as the 
security was not good enough”. In the first indication of what was to come, he 
suggested that “it might be advantageous for a Harbour Board to be formed”.514
The shipping community too was growing concerned at the increasingly inadequate 
facilities at Tauranga. The manager of the Northern Steamship Company remarked 
that:
“I must call the attention of your Chamber to the great need for enlarged 
berthage accommodation at the town wharf, to enable vessels to discharge 
more rapidly than at present. If this were done, and another shed erected, I feel
sure the result would be a great boon to the commercial public of Tauranga. 
The Maketu and Matata trades, as you may be aware, have increased 
considerably of late and our officers often have difficulty in finding space to 
discharge cargo at Tauranga. I should be glad, therefore, if your Chamber 
would take this matter up and impress its importance on the local authorities, as
the difficulty of which you complain.”515
All of these forces – the inability of the Borough to borrow or otherwise finance harbour 
developments and the pleas of the business community – culminated in the Tauranga 
Harbour Act 1912. This Act empowered the new board to acquire the existing wharves 
513 Minister of Marine, “Tauranga Town Wharf,” Marine Department Correspondence, (January 
24, 1908), R19980408, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
514 Ibid.
515 “Re the Town Wharf Tauranga,” Unsigned Letter, (April 14, 1908), R19980408, Archives 
New Zealand, Wellington.
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and, in the subsequent Tauranga Foreshore Vesting and Endowment Act 1915, also 
solved the issue of people loading on the foreshore without paying harbour dues by 
providing ownership of the land (and critically, the ability to enforce it) to the Harbour 
Board.
5.3. Slow and Steady, 1912 – 1945
In 1911, Tauranga only had a population of 1,346. In similar fashion to Port Hedland 
and Prince Rupert, a relative lack of success or development during the period when 
other ports were rapidly expanding would allow it to avoid capture and a path-
dependent outcome where interest groups – labour, local government (cross-
subsidisation), business groups – drive up costs to the point where it struggles to 
compete without ongoing government assistance.516
Table 5.3: Tauranga and New Zealand Population, 1874 – 1945517
Year Tauranga New Zealand As a % of New Zealand
1874 579 344,984 0.17
1878 793 458,007 0.17
1881 1,253 534,090 0.23
1886 1,148 620,451 0.19
1891 1,055 668,651 0.16
1896 1,018 743,214 0.14
1901 945 815,862 0.12
1906 1,047 936,309 0.11
1911 1,346 1,058,312 0.13
1916 1,685 1,149,225 0.15
1921 2,241 1,271,664 0.18
1926 2,549 1,408,139 0.18
1936 3,387 1,573,810 0.22
1945 4,712 1,702,298 0.28
516 Peter J. Rimmer, “The Changing Status of New Zealand Seaports, 1853–1960,” Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers 57, no. 1 (1967): 88–100.
517 Bloomfield, New Zealand, A Handbook of Historical Statistics, 42–58.
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Although officially becoming a port with the passing of the Tauranga Harbour Act 1912 
which saw a 9-member board appointed to oversee the Port of Tauranga,518 the lack of 
population and relatively undeveloped state of Tauranga at the time meant that there 
was very little activity at the new port.519 Interestingly, given the size of Tauranga's 
hinterland (Rotorua, for instance, covered 9,500 square miles), the representatives of 
the Board were still comprised almost solely of port users in Rotorua, rather than those 
in the port's immediate rating (taxing) boundary, as was the case with most other ports 
in New Zealand. This was an early, if accidental, institutional foundation that would 
have a large influence in how the port operated in the future.520
The rapidly expanding union movement which saw the establishment of the Maritime 
Council, a spin-off of J. A. Millar's Seamen's Union, was not yet present at Tauranga.521 
By the time the Labour Department started recording detailed statistics in 1921, the 
cost of New Zealand's strikes to the economy in that year alone was estimated at 
119,200 working days.522 It was therefore fortunate that this culture, given Tauranga 
was unaffected by any of these strikes, did not exist to the same extent it did at the 
larger ports such as Auckland. This was purely a matter of chance; due to a lack of 
demand, no development had taken place at Tauranga until the Tauranga Harbour 
Board constructed a new wharf in 1925 – the Railway Wharf, opposite Monllmouth 
Redoubt a quarter of a mile north of the Town Wharf.523 The wharf had a seaward face 
of 320 feet with a berthage depth of 14 feet.524
Prior to that, the only major bit of activity was when the White Island Agricultural 
518 Two appointed by the Governor, two elected by the Borough Council and five elected from 
the County Council areas.
519 Hansen, History of Tauranga Harbour & Port, 15.
520 New Zealand, Legislative Council and House of Representatives Debates, 2nd Session, 
27th Parliament, vol. 271 (Wellington, 1945), 81.
521 James Holt, Compulsory Arbitration in New Zealand: The First Forty Years (Auckland 
University Press, 2013).
522 Bloomfield, New Zealand, A Handbook of Historical Statistics, 147.
523 G.C. Godfrey, “Notice to Mariners No. 23 of 1925” (N.Z. Gazette No. 23, April 2, 1925), 
R19981197, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
524 G.C. Godfrey, “Notice to Mariners No. 83 of 1927” (N.Z. Gazette No. 84, December 8, 
1927), R19981197, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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Chemical Co. Ltd., had sought and was granted approval to build a private 400 foot 
jetty at Sulphur Point, with the condition that “The Board may require its removal at any
time without compensation [and] the payment of an annual rental of £10”.525
However, Tauranga was not without problems. Shipping trade in New Zealand had 
slowed down considerably since the First World War, with New Zealand subsidising rail
traffic both because rail was viewed as essential to her future, but also because in 
times of war it was deemed safer to move as much freight inland as possible. Internal 
traffic that used to ply the New Zealand coast was instead transferred to inland rail, 
with ports being partially centralised to minimise risk with the key beneficiaries being 
Auckland and Wellington.
Thus, several smaller ports such as Tauranga saw rapid declines in traffic. As the 
Report of the Railways and Coastal Shipping Committee 1945 showed, between 1925 
and 1938 trade fell by 41 per cent at Hokianga; 28 per cent at Kaipara; 59 per cent at 
Mangawai; 100 per cent at Whitianga; 60 per cent at Thames; and 60 per cent at 
Tauranga. This was understandable given the number of registered vessels in New 
Zealand had declined from 314 in 1919 to 114 in 1944, a decline of some 64 per 
cent.526
There were also divisions appearing in the now 10-member Tauranga Harbour Board 
and in 1927 W.S. Short was appointed Commissioner by the Governor-General to 
report on “matters connected with the Tauranga Harbour Board”.527 The board was 
unable to come to an agreement as to whether or not a wharf at Mount Maunganui 
should be constructed.
525 Archibald Allan Mercer to Mercantile Marine Department, “Re Jetty at Sulphur Point, 
Tauranga,” January 28, 1926, R19980985, Archives New Zealand, Wellington; C. Lowe to 
Archibald Allan Mercer, “Re Erection of Jetty, Sulphur Point Site,” January 28, 1926, 
R19980985, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
526 New Zealand, Legislative Council and House of Representatives Debates, 2nd Session, 
27th Parliament, vol. 270 (Wellington, 1945), 171–172.
527 “W.S. Short Commissioner Appointed by His Excellency Governor-General to Report on 
Matters Connected with the Tauranga Harbour Board,” Bay of Plenty Times, May 9, 1927, 
1, R19979701, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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Illustration 5.2: Port of Tauranga, December 2013528
528 Heritage And Character New Zealand, “Luxury Lodge and Bed and Breakfast 
Accommodation in Coromandel, Tauranga and Bay Of Plenty,” Heritage Inns, accessed 
January 14, 2014, http://www.heritageinns.co.nz/coromandel-tauranga-and-bay-of-plenty/.
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The inquiry concluded with the following resolution being unanimously accepted by the 
board:
“That if and when the Tauranga Harbour Board has made satisfactory 
arrangements for the institution of a business or businesses to its satisfaction 
(preferably with the White Island Products Limited, or its equivalent) at the 
Mount, to warrant the erection of the said Wharf... passed by a majority of those
present [Harbour Board members]... the Minister be recommended to give his 
approval of the work”.529
The debate over whether or not expansion should take place on the Mount Maunganui 
side of the harbour or the Tauranga side was one that would soon emerge again.
5.4. “Rotorua's Port”, 1945 – 1965530
“Nature had bestowed on Tauranga a sheet of water which had not been used to any 
great extent... I say Tauranga will be a city in 10 years if it is allowed to advance as it 
should.” – Chairman of the Tauranga Harbour Board, Mr. P.S. Densem, 1946.531 532
Following the Second World War, the New Zealand government engaged in a public-
private partnership with a company called Tasman Pulp and Paper, to construct and 
operate a large newsprint, pulp and timber mill. The proposed mill was isolated and so 
the government began exploring options for rail, road, housing, power and most 
importantly for Tauranga, an export port.533 That led to a report by Mr. Andrew Murray, 
an engineer hired to investigate Tauranga Harbour as a potential export port, 
concluding in 1945 that “[t]he acute shortage of ground readily available for 
development as an industrial area is very evident in Tauranga”.534
529 “W.S. Short Commissioner Appointed by His Excellency Governor-General to Report on 
Matters Connected with the Tauranga Harbour Board,” 2.
530 A.J. Mirrielees, “Tauranga Harbour: Present Facilities and Future Development,” Bay of 
Plenty Times, October 18, 1939, R8578125, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
531 In New Zealand a “city” is defined as a geographical area with over 100,000 inhabitants.
532 “Development of Harbour,” Bay of Plenty Times, February 7, 1946, R19979701, Archives 
New Zealand, Wellington.
533 Morris Guest and John Singleton, “The Murupara Project and Industrial Development in 
New Zealand 1945–65,” Australian Economic History Review 39, no. 1 (1999): 25.
534 “Acute Shortage of Sites,” Bay of Plenty Times, November 30, 1945, R19979701, Archives 
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However, the Mount Maunganui site which was within the Tauranga Harbour Board’s 
territory, had ample land available for development. So one year later when the 
Tauranga Harbour Board requested a transfer of 99 acres of crown land (Public Works 
Department) at Mount Maunganui, the resident engineer at Tauranga advised the 
government against it as the “question can only be resolved when the policy with 
regard to a deep water port is known”.535 In addition, Cabinet documents reveal that the
government was hesitant to grant the Board any authority to purchase lands for 
purposes other than “what is necessary for harbour management”, as the “precedent 
thus created could be an undesirable one from the Government point of view when 
dealing with possible similar applications from other Boards”.536
Rotorua – the region from which most of the port of Tauranga’s users came from – was 
not content with the decision. “There is no doubt that Rotorua and Tauranga have a 
community of interests and the establishment of a deep sea port will strengthen the ties
of not only these districts, but of other districts in the Bay of Plenty”, noted Mr. Alach, 
the Tauranga Harbour Board’s Chairman. According to government reports prior to 
suggesting Mount Maunganui as the location for the port for the Bay of Plenty, no port 
could be developed cheaper than Tauranga.537
Adding to the uncertainty was the fact that there was also another division in the 
Tauranga Harbour Board, this time between the Chairman, Mr. Alach, and the 
Secretary, Mr. E.V. Wall. The impasse was created when Mr. Alach dismissed Mr. Wall 
for a number of incidents he considered unsatisfactory, a decision the 10-member 
board was divided over 5 to 5, creating a situation where the Board could not function 
New Zealand, Wellington.
535 District Engineer Thornton, “Memorandum for the Engineer-in-Chief” (Public Works 
Department, Wellington, March 28, 1946), R8578125, Archives New Zealand, Wellington; 
A.R. Entrican, “Memorandum for the Under-Secretary” (Land and Survey Department, 
Wellington, May 6, 1948), R8578125, Archives New Zealand, Wellington; W.C. Smith, 
“Memorandum for the Engineer-in-Chief” (Public Works Department, Wellington, May 28, 
1948), R8578125, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
536 Minister of Lands, “Memorandum for All Members of Cabinet” (Ministry of Lands, January 
18, 1956), 4, R15422452, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
537 Ibid.
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as it could only make decisions with a majority vote. The government's investigating 
officer, reporting to the Minister of Marine, proposed three solutions to solve the 
impasse but ultimately recommended amending the Harbours Act to allow for an 11-
member board. The eleventh member would be elected by the Mount Maunganui 
Borough which was currently unrepresented, the advantage being “that it removes all 
responsibility from the Government in the matter of the Board's policy and throws the 
solution entirely on the elected representatives”.538 Despite these recommendations, 
the changes were not adopted as Mr. Wall and his allies reconciled their differences 
with Mr. Alach, allowing it to operate normally again.
However, even though it had the advantage of being a low cost port, the Tauranga 
Harbour Board was also very aware that given the financial constraints constitutionally 
imposed on it, it could not expand unless contractual guarantees were provided by 
private companies. The “State as the largest owner of exotic forests”, noted Mr. Wall, 
meant that “other owners of plantations and shipping companies could make no plans 
to use Tauranga unless they knew what provision the board was prepared to make to 
accommodate trade”.539
While the board was willing to adopt a plan to provide some guidance to those private 
parties, any such plan “would not commit the board or the harbour district to its 
fulfilment unless these assurances of trade sufficient to pay for the work were given by 
the parties referred to”.540 The Board, as stated in resolutions tabled to various local 
bodies in 1946, sought to “provide port facilities at Tauranga... [to] relieve congestion at
the port of Auckland... providing the guarantees of trade sought from private interests 
and the State are fulfilled”.541
The Board repeatedly asked the government whether or not it was considering its port 
538 “Tauranga Harbour Board - Impasse” (Marine Department, Wellington, September 23, 
1946), R19980267, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
539 “Development of Harbour,” Bay of Plenty Times, January 21, 1946, R19979701, Archives 
New Zealand, Wellington.
540 Ibid.
541 “Development of Harbour,” February 7, 1946.
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for the export of State Forest timber or were planning to rail it directly to Auckland, but 
were continuously left in the dark as to the government's intentions. As a Memorandum
for the Minister of Works notes:
“If the produce of these forests [State Forests in the Bay of Plenty hinterland] is 
likely to be exported from the Dominion then the Board has good reason to 
anticipate the requirements necessary in the handling of shipping and export 
from the harbour, but before it can embark on the necessary works, it is 
essential that it have knowledge of any policy for the working of the forests, 
especially as to whether the timber will be sent to Tauranga or elsewhere for 
shipment”.542
A year later, the Board still had no answer, with the Chairman pleading to the Minister 
of State Forests to make available “the Government's decision in this matter”, so that 
“the Board can take the necessary steps to prepare plans for any developments that 
may arise out of the opening up of the Timber Trade”.543 By 1948 the media was 
increasingly commenting on the possibility of a deep water harbour at Tauranga, but 
the Board was steadfast in that “until the report of the experts [from the Works 
Department] is available it is impossible for the board to make any decision in the 
question [of port facilities]”.544
Mr. Alach intimated that the Board had been left uninformed and that the Auckland 
Harbour Board had made inquiries “as to the suitability of the Auckland port for the 
export of timber... It appeared as if the Auckland port was out to grab everything 
possible”, he remarked, noting “that there was one thing in the Tauranga board's 
favour, and that was the congestion at the Auckland port... [and] the fact that the 
542 J.A.S. O’Brien, “Memorandum for the Minister of Works” (Marine Department, Wellington, 
August 15, 1946), 1, R19979701, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
543 J.D. Alach to Minister of State Forests, July 7, 1947, R19979701, Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington.
544 “Future Possibilities Of Tauranga Harbour Appreciated By Mnister,” Bay of Plenty Times, 
March 12, 1948, R19979701, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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department must consider all possible export ports”.545
The Secretary for Marine also expressed concern at a plan to dissolve the Tauranga 
Harbour Board and leave control of the port to the (proposed) amalgamated Borough of
Tauranga and Mount Maunganui. “From this Department's point of view”, Mr. Smith 
noted:
“[I]t would be unsound to have a Borough Council in charge of the Harbour 
when all the contributing or adjacent local Bodies are as much, or more, a 
concern with the efficient administration of the harbour... it would be a 
retrograde step to dissolve the Harbour Board.”546
“You [Tauranga] have proved that you can handle the timber”, said Mr. V. C. Florey, 
Rotorua County Council Chairman, “and we have the timber for you to handle”. The 
biggest obstacle was that the “roads existing and proposed between Tauranga and the 
inland areas were not sufficient”.547
This was because the Railways Department had previously bought a private road 
transport operator which had serviced the Rotorua – Tauranga route on behalf of the 
Northern Steamship Company, but had immediately discontinued the service. “This had
meant a serious loss to the board, which felt that the department was also a loser 
because the road service to Rotorua was not now patronised as it might be”, remarked 
a letter from the Tauranga Harbour Board to the Minister of Works.548
A committee was appointed by the government to decide between Tauranga and 
Whakatane for the proposed deep sea “Bay of Plenty port”. “We were very concerned 
545 “Deep-Sea Port for Tauranga,” Bay of Plenty Times, April 27, 1948, R19979701, Archives 
New Zealand, Wellington.
546 W.C. Smith, “Memorandum for the Secretary of the Local Bodies’ Commission, Internal 
Affairs Department” (Marine Department, Wellington, April 22, 1949), R19979701, Archives 
New Zealand, Wellington.
547 “Merit of Friendliness and Mutual Assistance,” Bay of Plenty Times, January 22, 1949, 
R19979701, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
548 “Tauranga - Rotorua Road Service: Harbour Board Desires Revival,” n.d., R19979701, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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at the delay”, stated Mr. Alach, “for we have been receiving numerous enquiries from 
New Zealand and overseas companies which we could not answer until the location of 
the port had been decided”.549
The proposal at Whakatane was never a serious option and never had the support of 
the Bay of Plenty local authorities.550 It would have seen to the creation of an artificial 
harbour just 60 miles from Tauranga requiring a “very large sum of public money”.551 
This was confirmed by the engineer's report, which estimated that Whakatane would 
cost £4 – £5 million to develop while Tauranga could be converted into a deep-water 
harbour for £200,000 – £950,000, with no rates required from local bodies.552 Annual 
charges at Tauranga would be £37,600 initially before rising to £128,000 while 
Whakatane would require £219,000 before rising to £336,000.553
But a decision continued to be delayed. By 1953 Mr. Alach was still unable to make 
“any promises of early activity”, as “over the past four years... arrangements had been 
made with the Government to proceed with the work, but a number of obstacles... 
caused continuous delays”. These, he noted, were primarily the result of a change of 
government and the counter-proposal to build a port at Whakatane, something the 
government had still not decided for or against.554
The uncertainty around Mount Maunganui due to the government's indecision over the 
establishment of pulp mills in the region and the urgent need for capacity saw plans put
549 “Tauranga’s Case Must Be Proved Against Whakatane’s On Question Of Location Of Bay 
Of Plenty Port,” Bay of Plenty Times, August 23, 1950, R19979701, Archives New Zealand,
Wellington.
550 Development at Tauranga was supported by the Tauranga Harbour Board, Tauranga 
Borough Council, Te Puke Borough Council, Opotiki Borough and County Council, Rotorua 
Borough and County Councils, Te Aroha Borough Council, Waihi Borough Council, Piako 
County Council, Matamata County Council, Putaruru Borough Council and the Ohinemuri 
County Council.
551 “Development of Deep-Sea Port for Bay of Plenty,” Bay of Plenty Times, September 1, 
1950, R19979701, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
552 “Rotorua Support for Tauranga as the Port for Bay of Plenty,” Bay of Plenty Times, October 
26, 1950, R19979701, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
553 “Bay of Plenty Port,” New Zealand Herald, November 2, 1950, R19979701, Archives New 
Zealand, Wellington.
554 “Port Will Definitely Go At The Mount, Says Board Chairman,” Te Puke Times, February 6, 
1953, R19979701, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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in place to extend the Tauranga Railway Wharf by 150 feet in 1951. The Harbour Board
drafted the plans and sought urgent approval by the Marine Department's engineer on 
April 12, 1951. It was considered “extremely difficult to handle the trade now offering at 
the existing wharf”,555 and the Harbour Board needed its plans to be approved before it 
could borrow £26,000 and commence the extension.556 The plans were promptly 
approved on June 22, 1951, with the Governor-General signing off on the project.
However, the extension of the wharf did not go as planned. In 1952 the Harbour Board 
revised its loan application to £12,000 and changed the proposal from the 150-foot 
concrete extension to the South to a 105-foot timber extension to the north. This last 
minute change was brought about by a visit from the Transport Minister on June 18, 
1951, in which “the opinion was expressed that in view of Port Development at Mr. 
Maunganui, heavy expenditure in increasing the capacity of the Tauranga wharf to 
cope with timber trade was not justified”.557
The Murupara scheme was going ahead and so the deep-sea port at Mount 
Maunganui was deemed necessary to have such a facility to accommodate the “most 
spectacular instance of State intervention in the first two postwar decades”.558
That soon led to the Department of Works commissioning an economic justification for 
establishing a deep water port at Tauranga in 1948, which concluded that:
• Rail haulage to Auckland would cost an additional £54,000 per annum per 
thousand board feet (MBF) of logs.
• The annual cost of harbour facilities in Tauranga is estimated at £30,000.
• Paper and pulp shipments would also save an estimated £6,000 per annum 
through Tauranga as opposed to Auckland.
• Shipping additional logs through Auckland would require the construction of 
another wharf.
555 W.J. Walker to Marine Department, “Railway Wharf Extension,” April 12, 1951, R19981197, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
556 Bay of Plenty Times, March 14, 1951, R19981197, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
557 H.M. Thompson, “Memorandum for the District Commissioner of Works” (Ministry of Works,
January 24, 1952), 1, R19981197, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
558 Guest and Singleton, “The Murupara Project and Industrial Development in New Zealand 
1945–65,” 52.
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• The report concluded that the annual savings of developing a deep sea port at 
Tauranga were estimated at £35,000.559
The Chief Investigating Engineer reaffirmed those estimates and went further in 
recommending that Mount Maunganui should be the preferred site, as development 
would be £100,000 cheaper; annual costs £3,000 less; have better facilities for 
expansion both on the water side and land side; and it would be easier and cheaper to 
develop for vessels of greater draft in the future.560
In 1950 it seemed the government had decided that the Murupara project would no 
longer involve the State to the point previously thought. As a confidential report by the 
Commissioner of Works in 1950 noted, 
“One of the principal reasons for this arrangement [State constructing Tauranga 
then handing it over to the Port Authority] was the fact that the products from 
the State development at Murupara were expected to account for the greater 
part of the trade of the port for many years.
Now that the exploitation of the forest is likely to be on a different basis, the 
State's immediate interest in a port at Tauranga is considerably less, and it is 
probably better under these circumstances for the Tauranga Harbour Board 
itself to undertake the port works.
There is no other site in the Bay of Plenty where a harbour could be 
constructed or maintained at lesser cost than at Mr. Maunganui.”561
“The major ports were national affairs and it was possible that the Mount installations 
would also grow into that category”, but for the time being, Mr. F.D. Donovan – a 
member of the Tauranga Harbour Board, thought that “eventually [after construction] 
559 Edwin Lloydd Greensmith, “Memorandum for the Commissioner of Works” (Wellington, 
February 11, 1948), R15422452, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
560 R.G. Adams, “Memorandum for the Engineer-in-Chief” (Public Works Department, 
Wellington, June 28, 1948), 6, R15422452, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
561 E.R. McKillop, Port for Bay of Plenty Area (Wellington: Ministry of Works, October 26, 
1950), 18, R16482544, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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the Mount wharf would be the responsibility of ratepayers... In the meantime the 
Government was carrying on and would hand over to the Tauranga Harbour Board on 
terms that had been negotiated”.562
Mr. F.N. Christian, speaking at the 1953 Harbour Committee of Inquiry but unaware of 
the government's plans for Murupara, rightly pointed out that the economics for Mount 
Maunganui were not there. He said that “As businessmen, would the board prefer to 
build a wharf at Mount Maunganui at a cost six times as great as that to extend at 
Tauranga which could handle the bulk of the trade through the port?”563
Despite such concerns, the end result was the passing of the November 4 1953 Deed 
of Agreement with the Crown to finance the development of a 1,400 foot concrete 
wharf at Mount Maunganui, but with the Tauranga Harbour Board to “eventually repay 
every penny”.564 The wharf was completed on July 1, 1958 with a depth of 31 feet at 
low tide. It was officially gazetted as “The Mount Maunganui Wharf”.565
The Board’s Chairman, Mr. Alach, was a firm believer in the idea that a port had to 
finance itself from shipping revenue. As a critic of this policy remarked, “the policy of 
the [Tauranga] Harbour Board, as expounded by its chairman, Mr J. D. Alach, has been
that the port must live on its shipping revenue, and the board has claimed as a great 
virtue the abolition years ago of 'the harbour rate', while the development of port 
facilities has been almost negligible in comparison with what has been done 
elsewhere”.566 One of the reasons for this cultural development at the port was that the 
region of Rotorua, the port’s largest user, was in the Tauranga port district but did not 
562 “Early Construction Expected: Tauranga Wharf Extension,” Te Puke Times, June 19, 1953, 
R19981197, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
563 “Town Wharf to Be Extended to North,” Bay of Plenty Times, June 25, 1953, R19981197, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
564 New Zealand, Legislative Council and House of Representatives Debates, 2nd Session, 
30th Parliament, vol. 298 (Wellington, 1952), 1900.
565 “Draft Tauranga Harbour Board Loan and Empowering Bill, 1959” (Tauranga Harbour Board
Internal File, July 30, 1959), R15422455, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
566 “Harbour Policy,” Bay of Plenty Times, October 7, 1953, R19979701, Archives New 
Zealand, Wellington.
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pay rates to finance it.567 This was not seen as an issue by the Board because 
“wharfage receipts [are] ample to meet all maintenance and administrative charges”.568 
Interestingly, by 1953 the board was comprised of professionals, farmers, business 
people with only two having had experience at sea.569 Representation came from 
Matata (1 member); Maketu and Te Puke (2 members); Waimapu, Te Puna and Katikati
(2 members); Tauranga Borough (1 member); Rotorua Borough (1 member); and the 
federal government (2 members).570 It also maintained a strong opposition to rating the 
land within the port's district, as it believed that “the Port is mainly servicing newsprint, 
pulp, sawn timber and logs”, almost none of which came from within the port's rating 
zone.571
But this soon became a problem as legally for every pound of capital expenditure the 
Board was only able to raise 1 penny from each of the Tauranga Borough and 
Tauranga County, as well as three farthings from Matata Riding of Whakatane County, 
for a total of 23/4d or 2.75% of all capital expenditure.572 For loans, the Harbour Board 
was constrained by the Harbours Act 1908, Harbours Amendment Act 1910, the Local 
Bodies Loans Act 1913 and the Tauranga Harbour Board Empowering Act 1919, which 
required the Board to obtain “consent of the ratepayers of the Harbour District”, prior to 
being approved for a loan.573 All harbour works had to be approved by the Marine 
Department before being undertaken.574 In addition, the Board could not raise any 
money without legislative authority.575 But unlike other local authorities around New 
Zealand, Tauranga was also constitutionally unable to levy any significant rates on the 
567 “Development of Harbour,” February 7, 1946.
568 Mr. J. D. Alach, “Bay of Plenty Port,” The Rotorua Post, October 8, 1949, R19979701, 
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Times, August 24, 1948, R19979701, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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local population and instead had to rely exclusively on harbour dues to finance 
operations.576
This placed the Board in a tough situation. Trade through Tauranga was growing at a 
rapid pace, with Treasury expecting the tonnage to double during the five years to 
1964. However, the board was still legislatively restricted from raising capital itself; the 
1953 Loan Agreement with the government as part of the Mount Maunganui project 
prohibited the Board from taking on any more debt until the outstanding balance of £1.4
million was repaid, even if it had revenue surpluses sufficient to cover interest and 
sinking costs of any new construction.577 578
Eventually, Treasury and the Tauranga Harbour Board both agreed that 1,200 feet of 
additional berthage would be required at Mount Maunganui. Cabinet decided that the 
best way forward was to relax the legislative constraints on the Board, partially 
releasing it from the 1953 constraints and forming a Heads of Agreement “as a basis 
for co-operation between the Government, Tasman Pulp and Paper Ltd. and the 
Tauranga Harbour Board”. Tasman Pulp and Paper Ltd. would provide a loan of 
£500,000 subject to Tasman exports having priority at the port, with the Board issuing 
raising the remaining £500,000 through the issue of public debentures.579 580 The 
Heads of Agreement and alterations to the 1953 Agreement were approved by Cabinet 
on February 2, 1959.581
At the same time there was significant Japanese interest in the use of Tauranga to 
576 “Town Wharf Extension Plan Defended,” Bay of Plenty Times, August 8, 1953, R19981197, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
577 Treasury estimates showed that the Tauranga Harbour Board had revenue surpluses large 
enough to pay off both the amount specified in the 1953 Loan Agreement as well as new 
capital expenditure of £585,000 through the issue of public debentures, with an “increased 
margin of revenue available for further capital extensions at a later date”. Nordmeyer, “Draft
Cabinet Paper: Tauranga Harbour Board.”
578 Ibid., 2.
579 The government would advance the required capital to the Board until finance was 
acquired.
580 Nordmeyer, “Draft Cabinet Paper: Tauranga Harbour Board,” 4.
581 R.L. Hutchens, “Tauranga Harbour Board - Additional Berthage, Mount Maunganui” (Prime 
Minister’s Office, February 2, 1959), R15422455, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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export logs to Japan. Treasury reports note that the Tauranga Harbour Board came to 
an agreement with the Japanese interests that if they could find the capital to finance a 
new wooden wharf then the Board would give them sole right of use for loading logs for
up to 10 years with nominal wharfage charges.582 This was because the Japanese – 
Tokyo Menka Kaisha – who had agreed to lend the Board £100,000 for the construction
of the wharf, were stifled by the government's restrictions on local authorities seeking 
external investment funds.583
However, if the Japanese were going to construct the wharf themselves then they 
required certainty in the form of a long-term contract and guarantees from the New 
Zealand government to increase the number of import licenses so that Japanese ships,
which had been arriving almost empty, would be able to secure more balanced 
loadings. The government declined the offer and the “whole proposal [was] dropped”.584
A.D. McIntosh, the Secretary of External Affairs, noted that the whole incident raised 
the “general question of Japanese investment in New Zealand”, and that “the 
suggestion that gift finance might have been made available by Japan is even more 
delicate”.585
Tasman Pulp and Paper Ltd., as part of its agreement to finance half of the cost of the 
wharf, had its privileges contractually secured in an agreement with the Crown and 
Tauranga Harbour Board that granted it a 20-year priority of 600 feet of berthage along 
with storage space at the date of the Agreement. This priority would be upgraded to 
1,000 feet of berthage, if required by the Company, upon completion of the 1,200 foot 
wharf upgrade.586
582 A.B. Taylor, “Memorandum for the Minister of Finance: Japanese Log Trade” (Treasury 
Department, January 5, 1959), R15422455, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
583 A.D. McIntosh, “Japanese Shipping At Mt. Maunganui” (Prime Minister’s Office, February 
12, 1959), R15422455, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
584 Ibid.
585 Ibid.
586 F.M. Hanson, “Tauranga Harbour Board Agreements with the Crown and Tasman Pulp and 
Paper Co. Ltd.” (Ministry of Works, July 6, 1959), 2, R15422455, Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington.
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But this agreement was not allowed under the Harbours Act 1950, under which a Board
could not grant such a long priority without first going to the public with a tender for 
lease. Even then, certain cargoes and vessels could not be prioritised. The “accepted 
principle of Harbour Boards”, at the time in New Zealand, was that “the first ship to 
arrive gets the first berthage available”. The stakes involved at Tauranga – the 
government considered the port's upgrade as a matter of important “national 
development” – were so high that for the first time these provisions were changed.587 
But to do so, the Harbour Board had to seek parliamentary approval. This was 
achieved with the Tauranga Harbour Board Loan and Empowering Act 1959 which 
overruled the Harbours Act 1950 and allowed the contract to become reality.
However, it was not all one-sided. The Tauranga Harbour Board had its own provisions 
which made sure that safeguards were in place that ensured any unused space would 
be available to other shipping, “and for the re-establishment by the Board of any 
alternative priority berthage at another site if the Board requires the berthage now 
allotted to the Tasman Company for other purposes”.588
At the time, a tanker occupying a berth for less than 24 hours would bring the Board 
£2,000 in revenue, but a log ship that sits in a berth for 24 days only paid half that. This
was because the berthage “rent” was fixed at 1d per ton per working day. Under the 
“first come, first served” mandate in the Harbours Act 1950, if all three berths at 
Tauranga were occupied by log ships it would “completely disrupt all other trade of the 
port”, resulting “in a disastrous fall in port revenue, leaving the board two alternatives – 
either strike a harbour rate to make up any deficiency existing after the 'establishment 
period' or to increase the wharfage charges on logs to an extent which could only have 
the effect of killing a trade which is of great national importance”.589
By this stage the growth at Tauranga had been phenomenal.
587 Ibid., 3.
588 Ibid., 2.
589 Times Special Reporter, “Harbour Board Aim to Protect Trade: Priority Berthage Plan,” Bay 
of Plenty Times, July 16, 1959, R15422455, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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Figure 5.2: Tauranga's Rapid Growth, 1946 – 1973590
However, New Zealand's institutions were struggling to keep up. For Tauranga to 
expand – that is, to borrow – it had to have an Act of Parliament passed (a Loan and 
Empowering Bill). In just eight years between 1954 and 1962, Tauranga had to do this 
four times. “I wish to dispel from the minds of members any thought that the Tauranga 
Harbour Board is seeking to expand its port before such expansion is really 
necessary”, assured Mr. Welsh in a Parliamentary speech. “The pressure on the port's 
facilities is so great that it is necessary to provide overdue extensions. It is not unusual 
to see four or five ships anchored in the roadstead awaiting a berth”.591
The seven berths at Tauranga were occupied for, on average, 30 days in a 31 day 
month, an occupancy rate of nearly 97 per cent which was the highest in New 
Zealand.592
This growth led to the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry on August 23, 1962 into 
Tauranga's land access which had not kept up with the pace of the port. The 
Commission recommended that £3 million be spent to 1970 by the Ministry of Works 
590 Port of Tauranga, Port Trade and Statistic Information.
591 New Zealand, Legislative Council and House of Representatives Debates, 2nd Session, 
33rd Parliament, vol. 332 (Wellington, 1963), 2145.
592 Ibid.
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on upgrading the road facilities to the port of Tauranga, with a further £2.36 million 
required between 1970 – 1980. It also advised the Railway Department to complete the
Kaimai Deviation which would shorten the distances to Tauranga considerably.593
Table 5.4: Kaimai Deviation594
From 1962 Mileage to 
Tauranga
Kaimai Deviation 
Mileage to 
Tauranga
1962 Mileage to 
Auckland
Morrinsville 86 54 102
Waharoa 102 40 118
Putaruru 123 61 139
Kinleith 141 79 160
Rotorua 155 93 171
Cambridge 112 80 100
Frankton 104 72 85
Te Awamutu 120 88 100
While the deviation would cost £5 million, the commission regarded the savings in 
internal transport costs to be, from the “broader national viewpoint”, worthwhile. It also 
noted that an “important consideration” was the immediate savings of £1.841 million 
which would be achieved on the existing line by having the deviation in place.595
Finally, the Commission strongly advised that regulation 29 (2) of the Transport 
Licensing Regulations 1960 not apply to any railways servicing the Bay of Plenty. 
Regulation 29 (2) protected the railways from road competition. While the Commission 
advised that this regulation should be abolished for all transport operators, it only 
recommended that it be omitted for new transport development. The “road transport 
593 E.R. McKillop et al., Improved Access by Land to the Port of Tauranga and Bay of Plenty, 
Report of Commission of Inquiry (Wellington: Government of New Zealand, 1963), 13, 
R19600345, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
594 Ibid., 17.
595 Ibid., 18.
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operators working in the Bay of Plenty are giving efficient service at reasonable costs 
and with full regard to their customers' interests”, and it did not want to see that 
competition eroded.596
The Kaimai Deviation tunnel would ultimately be completed in 1976 at a total cost of 
$26 million, massively reducing inland transportation costs to Tauranga relative to 
Auckland.597
5.5. Amalgamation, 1965 – 1985
The environment in New Zealand in the 1950s and 1960s was one of trying to 
centralise a number of services that were currently run by local government to avoid 
'wasteful duplication' of infrastructure and services.598 One such attempt was the Local 
Government Commission, a body initially established in 1946 designed to review the 
ongoing functions of the numerous local government authorities.
However, this first attempt proved to be a complete failure; the Commission set to work 
“with the gusto of a cartographer mapping hitherto unexplored territory”, but in 
attempting to reorganise local government in Christchurch and Auckland it crossed a 
political line and was promptly abolished in 1951.599
A second attempt was made with the Local Government Commission Act 1953, but this
body achieved very little given it had far fewer powers than the 1946 version. It was 
reconstituted in 1961 following a 1960 parliamentary Select Committee with the Local 
Government Commission Act 1961, which reinstated both the powers the original body 
possessed as well as additional ones. The justification was that between 1946 and 
1960 leading up to the reconstitution the number of local bodies in New Zealand had 
increased by 300, demonstrating the inadequacy of the previous commission at 
596 Ibid., 21.
597 Bay of Plenty Harbour Board, “Proposed Tauranga Container Terminal,” n.d., R10384546, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
598 Rimmer, “The Changing Status of New Zealand Seaports, 1853–1960.”
599 Graham William Arthur Bush, Local Government and Politics in New Zealand (George Allen
& Unwin Aucklandz, 1980), 39.
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achieving its goals.600
In 1965 the Local Government Commission investigated the Bay of Plenty region and 
recommended that the Whakatane Harbour Board and the Ohiwa Harbour Board be 
abolished, with their functions transferred to the Tauranga Harbour Board. The 
Tauranga Harbour Board would then be reconstituted to the Bay of Plenty Harbours 
Board, consisting of 16 members as follows:
• 1 elected member for the Country of Opotiki and Borough of Opotiki
• 1 elected member for the Borough of Whakatane
• 2 elected members for the City of Rotorua
• 2 elected members for the County of Rotorua
• 2 elected members for the County of Whakatane and the Boroughs of Kawerau 
and Murupara
• 2 elected members for the County of Tauranga and the Borough of Te Puke
• 1 elected member for the Borough of Mt Maunganui
• 2 elected members for the City of Tauranga
• 3 elected members for the County of Matamata and the Boroughs of Matamata 
and Putaruru601
This proposed change would have increased the representation of the port's users on 
the Board. While the Commission's advice was not acted on immediately, eventually a 
slightly modified version was enacted culminating in the August 24 Bay of Plenty 
Harbour Board Act 1970. The duties and authority of the Board were not much 
changed from when it was the Tauranga Harbour Board; however, the composition of 
the Board had, and it now comprised:
• 2 elected members for the City of Tauranga
• 1 elected member for the Borough of Mount Maunganui
• 2 elected members for the Borough of Te Puke and the County of Tauranga
600 Mike Reid, “Amalgamation in New Zealand: An Unfinished Story?,” Public Finance and 
Management 13, no. 3 (2013): 249.
601 J.B. Yaldwyn, J.C.D. Mackley, and R.E. White, Bay of Plenty Harbours District Final 
Scheme (Wellington: Local Government Commission, May 14, 1965), 2, R12322928, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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• 2 elected members for the Rotorua District (Urban)
• 2 elected members for the Rotorua District (Rural)
• 1 elected members for the Borough of Kawerau and Part of Whakatane District
• 3 elected members for the Boroughs of Matamata, Putaruru, Tokoroa and the 
County of Matamata
Rotorua, along with the other major regions that exported from Tauranga, finally had its 
port.
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Illustration 5.3: 1961 Port of Tauranga's Economic Service Area602
602 “Memorandum for the Hon. Minister of Transport: Tauranga Harbour - Road/Rail Access” 
(Ministry of Transport, April 12, 1961), “Map A,” R16482544, Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington.
186
5.6. Containerisation, 1975 – 1977
By 1975 containerisation was well on the way to revolutionising the global shipping 
industry.603 The port of Tauranga, now under the control of the Bay of Plenty Harbour 
Board, was keen to expand into this growing industry. As Gordon Jackson put it, “every 
port authority wishing to remain in business in a serious way began equipping 
container berths”.604
In New Zealand, while Auckland had seen $20 million of port container investment 
approved by the government over the six years prior, Tauranga's applications to 
expand into containers – beginning in 1968 – were repeatedly refused.605
“There are several investment decisions by major Port of Tauranga users such 
as the Dairy Industry, Forest Industry etc., pending at this time. Many of the 
investment decisions are directly related to the decision as to whether Tauranga
will become a container port... The uncertainty as to the future of Tauranga as a
container port has also produced uncertainties in terms of pending future multi-
million dollar regional stock/storage investments.”606
Other than the costs imposed on port users by the uncertainty created around 
Tauranga's future, the biggest argument in favour of Tauranga as an export port was 
the congestion at Auckland that had been ongoing since the 1950s. The port of 
Auckland already had two container terminals and was proposing to build a third at a 
cost that greatly exceeded Tauranga's proposal. On the other hand, Tauranga had 
ample space to cope with additional throughput; the log trade that had previously been 
a staple at the port had declined to the point where forecasts only expected, at most, a 
603 Arthur Donovan, “The Impact of Containerization: From Adam Smith to the 21st Century,” 
Review of Business 25, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 10–15; Levinson, The Box; Roy Pearson John 
Fossey, “World Deep-Sea Container Shipping,” 2011.
604 Jackson, The History and Archaeology of Ports, 155.
605 K.S. Calder to Basil Arthur, Bay of Plenty Harbour Board, (August 4, 1975), R10384546, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
606 Bay of Plenty Harbour Board, “Bay of Plenty Harbour Board’s Visual Presentation of Its 
Appeal,” August 27, 1975, sec. 2, pt. 5, 8, R10384546, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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recovery to 25% of the previous highs.607
Much like the containerisation scenario that Prince Rupert faced in the sense that the 
facilities were already in place, Tauranga had 44 acres of space immediately available 
for a container terminal (30 acres available as part of Phase 2), with a 1,000 foot quay 
suitable for container operations also available.608
The Bay of Plenty Harbour Board argued that only through “a healthy competition 
between ports, especially where inland transport economics are favourable”, could you 
“ensure that port labour costs are maintained at the lowest possible levels compatible 
with efficiency and a fair deal to watersider labour”.609 This point was made in light of 
international events where inland container backup areas had created an extension of 
higher watersider pay rates at inland terminals along with demands for exclusive 
watersider labour at all inland container handling points, resulting in “bitter industrial 
disputes and in some cases national port strikes... lasting months”.610
Tauranga had no such constraints; indeed, the 54 acres of available consolidated 
backup area meant that no inland container depots would be required.
The proposed governance model selected by the Harbour Board differed from that of 
other New Zealand ports in that it was deliberately designed to avoid conflict. The initial
proposal was for the container terminal to be owned by a consortium made up of the 
Harbour Board, the stevedoring companies, user shipping lines, as well as the 
Watersiders Union, “if possible”.611 
The Union was a strong supporter of this plan, acknowledging that due to the seasonal 
nature of Tauranga's trade the condition that casual employment would be the primary 
employment structure was essential, with union participation aiding to “minimise the 
607 Bay of Plenty Harbour Board, “Proposed Tauranga Container Terminal.”
608 Ibid.
609 Bay of Plenty Harbour Board, “Bay of Plenty Harbour Board’s Visual Presentation of Its 
Appeal,” sec. 2, pt. 6, 12.
610 Ibid., sec. 2, pt. 6, 11.
611 Bay of Plenty Harbour Board, “Proposed Tauranga Container Terminal,” sec. 4.
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normal industrial problems of the introduction of a Container Terminal and produce a 
better degree of co-operation and understanding between management and labour”.612 
One shipping company in a letter to the Minister of Transport Sir Basil Arthur noted that
it found the “watersiders Union most co-operative, and within their own authority they 
would certainly do all they can to allow us to work two shifts, but whether Government 
Legislation at that time would allow this or not is a matter of speculation”.613
At the time investment decisions had to be approved by the New Zealand Ports 
Authority (NZPA), an entity established with the New Zealand Ports Authority Act 1968 
with the idea that it would regulate capital spending (sec. 13) to prevent spending that 
was outside the “national ports plan”. The Authority was established with the best of 
intentions as an attempt to stem the apparent duplication of infrastructure that 
individual ports, acting in local interests, were undertaking.614
However, in reality the Authority was quickly influenced by interests in Auckland and 
Wellington. One of the biggest problems was that the NZPA never developed a 
“national ports plan” and so, as noted by King, “it is hard to see on what grounds the 
Authority can judge proposals... except on an ad hoc basis with reference to only the 
viability of the specific project concerned”.615 There was simply no standard economic 
nor political criteria from which to judge applications from individual ports.
In the first four years of the Authority's existence, 56.3% of capital expenditure 
approved was for Auckland and Wellington (Section 13 (1) of the Act required the 
Authority's permission for any capital expenditure over $150,000; $250,000 for 
Auckland and Wellington).616 Admittedly they were the two largest ports at the time, 
however together they only handled about 39.5% of the total tonnage in New Zealand 
612 Ibid.
613 A.C.A. Gilmour to Basil Arthur, “Polish Ocean Lines - Port of Tauranga,” July 25, 1975, 
R10384546, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
614 Reveley and Tull, “Centralised Port Planning,” 153.
615 M.A. King, “Containers and the Future of New Zealand Ports”, 1971, 108. Cited in J. G. 
Sinclair, “The Impact of Changing Cargo Handling Techniques on South Island Ports” 
(Doctor of Philosophy, University of Canterbury, 1973), 42.
616 Ibid., 43.
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and future expansion was limited by their geography.617 More economical, lower-cost 
alternatives to pouring more capital into Auckland and Wellington were available, such 
as the Tauranga proposal.
Despite these advantages, the Authority refused to approve Tauranga's application. In 
a letter addressed to Sir Basil Arthur, Minister of Transport, F.W. James of the Steel and
Tube Company of New Zealand Ltd., expressed his displeasure in no uncertain terms:
“We have found through bitter and expensive experience that the Port of 
Auckland has not been a successful port for the discharge of cargo destined for
the Bay of Plenty and Waikato... We feel that the extension of the Auckland 
Harbour Board's container terminal will not ease the situation but in our view 
the present unsatisfactory position would be worsened by the extra cargoes 
such extensions would generate.
The Bay of Plenty Harbour Board has ample land available for the successful 
operation of a container berth and we were most disappointed to learn of the 
Port Authority's decision... Because of the land already available for storage 
and handling of containers at Mount Maunganui such congestion would not 
occur at this port. In addition, the Kaimai tunnel, when completed will provide a 
fast, economical inward and outward route for the Waikato and South Auckland 
areas.”618
Similar letters from the Wilsons Cement company, Cambridge Co-operative Dairy 
Company, NZ Co-operative Wool Marketing Association, Bay of Plenty Co-op Dairy 
Association, Bruntwood, East Tamaki, Morrinsville, Sunny Park-Hinuera, Tatua, Te 
Puke Fruitgrowers Association, Te Aroha-Thames Valley, Te Awamutu, Dominion Salt 
Ltd., the Tasman Pulp and Paper Company, and the General Secretary of the New 
617 Lewin, J.P., The New Zealand Official Year-Book (Wellington: Department of Statistics, 
August 14, 1970).
618 F.W. James to Basil Arthur, August 26, 1975, R10384546, Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington.
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Zealand Waterside Workers' Federation all made similar points, with the latter stating 
that the decision “will have the inhibiting effect and inevitable result of a stealthy ring-
bark”.619
Illustration 5.4: 1975 Newspaper Comic Critical of the Auckland Harbour Board's 
Influence620
Auckland was struggling to cope with its current trade volume, with the average delay 
at the Auckland container terminal from August – December 1974 being in excess of 24
days per container. The minimum delay from the time of off-loading from the vessel to 
the completion of devanning of the contents was 13 days, with a maximum delay of 48 
days.621
Even when the well-documented congestion at the port eased, the delays persisted as 
the number of containers devanned per calendar day fell progressively with congestion 
619 E.G. Thompson to Basil Arthur, August 27, 1975, 2, R10384546, Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington.
620 “Expert Calls for Action on Port: Welfare of Region Hinges on Review,” Bay of Plenty 
Times, August 20, 1975, R10384546, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
621 K.S. Calder to Basil Arthur, “Auckland L.C.L. Container Devanning Study,” August 20, 1975,
R10384546, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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levels. “It seems apparent therefore”, notes a 1975 study on Auckland's container 
devanning, “that the reduction in congestion has not produced the devanning 
performance efficiencies at the container terminal which might have been expected 
following the reduction in congestion and the availability of additional shed space... If 
such a course is persisted with [additional handling through inland expansion at 
Auckland] it can in itself finally negate the whole benefit to the nation of the adoption of 
containerisation as a complete transport system”.622
The whole situation at Auckland and in New Zealand in general was not aided by the 
actions of waterfront labour. According to the Waterfront Industry Commission's annual 
report, in 1972-73, the average turnaround of container ships was 5.31 days; by 1973-
74, it had risen to 7.55 days. This was caused primarily by a “reluctance of watersiders 
to work a three day shift, the lack of container handling equipment and the industrial 
climate on the water front”.623
Tauranga's Mayor, Mr. R.A. Owens, described the situation as one where “Auckland is 
endeavouring to build an empire which, just as surely as that of the Romans, will fall – 
it will kill itself with its own weight”. He pleaded with the government to, “in the national 
interest... [to] weigh it up, over and above the power of the Auckland members of 
Parliament”.624
Unfortunately for Mr. Owens and Tauranga the Transport Minister, as the appeal 
authority, upheld the decision of the NZPA on March 24, 1976.625 This decision was 
made on the back of a socio-economic study done by the Ministry of Transport with 
assurances from the Auckland Harbour Board that “they expect no insurmountable 
problems in this area [congestion], and I have no reason to doubt that assurance”.626
622 Ibid.
623 Brian Lockstone, “It’s Shape up or Ship out,” Auckland Star, July 5, 1975, R10384546, 
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Judge K.G. Arthur, the former chairman of the NZPA and chairman of the commission 
set up to evaluate Tauranga's first major deep-water expansion in 1950, commented on
the decision by remarking that Auckland did not have the space for its container berth 
“but will never change and admit it”. As chairman of the 1950 inquiry he was assured 
by the Auckland Harbour Board that “its upper harbour development would be finished 
in a few years and it would take all the trade Tauranga could handle”.627 Yet by 1976 
that development had yet to begin and Tauranga was New Zealand's leading export 
port.
The Bay of Plenty Harbour Board was understandably upset. It was quick to point out 
errors totalling over $3 million in the Ministry of Transport's socio-economic analysis, 
sums which had proven to be a decisive factor in the appeal's failure. Businesses were 
also quick to criticise the decision, with the Federated Farmers of New Zealand adding 
that even with the error, it “will cost a great deal more than $3 million to get our produce
up to Auckland”, and that there is a “deplorable situation [in] which [there] exists a $2 
million crane in Wellington has been sitting idle for 2 years, because of an argument as
to who should work it. What good is a major port to anybody when this state of affairs 
can render it useless?”628
These complaints continued to flow and in 1977 the New Zealand Co-op Dairy 
Company, New Zealand's largest dairy company, also appealed the decision against 
the Bay of Plenty Harbour Board. Its submission estimated that it was losing $1 million 
annually by having to ship through Auckland instead of Mount Maunganui, adding that 
only “the joint follies of the Ports Authority and the Auckland Harbour Board”, could 
ignore the issues involved in moving freight through “some of the most congested 
arteries in N.Z”.629
March 24, 1976), 4, R10384547, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
627 “Port Has Good Case for Containers: Judge,” Bay of Plenty Times, February 24, 1976, 
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Support was widespread; an internal Ministry of Transport memo dated September 14, 
1977 listed the following correspondence:
Table 5.5: Actors Supportive of the Tauranga Proposal630
Letters Supporting the Bay of Plenty Harbour Board's Appeal
Maritime Services and Stevedore Ltd.
Bay of Plenty Co-operative Fertiliser Co. Ltd.
Bay of Plenty Stevedoring Co. Ltd.
The British Phosphate Commissioners
Seatrans Consolidated (N.Z.) Limited
The New Zealand Farmers' Fertiliser Company Ltd.
Dominion Salt (N.Z.) Ltd.
Maritime Carriers New Zealand Ltd.
Bay of Plenty Fruitpackers Ltd.
N.Z. Lumber Co. Ltd.
The New Zealand Co-operative Dairy Company Ltd.
Te Awamutu Co-op Dairy Co. Ltd.
Federated Farmers of N.Z. Bay of Plenty Province Inc.
Mt. Maunganui and Tauranga Waterside Workers Industrial Union of Workers
Tatua Co-operative Dairy Company Ltd.
Sunny Park – Hinuera Co-operative Dairy Company Ltd.
The New Zealand Harbour Boards Employees Union
New Zealand Forest Products
Letters Written Through the Bay of Plenty Harbour Board Expressing Qualified Support
Nedlloyd (N.Z.) Ltd.
New Zealand Unit Express
Shaw Savill Line
Blueport A.C.T. (NZ) Ltd.
Union Steamship Company of New Zealand Ltd.
New Zealand Meat Producers Board
The memo noted that the only body in New Zealand that supported the Ports Authority 
decision was the Auckland Harbour Board.631 The main argument put forward by 
Auckland in its submission was that 85% of its (Auckland's) costs are fixed and so must
be recovered from users. It feared that competition from the more efficient and flexible 
Lodges This Appeal,” 1977, 2, R10384549, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
630 Secretary for Transport to Minister of Transport, “Bay of Plenty Harbour Board Multi-
Purpose Container Crane Appeal,” September 14, 1977, R10384549, Archives New 
Zealand, Wellington.
631 Ibid.
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Tauranga would decimate its financial position, somewhere in the region of $1.4 – $3.5 
million per annum.632
Finally on December 7, 1977 in what was described in an internal memo as a 
“controversial decision”, the Minister of Transport for the first time overruled a NZPA 
decision. The Secretary for Transport advised the Minister that it would be “unwise and 
unnecessary for you to state that you found the new evidence presented as persuasive
because although it is likely to be found more palatable by the Ports Authority it may 
not be so acceptable to the Auckland Harbour Board who did not see this new 
evidence or comment on it”.633  The new evidence the Secretary was speaking of was a
revised financial analysis which eliminated the $3 million cost error from the previous 
study.634
In all, the NZPA had “failed dismally at central planning of port development”.635 It was 
quick to heed the advice of the Auckland and Wellington status quo while attempting to 
prevent 'duplication' of infrastructure even when the market was crying out for and 
willing to pay for it. It had misunderstood how competition worked and in an attempt to 
increase efficiencies by centralising the industry, actually worked to reduce it by stifling 
the competitive process.
5.7. Decentralisation and Waterfront Reform, 1977 – 1989
While the victory of the Bay of Plenty Harbour Board in 1977 to be granted container 
port status ensured the future of Tauranga, there were still a number of institutional 
issues in New Zealand that were coming to a head. Two of the biggest issues were 
waterfront labour and the centralisation of New Zealand's ports that had occurred 
under the reign of the NZPA.
632 A.J. Healy, “Summary of Points Made Concerning the Ports Authority Decision by Parties to
the Ports Authority’s Deliberations and by Parties to the Appeal” (Ministry of Transport, 
September 21, 1977), 2, R10384549, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
633 Secretary for Transport, “Bay of Plenty Multi-Purpose Container Crane Appeal” (Ministry of 
Transport, November 27, 1977), R10384549, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
634 A.J. Edwards, “Bay of Plenty Harbour Board Multi-Purpose Container Crane” (Ministry of 
Transport, December 7, 1977), R10384549, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
635 Reveley and Tull, “Centralised Port Planning,” 155.
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On October 1, 1975 New Zealand introduced a “Port Service Charge”, a fee to be 
charged to port users determined by the average of all New Zealand port handling 
costs. While this initially eased the problems facing the larger ports such as Auckland 
and Wellington who were able to over-man and under-utilise facilities as a result of 
prior labour agreements, it placed an increasing burden on the more efficient 
secondary ports. These secondary ports were no longer able to compete on price 
through lower handling costs. With costs centralised, competition was fought on turn-
around instead of price and the larger ports were able, through their influence with the 
NZPA, to invest in “vast amounts of capital on wool store facilities, cranes, land 
reclamations for container parks and a variety of peripheral necessities. The more 
invested, the more unlikely that secondary ports will come into their own again and the 
more certain that the huge, unnecessary internal freight bill will grow”.636
New Zealand had also centralised its waterfront labour force with the Waterfront 
Industry Commission (WIC), an entity established during the Second World War.637 The
WIC pooled all waterside workers together effectively cross-subsidising labour costs 
between different ports.638 Workers were allocated to individual ports by the WIC for up 
to 5 months with guaranteed payments to any underutilised workers made out of the 
National Administration Fund, a fund financed by a levy on the national port wage bill 
and a charge on container traffic.639 Reveley has argued that this system, while 
manageable but far from perfect, reached a breaking point with the advent of 
containerisation which reduced the labour-intensiveness of waterfront work.640 It only 
continued for so long because institutional “lock-in” had occurred through the creation 
636 “Container Era Costly Burden For Farming,” Otago Daily Times, October 5, 1976, 
R10384556, Archives New Zealand, Wellington; E.R. Spriggs to J.R. Harrison, “Overseas 
Exports.,” October 12, 1976, R10384556, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
637 Peter Turnbull, “Contesting Globalization on the Waterfront,” Politics and Society 28, no. 3 
(2000): 367–92.
638 Jarden Morgan, Review of Regulatory Issues Relating to Ports of Auckland, December 
1989, 9, R629798, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
639 Peter Turnbull and David Sapsford, “Hitting the Bricks: An International Comparative Study 
of Conflict on the Waterfront,” Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 40, 
no. 2 (2001): 238.
640 James Reveley, “Waterfront Labour Reform in New Zealand: Pressures, Processes and 
Outcomes,” Journal of Industrial Relations 39, no. 3 (September 1, 1997): 369–87.
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of a self-reinforcing path-dependent outcome caused by the establishment of inefficient
labour market institutions.641
Under containerisation, labour needed to be directly and continuously employed but 
this was not possible under the Container Terminals agreement between the WIC and 
the unions. Perversely, as with capital expenditure where the only competition that 
could take place was through over-investing, the only competition that could take place 
on the labour front was through “special agreements” outside the WIC between 
individual shippers and labour unions.642 
In New Zealand, both of these incentives – the pooling of capital and labour costs – 
worked to centralise key costs faced by ports in New Zealand to the point where they 
were unable to compete on these fronts by reducing costs and improving efficiencies. 
Inefficient ports were not revealed as they were automatically cross-subsidised by 
more efficient ports (or at least, inefficiencies would grow and persist for a long time 
before being discovered). By the mid-1980s, waterfront labour costs averaged around 
$950 for a 28-hour week with no overtime, two-thirds higher than the national average 
of $575 for a 40-hour week inclusive of overtime.643
As North put it, because “various kinds of markets (political as well as economic) have 
different margins at which competition can be played out, the consequence of the 
structure we impose will be to determine whether the competitive structure induces 
increasing economic efficiency or stagnation.”644 Competition will always take place; 
institutions determine where this competition occurs and whether that competition is 
unproductive (rent-seeking) or productive (welfare-improving). In the case of ports in 
1977 New Zealand, a significant amount of competition was of the welfare-reducing 
variety where Port Authorities, shipping companies and stevedores had to compete not 
641 Reveley, “Path Dependence.”
642 Reveley, “Waterfront Labour Reform in New Zealand,” 379.
643 Colin James, “On the Waterfront,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 21, 1989, 38, 
R629798, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
644 North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, 7:1.
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in lower prices or improved efficiencies but through over-investment and costly illicit 
payments to labour.
This all began to change in 1983. The process of reform began with increasing disquiet
over the contribution of New Zealand's ports to the well-being of the nation. In a letter 
to the Minister of Labour from the New Zealand Stevedoring Employers' Association 
Inc., the Association described the situation on the waterfront as “a mess”, where 
“special agreements proliferate, special cargo rates are often astronomical, and the 
bonus system is a machine that devours money faster than it can be generated, all 
without much visible benefit to the industry. Watersiders... are interested only in how 
much can be milked from the industry”.645
The Association thought that piecemeal attempts at altering the existing arrangements, 
as had taken place since 1950, would not work. What was needed was a “radical 
approach”, to reform “a system which thrives on overmanning at all levels, which holds 
the employer to ransom daily... and which required an expensive and bureaucratic 
Waterfront Industry Commission to administer it”.646
The first sign that the government was willing to change the institutional environment of
the New Zealand port industry was an initial review in 1984 involving the Transport 
Advisory Council, Exports and Shipping Council, Harbours Association, as well as the 
Waterfront and related industry groups. Shortly thereafter the government 
commissioned the “On Shore Costs Study”, a work which identified operating 
inefficiencies and poor work practices in New Zealand's ports.
While the “On Shore Costs Study” itself was light on recommendations, the 
government used it to justify reform in the shape of the commercialisation of ports 
through the passing of the Ports Companies Act, 1988. The full timeline of events is 
summarised in Table 5.6.
645 T. Smith to J.B. Bolger, “The Waterfront Industry,” October 12, 1983, 1, R629834, Archives 
New Zealand, Wellington.
646 Ibid., 2.
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Table 5.6: Timeline of Port Reform, 1984 – 1989647
1984
February Initial Review due to increasing disquiet about New Zealand's ports.
November Onshore Costs Discussion Document: The transport, handling and related 
costs of goods by sea.
December The Minister of Transport along with 140 industry representatives 
expressed their views on the Onshore Costs study.
1985
July Onshore Costs Study Summary and Analysis of Submissions by the 
government.
September Ports Industry Workshop held with 46 industry representatives, agreeing 
that: “The New Zealand ports industry should actively promote New 
Zealand's trade objectives in the national interest by providing within an 
integrated transport network a ports system which ensures an efficient and 
cost-effective transfer of cargoes between land and sea.”
1986
May Ports Industry Review Committee containing industry representatives 
tasked to report back with recommended reform proposals.
1987
March Announcement of Ports Policy with three primary objectives:
• The separation of the harbour boards' commercial function from 
their non-trading roles;
• The freedom from antiquated legislative controls over commercial 
activities; and
• the need for standards of accountability similar to those applying to
businesses in the private sector.
1988
May Port Companies Act and related legislation enacted by Parliament (29 
April).
June Government Initiates review of the WIC.
October Establishment of Port Companies.
December Government announces the WIC prevented any accountability that would 
result from a direct employer-employee relationship; it created rigidities 
which prevents ports from adapting to changing circumstances; waterfront 
labour was no different to the rest of the economy and should be treated as
such; and that therefore it would be abolished.
1989
March Waterfront Industry Reform Act approved by Parliament.
September Waterfront Industry Restructuring Act approved by Parliament.
As part of the reform process the now obsolete and ineffectual NZPA was abolished 
647 B.A. Martin, Port Reform Publicity (Ministry of Transport, April 2, 1990), R17340931, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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(Sec. 41), with the new port companies taking full ownership of their respective ports.
Table 5.7: Key Institutional Changes, 1988 – 1989
Pre-1989 Post-1989
Ports owned by the New Zealand 
Government.
Ports owned by Port Companies, with 51% 
held by local authorities.
Investment decisions made by the New 
Zealand Ports Authority and Transport 
Minister.
Investment decisions made by individual Port 
Companies.
All labour pooled by with costs for unused 
labour distributed evenly across the industry.
Ports negotiate for their own labour force. 
Employment declined 37% in one year.
40-hour work weeks guaranteed with tight 
restrictions on shift arrangements. Ports free to innovate on labour scheduling.
Stevedores prohibited from owning or leasing 
mobile equipment.
Stevedores allowed to purchase or hire mobile
equipment from whomever they please.
To soften the blow to ports who were suddenly faced with enormous redundancy 
payouts the government passed the Waterfront Industry Restructuring Act 1989. This 
Act temporarily established the Waterfront Industry Restructuring Authority (Sec. 4) with
the power to compensate employers for these obligations.648 This was a necessary step
to help break the path-dependent “transitional gains trap” that New Zealand's port 
industry had found itself in.649
Finally, amendments were made to the Local Government Act 1974, the most important
feature of which – from the point of view of Tauranga – was to transfer a large portion 
of the power previously bestowed to the Auckland Harbour Board to the Auckland 
Regional Council and the Waikato Regional Council.
All of these reforms allowed Tauranga to flourish. Unlike Auckland, Tauranga had ample
low-cost backup land; was close to major domestic markets; had cool-store capacity; 
off-wharf permanent stores for major shippers; and had a far more competitive, long 
established cargo marshalling service. According to a Ports of Auckland Limited (PAL) 
study, “Tauranga has the potential to compete for nearly all of Auckland's 
conventionally handled general cargo overseas trade, and some container trade (e.g. 
648 The Act stated that the Authority was to be dissolved in September 1992.
649 Gordon Tullock, “The Transitional Gains Trap,” The Bell Journal of Economics 6, no. 2 
(1975): 671–78.
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the Japan trade)”.650 The marshalling efficiency at Tauranga came about because “while
stevedoring companies were powerless to influence the loading practices of the 
watersiders, it was possible to innovate in the marshalling area”.651 Independent 
contractors were hired along with the Drivers' Union to transport cargo to ship-side.
Les Dickson, a first-year employee at Tauranga, saw an opportunity: use an existing 
“Wagner” – a log moving machine that was not being utilised – to, along with two 
contractors who agreed to work in shifts with him, cart logs 24 hours a day to the dock. 
This improved efficiency dramatically, doing the work of three trucks and trailers, three 
truck drivers, three cranes, six crane drivers, along with the operating costs of running 
all that machinery. It was the first time 24 hour a day operations had been introduced at
a New Zealand port, a “groundbreaking” achievement “in an industry where union 
control meant that normal operating hours were strictly limited to daylight, with 
weekend work coming under special arrangements”.652
The success of that effort saw Dickson form his own company at Tauranga, Associated 
Stevedores, and after navigating “the unique bureaucracy of the waterfront”, managed 
to negotiate with the Waterside Workers' Union for shift work that would enable work to 
continue 24 hours a day until cargo was fully loaded. This was a landmark achievement
in the late 1970s in an industry where “hours and conditions of work were strictly 
controlled”. They were met with continuous pressure from established vested interests 
such as the Port Employers Association653 and the Auckland unions, the latter of which 
“imposed itself on Tauranga, preventing the adoption of systems that might be less 
labour intensive”.654 
650 Morgan, Review of Regulatory Issues Relating to Ports of Auckland, 45.
651 Greg Dickson, Transforming the New Zealand Waterfront: Les Dickson’s Story (Mount 
Maunganui: Dickson Family, 2013), 9.
652 Ibid., 12.
653 This Association represented the conference shipping lines which had a political influence 
so great that it had managed to have an exception written into the Commerce Act stating 
that “restrictive trade practices” do not apply to the carriage of goods by sea to or from New
Zealand.
654 Dickson, Transforming the New Zealand Waterfront: Les Dickson’s Story, 25.
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The change in attitude in New Zealand was exemplified by a speech given by 
economist Ronald R. Allan of McGregor & Company. He noted that the concerns that 
had led to the creation of the NZPA and similar anti-duplication regulations were 
unfounded. Fluctuations in the shipping industry should not be “interpreted as a sign of 
a cut-throat and unstable market”, for these “instabilities are a reflection of a healthy, 
entrepreneurial and highly competitive market”. The desired policy then was to 
“illuminate the future by posing a diverse set of plausible prospects then asking 'what if'
questions about their consequences for our industry... we must avoid making forecasts 
that tempt people to 'back horses'... to 'pick winners'”.655
To prevent over- or under-investment, what was required was an industry where “ports 
truly compete with one another”, resulting in port users voting with their feet where the 
“successful ports will be those offering the best balance between port charges and 
average in-port time”.656
Opportunity costs are important; the relative costs of capital expenditure and waiting 
times have to be counted together. In terms of dynamic or adaptive efficiency, an 
“efficient” port should be defined not as one with the lowest in-port time (a possible sign
of over-investment), but one that operates in a contestable market with an excess 
capacity where the total cost of delays is still below the total cost of additional 
infrastructure outlays.657 Feedback on whether or not the port is acting efficiently is then
provided by profit and ultimately the port's users.658
655 Ronald R. Allan, “Efficiency and Growth in Maritime Transport: Forum Debate” (McGregor &
Company, November 1989), 3–4, R629654, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
656 Ibid., 5.
657 Of course institutional issues such as labour market regulation, anti-trust regulations, and 
the general political environment must be taken into consideration.
658 Again, this is only possible in an institutional environment conducive to it. Such provisions 
in a highly regulated, uncontestable and monopolistic port industry would likely cause more 
issues.
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5.8. Privatisation and the Modern Port, 1989 – 2012
“History shows that ad-hoc government intervention in the New Zealand waterfront has
not worked”. – Minister of Transport, W.P. Jeffries, addressing the South Pacific Ports 
Association's 15th Conference, Tauranga, 5 December 1989.659 
Following the resounding success of the 1987 – 1989 reforms of the New Zealand port 
industry, the government sought almost immediately to “liberalise the ownership regime
of the newly formed port companies”, once it was “satisfied that port users will not be 
disadvantaged and that economic efficiency will be promoted”.660 The ownership 
structure prevented private ownership of a port beyond 49%, which it believed 
“prevents the natural development of an ownership market for port companies”.
Indeed, without the possibility of competition in the form of a takeover, it cannot be said
that a market is truly competitive and therefore inefficiencies may persist. According to 
Williamson, when regulations delay “the transition to an efficient industrial 
configuration”, by preventing changes in structures, the economic costs can be far 
higher than any increased risk of monopolisation.661 A more appropriate approach is to 
allow all types of ownership structures, carefully analyse the trade-offs for each case, 
and only act when “they are convinced that such economies as may exist are not 
sufficient to justify [that ownership structure]”.662 663
659 W.P. Jeffries, “Speech to the South Pacific Ports Association’s 15th Conference” (Tauranga,
December 5, 1989), R17340931, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
660 Northland Port Corporation et al., Regulatory Issues Relating to the Ports of New Zealand 
(Wellington: Ministry of Commerce, The Treasury, and the Ministry of Transport, November 
1989), i, R17340931, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
661 Oliver E. Williamson, “Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,” The 
American Economic Review 58, no. 1 (1968): 33.
662 Ibid., 34.
663 But too much discretion should be discouraged less the regulator itself gets captured. 
George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science 2, no. 1 (1971): 3–21.
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Illustration 5.5: New Zealand's Ports in November 1989664
The review noted that port companies, shippers and shipping companies viewed the 
main flaw of the corporatisation model adopted in 1988 as the transfer of ownership 
from Harbour Boards to local authorities. This was because the temptation for the local 
authorities to cross-subsidise other community concerns created a conflict of interest, 
whereas the Harbour Boards “had at least been for the port alone”.665 The stakeholders
664 Ernst & Young and NZIER, Review of New Zealand Shipping Ports, Draft, (November 
1989), R17340931, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
665 Ibid., 67.
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interviewed almost unanimously agreed that the removal of the 51% compulsory local 
authority ownership should be abolished and that this would solve the issues they 
faced.
The government agreed and on March 20 1990, the Minister of Transport announced 
that the government planned to introduce legislation to allow 100% industry ownership 
of port companies.666
While all of this was going on, Tauranga had already begun innovating and expanding. 
The removal of the NZPA saw Tauranga immediately start work on two new berths at 
Sulphur Point to cater for the pressure its clients were putting on it to increase capacity 
as by this stage the port was quite congested. It was not alone either; by 1990, Napier, 
Timaru, Tauranga and even Auckland had begun expanding to the sum of $90 million in
port facilities.667
Actors at Tauranga quickly established the Port of Tauranga Industrial Council,668 with 
the sole goal of negotiating with the unions for an individual award at the port. If a 
national agreement was signed first, precedent would be set and Tauranga would have 
to follow it. So the Council sent Mr. Allan Jones to Wellington to negotiate on behalf of 
the port with the sole job to say 'no' to any deal. “By never agreeing to anything, they 
could never do a deal”, Jones recalled.669 Other ports made concessions to the union to
have work continue but Tauranga would not back down on the requirement of 24 hour a
day, 7 day a week shift work and that strategy eventually worked, with an agreement 
being reached on December 11, 1989. It also set the precedent for casual labour, 
appealing the initial 10% cap on casuals to the Labour Court and ultimately being 
victorious, allowing it to hire whomever it wanted, whenever they were needed.670
666 Bill Jeffries, Economic Statement: Port Companies (Ministry of Transport, March 20, 1990), 
R17340931, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
667 Martin, Port Reform Publicity.
668 Associated Stevedores, New Zealand Marshalling and Stevedoring, New Zealand 
Stevedoring, NZFP Forests, Tasman Forestry and the Port of Tauranga.
669 Dickson, Transforming the New Zealand Waterfront: Les Dickson’s Story, 39.
670 Ibid., 44; 71.
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These innovations had a massive effect on port productivity. In New Zealand as a 
whole, post-reform labour declined from 3156 to 1774 within a year, or some 43.8%. At 
Tauranga, the labour force declined from 441 to 202, or 54.2%, with gang sizes 
declining from 10.5 to 6. Cargo handling costs fell rapidly with the improved 
productivity, with Tauranga handling 1,550 tonnes per ship in 1989, up to 2,500 tonnes 
in 1990 – an increase of over 60% – with a lot of the benefits passed on to shippers in 
the form of an immediate 26% price decline.671 Compared to the situation in Australia, 
New Zealand had a 30% cost advantage pre-reform but a 60% advantage post-
reform.672
Table 5.8: Key post-Reform Statistics at Tauranga673
Item 1989 1991 1993
Throughput ('000 
tonnes) 4,078 6,114 6,880
Average Days in Port 5.5 2.4 1.8
Operating Cost per 
Tonne (Index) 100 57 55
Average Tonnes per 
Employee 25,487 44,627 52,124
Average Berth 
Occupancy 70% 39% 32%
Tonnes per Gross 
Gang Hour 71.9 - 115.1
The New Zealand Dairy Board, one of the largest port users in New Zealand, estimated
that in the 8 months following the reforms it had saved $5 million.674
The question then becomes, if such huge savings were available why was reform not 
undertaken earlier? The answer lies in New Zealand's institutions: actors such as the 
New Zealand Dairy Board, if such enormous savings were available, would spend up to
$5 million to achieve them. Today's inefficiencies can be tomorrow's profit opportunities 
671 New Zealand Business Roundtable, Port Reform in New Zealand: A Mid Term Update, 
August 1990, 5, R17316963, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
672 Martin, Port Reform Publicity; New Zealand Business Roundtable, Port Reform in New 
Zealand: A Mid Term Update, 4; ibid., 22.
673 Grant Macvey to Ministry of Commerce, “Statistics Port ‘Port Reform,’” May 30, 1994, 
R16684786, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
674 Ministry of Transport, “Introduction for Australasian Shipping Directory,” September 21, 
1993, R16684786, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
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provided the institutional environment is one that allows those opportunities to be 
taken. In the case of New Zealand, the inefficiencies were institutional in that they were
the result of a long period of poor interventions in the industry. The New Zealand Dairy 
Board, along with New Zealand's ports, stevedoring companies, and shipping lines, 
were prevented from capturing these potential efficiency gains due to an institutional 
structure that did not allow it. It took a change in political ideology for institutional 
change to begin and for those potential gains to first be discovered, and then 
realised.675
The rapid move from one of the most regulated economies in the western world to the 
most liberal in the 1980s, dubbed “Rogernomics” after the Minister of Finance Roger 
Douglas, was the result of a “dominance of policy formation by a small number of 
people”.676 As Roger Douglas said in his own words:
“Do not try and advance a step at a time. Define your objectives clearly and 
move towards them in quantum leaps. Otherwise the interest groups will have 
time to mobilise and drag you down”.677
Without this change in the institutional environment, any attempts at port reform would 
likely have been doomed to repeat the well-intended but failed attempts to improve 
efficiency that had gone before it (such as the NZPA).
Meanwhile the post-reform environment at Tauranga was energetic. Tauranga had 
never become involved in stevedoring and generally kept its operations to the port 
business only, unlike other ports around New Zealand.678 It had also maintained the 
early philosophy instilled by former Chairmen such as J.D. Alach that the port should 
not cross-subsidise; it should consult with port users; and that in exchange it should 
675 Enid Wistrich, “Restructuring Government New Zealand Style,” Public Administration 70, 
no. 1 (1992): 119–35; Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship.
676 Shaun Goldfinch, “Remaking New Zealand’s Economic Policy: Institutional Elites as 
Radical Innovators 1984-1993,” Governance 11, no. 2 (April 1998): 199.
677 Roger Douglas and Louise Callan, Unfinished Business (Auckland: Random House, 1993), 
220–221.
678  Tauranga owned some sheds but no equipment.
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operate on a user-pays basis rather than levy rates on its constituents, most of whom 
do not use the port.
The same could not be said for other ports. Stevedoring was one item that where each 
individual port could make its own decision on. Every other port in New Zealand had 
some kind of stake in stevedoring, whether it was a shareholding or outright ownership.
Tauranga was the only port with no investment by the port in stevedoring, or receiving 
and delivery. While stevedores said they were happy to compete with the ports in 
stevedoring, none of them actually believed they would face true competition.679
Tauranga, having always had true stevedoring competition, had three stevedore 
companies working the port at the time of the reforms: the Associated Stevedores, NZ 
Marshalling, and NZ Stevedores. There was even union competition, with the 
Watersiders Union, Northern Drivers Union and Harbour Workers Union all having a 
presence at the port. It also had no labour force of its own, unlike other port companies 
which had hired their own labour force with the abolition of the WIC.680
Thus the governance structure at Tauranga, itself a legacy of the past, was quite 
conducive to efficiency and it had for a long time been the most efficient port in New 
Zealand, even with the institutional difficulties it and all ports in New Zealand faced. So 
when those institutional barriers were lifted by the reforms in the 1980s, business as 
usual rather than a massive overhaul of the port's governance was what was required.
Tauranga was also a leader in cost reducing innovation. The port pioneered what 
became known as the '5 in 7 rule', where stevedores could adjust working 
arrangements so that their employees could be paid on a 5 day a week basis with the 
actual hours worked varying in line with vessel availability. This was enshrined in its 
local award contracts after negotiations with the unions (which resulted in some short-
679 Ernst & Young and NZIER, Ports of New Zealand Review of Regulatory Issues, Draft, 
(December 1989), Appendix 11.2, R17340933, Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
680 Ibid.
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term industrial action before being accepted), stevedores and shipping companies.681 
This contract meant that labour costs were the same for the port for all shifts Monday 
through Sunday and where there was a shortage of permanent labour, the port was 
free to hire casual employees.682
So when the time came to sell the 51% local government stake in New Zealand's ports,
the Bay of Plenty Regional Council refused to sell. While other local authorities could 
not wait to offload their ports – ratepayers were often saddled with expensive port 
levies – the port of Tauranga had never levied a rate and was profitable in its own right.
For example, the $25 million expansion at Sulphur Point, announced as soon as the 
NZPA was dissolved, was financed entirely from port revenue.683
After devolution, other ports such as the port of Auckland eventually bought back its 
shares and became fully public again. There have been suggestions that this could 
lead to some ports “being used as ready sources of public revenue... with profits being 
earmarked to fund city infrastructure without the politically unpalatable need to increase
property taxes”.684 While institutionally possible and true for some ports, there is little 
evidence that that takes place at Tauranga despite mixed ownership. The long tradition 
of user-pays and self-sufficiency were maintained, with the Bay of Plenty Regional 
Council preferring to treat the port as “a financial asset, rather than an entity to 
control... [with] a substantial proportion of private shares and contestability between the
port's service providers”.685
Since the reforms in 1989, Tauranga's growth has been phenomenal. Throughput has 
increased at the port virtually every year, handling 373% more tonnage than it did when
681 New Zealand Business Roundtable, Port Reform in New Zealand: A Mid Term Update, 5.
682 Macvey to Ministry of Commerce, “Statistics Port ‘Port Reform.’”
683 “Region Says Port Not for Sale,” Bay of Plenty Times, March 21, 1990, R17316962, 
Archives New Zealand, Wellington.
684 James Reveley and Malcolm Tull, “Privatisation Postponed: Convergence and Divergence 
in Australian and New Zealand Port Reform,” in Port Privatisation: The Asia-Pacific 
Experience, ed. James Reveley and Malcolm Tull (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), 36.
685 “Mark Cairns: Mixed Ownership Works for Port,” New Zealand Herald, February 18, 2013, 
sec. Business.
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the reforms took place 23 years ago at an average annualised increase of 
approximately 5%.
Figure 5.3: Tauranga's Growth, 1989 – 2012686
Figure 5.4: Tauranga's Annualised Growth Rates, 1989 – 2012687
The port has the largest private ownership of any of New Zealand's commercial ports, 
with 45.02% being owned by the private sector and 54.98% held by the Bay of Plenty 
Regional Council. Its financial performance is unmatched in New Zealand; in the past 
15 years it has been the best performing stock of any industry on the New Zealand 
686 Port of Tauranga, Port Trade and Statistic Information.
687 Ibid.
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Stock Exchange.688
Tauranga is also the only port in New Zealand where stevedores compete with each 
other in the container area. This unique feature is one of the key reasons for 
Tauranga's handling efficiency: in an industry with very specific assets, Tauranga has 
been able to use markets to provide relatively non-specific services where others have 
relied on hierarchy, thus enjoying the production and governance cost advantages 
markets provide.689
The institutional reforms that took place in New Zealand did not deal with the 
organisations (ports) themselves, but instead opened them to competitive forces. The 
government successfully lowered transaction costs across the entire industry – as 
Williamson would put it, it reduced “frictions” in the system that were producing 
“needless slippage or other loss of energy”.690
Tauranga was fortunate in that its organisational model, thanks to events in the past, 
was already one of the most efficient in New Zealand. Institutional reform simply 
allowed that efficiency to flourish on a larger scale through competition with less-
efficient ports whose position was protected by high transaction costs and institutional 
“lock-in”.691 There was a “third-degree” path-dependent lock-in in the New Zealand port 
industry, where several inefficiencies were present: the selection of Auckland and 
Wellington as the North island's two major ports; the poorly implemented centralisation 
and cross-subsidisation of the industry; and the influence waterfront labour exerted 
over every port in New Zealand. Tauranga as well as other ports in New Zealand were 
more profitable options but it took major institutional reform – only when the potential 
profits were large enough for entrenched interest groups to be overcome – for that 
688 “Mark Cairns.”
689 Stevedoring assets – the use of cranes to load and unload vessels – certainly requires a lot
of capital but as far as transaction costs are concerned it is non-specific in the sense that 
unlike the port itself, those assets can be moved elsewhere.
690 Williamson, “The Economics of Organization,” 552.
691 Liebowitz and Margolis, “Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History.”
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better outcome to be realised.692
Tauranga today has benefited enormously from the change in institutional environment.
Without first fixing the institutions, Tauranga and New Zealand's port industry would 
likely be in far worse shape than it finds itself in today.
However, it is also important to note that the institutional reforms were not free. It was 
an extremely costly process, both ex ante in overcoming interest groups such as the 
port of Auckland as well as ex post as thousands of waterfront workers were put out of 
work and ports had to adapt to a new, more competitive, environment. Importantly, 
institutional reform did not fix all of the problems at New Zealand's ports. Some 
regional councils still use their ports for political purposes, such as cross-subsidising 
city infrastructure.693 The institutional reform in New Zealand allowed ports that were 
willing and with good governance structures in place, such as Tauranga, to thrive, but it
did not go so far as to allow less efficient ports to fail.694
All institutions and organisational forms are imperfect; before embarking on institutional
change on the scale that New Zealand did, it is essential to first make sure that the 
benefits will outweigh the costs of an alternative. Adopting an alternative structure 
without knowing whether the benefits will outweigh the costs for a particular case at a 
particular point in time – including the administrative costs of implementing it – is 
almost certain to lead to a poor outcome.695
692 Acemoglu, “Why Not a Political Coase Theorem?”
693 Reveley and Tull, “Privatisation Postponed,” 36.
694 Fail does not mean cease to exist. For example, perhaps Auckland would have been 
subject to a takeover if it continued to under-perform.
695 Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory,” Industrial 
and Corporate Change 2, no. 1 (1993): 140.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
6.1. Introduction
The main question posed at the beginning of this thesis was:
What role did institutions play in the efficiency, organisational forms and 
ultimately, the outcomes at Port Hedland, Prince Rupert and Tauranga over 
time?
The goal was to discover whether the tenets of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
can illuminate particular details about a given port – constraints and incentives – that 
traditional methods of examination may miss. In particular, how did the institutional 
matrix influence the organisation and efficiency of the ports of Port Hedland, Prince 
Rupert, and Tauranga? For example, is port performance reduced as a result of lower 
investment and less support for efficiency incentives? To paraphrase Olson, if there are
proverbial $100 bills left sitting on the pavement, why are they not being picked up?696
To assist in answering this question, a theoretical framework was presented in Chapter 
2 and was subsequently utilised to analyse the three case studies over a 152-year 
period. This chapter will bring together the results of those case studies in order to 
compare and contrast the evidence and then draw conclusions.
6.2. A Comparison of the Findings of the Three Case Studies
Port Hedland, Prince Rupert and Tauranga are geographically diverse; if you were to 
visit each one and return to your starting port you would have to cover a cumulative 
distance of 30,431km (18,909 miles), or about 75% of the earth's circumference.
Port Hedland and Prince Rupert were, and some might argue still are, isolated in the 
696 M. Olson, “Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Big Bills Left on the 
Sidewalk: Why Some Nations Are Rich, and Others Poor,” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 10, no. 2 (1996): 3–24; William J. Baumol and Robert J. Strom, 
“Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth,” Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 1, no. 3–4 
(December 1, 2007): 233–37.
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sense that they are a considerable distance from major settlements with natural 
obstacles in their path – the inhospitable Australian North-West for one, and the 
Rockies for the other. On the other hand, Tauranga is to the South-East of New 
Zealand's largest city and is well situated in the fertile Bay of Plenty region. However, 
all three have non-physical element in common: British institutional heritage.
6.2.1. Constitutions
By 1860 British Columbia, New Zealand and Western Australia had all become 
colonies of Britain and subjected to British colonial law. While the British institutions 
inherited by each port have evolved and adapted considerably in each location since, 
they all faced relatively similar constraints at that time.
Table 6.1: Arrival of British Institutions in Western Australia, British Columbia 
and New Zealand
Year Location and Act
1829 Western Australia (Interpretation Act of Western Australia)
1840 New Zealand (Treaty of Waitangi)
1858 British Columbia (An Act to provide for the Government of British Columbia)
Each port's institutional environment quickly changed with the circumstances that the 
political actors faced at the time and the enactment of quite unique constitutions. The 
differences in each nation's constitution would indirectly change each port's future, as 
they determined the stakes that certain players would have in the development of each 
port.
In Western Australia, the decision to join the rest of Australia in federation came later 
than the other States. But importantly, post-federation ownership and control (i.e., 
regulatory authority) over natural harbours remained with the State government. 
However, for Port Hedland it may as well have rested in Canberra given the distance 
from Perth – where authority rested – and the unique local challenges faced by those in
the North-West, a region where at the time most Perth-based politicians did not 
concern themselves.
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In British Columbia, the combination of the potential encroachment of the United States
from the South and the desire to keep British North America whole (as Canada was 
known then; for simplicity, Canada will be used when referring to either British North 
America or Canada), saw a unique form of federalism evolve where the nation's natural
harbours would ultimately be controlled by Ottawa. This did not preclude Canada's 
ports from private ownership and operation; the Provincial government could, and did, 
sell port land to allow it to be operated by private individuals, as was the case in Prince 
Rupert with the Grand Trunk Pacific. However, control rested in Ottawa; once it was 
declared a public harbour, Prince Rupert could at any moment be taken over by Ottawa
in the national interest.
In New Zealand, six Provinces were initially constituted and were responsible for ports. 
Due to a lack of finances, wharves were sometimes constructed by private individuals 
who had received the government's permission to charge tolls and dues. But certain 
parts of a port's trade were still federally regulated; namely, the ability to levy custom 
duties of any good at any port and the ability to implement charges on shipping at any 
port in the country. While those federal powers were not used with any great frequency,
when New Zealand's Provinces were later abolished and port operations transferred to 
local boroughs, boards and authorities, those powers remained in place.
Table 6.2: Ownership and Control of Each Port by the First World War (WW1)
Port Ownership Overseeing Authority Governance Model
Port Hedland State Government State Government Public Service Port
Prince Rupert Private (GTP) Federal Government Private Landlord
Tauranga Local Borough Federal Government Landlord Port Authority
The following illustration helps to illustrate the different paths taken.
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Illustration 6.1: Institutional Change, Pre-WW1 – Post-WW1
6.2.2. Credible Commitment and the Legal System
The legal institutions in Canada, as far as contracts are concerned, were strong even in
the early days of federation. Foreign investors could be confident that the independent 
judiciary – Britain's Privy Council – would protect their contractually agreed property 
rights, limiting administrative discretion or “hold-ups”, thereby encouraging investment. 
Given the asset specificity of a railway and port, the hold-up problem is always of 
concern to private investors when this is not the case. 
In the early days the outlook for Western Canada was still uncertain and therefore even
with this assurance the risk was high. To ease those concerns and encourage private 
investment in transcontinental railways, the Canadian government provided generous 
contractual subsidies to attract capital for its political ends. These subsidies achieved 
the desired result as British capital poured in and the Grand Trunk Pacific and Prince 
Rupert were constructed. However, the incentives established by the subsidies, 
combined with contracts that were too complete697 and the perverse incentives created 
697 In the sense that there was very little post-contractual flexibility afforded to either party.
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by the Crow Rates, ultimately saw the railway – and therefore Prince Rupert – fail, with 
the taxpayer footing the bill. A path-dependent outcome had been set and development
at Prince Rupert, despite quality infrastructure sitting idle, would remain neglected for 
decades to come.
At Port Hedland, credible commitment was also an issue throughout the early life of the
port but unlike Prince Rupert where the federal government overcommitted, the State 
government did not do enough to ease the potential for hold-ups. The North-West of 
Australia has a vast supply resources available for export and a quality port is 
necessary for miners to be able to sell it internationally. The global commodity price 
mechanism serves as the signal to mining entrepreneurs that a certain commodity is in 
demand (or in short supply); but miners cannot act on that signal unless they can be 
sure that their highly specific assets – such as mining land, railways, and ports – will be
free from ex post rent-seeking both from the State and private parties.
In Western Australia, mining rights and the legal system were inherited from Britain, 
providing the framework and security necessary to prospect. These laws initially 
catered only to small-scale miners, creating issues in attracting capital for large-scale 
projects. It was not until the State government added representation to the North-West 
in 1886 and passed of the Goldfields Act in the same year that larger miners could be 
assured of their mineral property rights.
However, the State government soon lost a number of constitutional constraints with 
the granting of responsible government by Britain in 1890 and soon began to assume a
direct role in the advance of select industries in the State, engaging in a program of 
socialisme sans doctrines with a keen focus on infrastructure. The institutions in 
Western Australia then become incapable of credibly curbing regulatory discretion at 
Port Hedland forcing port investment, whether it was planned or not, into the State's 
hands.
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Having assumed the burden of infrastructure financing, by 1892 the State was 
beginning to be lobbied by miners at Marble Bar as the gold price rose to upgrade the 
facilities at Port Hedland and by 1896 committed to constructing a jetty and an inland 
causeway for gold and livestock exports. This was followed by a second jetty and a 
railway connecting Marble Bar to the port a decade later.
But it all came too late for Port Hedland. The gold boom had ended and the delays in 
port expansion due to limited and inappropriately allocated State funds meant that by 
the time Port Hedland had been upgraded to cater to the gold boom in 1909, the boom 
was over.698 To be able to capitalise on a finite boom, what is needed are institutional 
safeguards that allow entrepreneurs to both find opportunities but more importantly to 
capitalise on them: to invest at the required facilities at the right time and be sure that 
their rents will not be extracted ex-post. At Port Hedland, those safeguards were not 
available leaving those desiring expansion with two options: to lobby the State for 
upgrades, or try to change the institutions to attract private capital. Institutional change 
is not costless and so only when the potential profit is large enough will actors go down
this path. In the case of the Marble Bar gold boom, the least-cost path was to try to 
operate in the political markets, to achieve not costly institutional change but less-costly
(to them) State-funded infrastructure investment.
Commitment issues were not as prevalent at Tauranga for a few reasons. First, New 
Zealand was the last to achieve true sovereignty from Britain (that is, after Western 
Australia and British Columbia). Although all three maintained ties to the British Privy 
Council for some time, the New Zealand government was well aware that achieving 
true sovereignty too early would deprive the small nation of much needed capital. This 
reassured foreign investors that their contracts would be honoured, lowering the risk of 
ex-post hold-ups.
698 E.g., nearly 17% of the entire 5-year North-West budget was spent on maintenance for just 
one 186km road between Southern Cross and Coolgardie.
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Secondly, the New Zealand constitution bestowed the management of ports first to the 
Provinces (abolished in 1875), then to local boroughs and authorities as opposed to 
State or federal levels of government. However, a conflict soon emerged between the 
agency in charge of operating the port – the Tauranga Borough – and the actual owner 
of the land, the Marine Department. The Borough was unable to borrow against the 
port to finance infrastructure upgrades – even from the federal government's lending 
department – creating a situation of underinvestment and general chaos at the port, 
with goods having to be landed directly on the foreshore.
This was an unintentional institutional problem caused by the abolition of Provincial 
control. In abolishing the Provinces, the government had created a conflict between 
two different levels of government: the owner of the port land, the Marine Department; 
and the port operator, the Tauranga Borough. This conflict could be solved in one of 
three ways: one, by granting the land to the Borough; two, transferring the day-to-day 
management to Wellington; or three, create a local Authority at Tauranga. Ultimately 
the latter option was taken, with the act of establishing a Port Authority being revealed 
as the path of least resistance due to the fact that New Zealand was at the time 
undergoing a process of decentralisation, with the legislation available as a result of its 
British legal legacy.
Nonetheless, resolution took a considerable amount of time; from the time the conflict 
began, 35 years passed before Tauranga acquired a Harbour Board, demonstrating 
that institutional change – even when the powers to change a situation already exist – 
can be costly and slow. The institutional constraints at the port were not initially evident 
and it took a major deterioration in the port's facilities, and ongoing pressure from the 
port and port users (potential profit opportunities), to break the path-dependent 
outcome.
The following diagram highlights the institutional changes that occurred at each port 
from 1829 to WW1.
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Illustration 6.2: Institutional Events at Port Hedland, Prince Rupert and Tauranga,
1829 – WW1
All three ports had a similar institutional starting point in that they were all declared 
British colonies and had to abide by colonial laws, albeit at different times. However, 
that quickly changed.
In Western Australia, ports were – even post-federation – entirely a matter for the 
States. This differed to both Canada and New Zealand. However, there were ongoing 
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institutional issues in the North-West following the first responsible State government 
led by John Forrest. With the State unable to provide the mineral property rights 
necessary for mining to be undertaken by private parties on a scale sufficient to fund 
transport infrastructure, it was left to the State, including infrastructure at Port Hedland. 
This left the port in the State's hands, and it would remain so for a considerable time.
British Columbia was the last of the three cases to be declared a British Colony, and it 
joined with the rest of Canada shortly afterwards. A condition of federation was for a 
transcontinental railway to be built, but it was soon deemed insufficient and so the 1904
election was fought on whether or not to build a second railway. Wilfrid Laurier won 
decisively, and so the Grand Trunk Pacific (GTP) and Prince Rupert as a Pacific 
terminus were born. Conflicts between the Province and federal government saw the 
port declared a national harbour in 1912, and when the GTP failed, so did Prince 
Rupert. The contractual agreements and institutional changes that were made to 
facilitate the GTP locked Prince Rupert into an inefficient post-GTP outcome which 
would take some time to break.
New Zealand initially adopted a system that empowered the Provinces, but it was soon 
dismantled by Julius Vogel – with the support of the electorate – in favour of a unitary 
government. Importantly, control over harbours was decentralised even more-so than 
when they were operated by the Provinces, with an independent port authority 
established at Tauranga in 1912.
6.2.3. Institutional Constraints and Transaction Costs
By the early twentieth century, all three ports found themselves in predicaments 
created by different institutional issues. Port Hedland had missed a golden opportunity 
(no pun intended) to gain from, and facilitate, a boom in the North-West due initially to 
credible commitment problems and then once that path had been taken, poorly timed 
investment by the State government. 
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Prince Rupert also suffered from mismanagement but the port's failure was inevitable 
as soon as the first contracts between the Grand Trunk and the Canadian government 
were signed. The rush to build multiple transcontinental railways was driven by politics 
and not economics. In that environment, competition took place in the discretionary 
political markets of Ottawa, with actors competing for government guarantees so that 
they could further expand their rail networks and capitalise on the euphoria and 
optimism at the time, knowing that over-expansion would result not in personal loss but
in a public bailout. Optimism was high and ultimately the contracts proved to be too 
complete, not allowing the flexibility necessary to adapt to an ever changing world.
These mistakes were revealed when it was already too late: too much had been built, 
too early, to cater for a level of demand well below initial, inflated expectations. On the 
one hand, institutional lock-in had occurred with various contractual agreements 
designed to attract private capital such as debt guarantees, monopoly rights over 
certain routes, and land grants agreed. On the other hand, the government required 
service guarantees (unprofitable routes; provision of steamships), price controls (e.g., 
the Crow Rates), and a rigid, vertically integrated organisational structure. The 
combination of poor incentives and the inability to cut unprofitable routes eventually 
saw a Royal Commission and the buyout and transfer of the Grand Trunk Pacific to the 
Canadian government's national railway. Traffic was then promptly routed South to its 
existing hub at Vancouver, depriving Prince Rupert of a profitable hinterland 
connection.
For decades, the legacy of those contractual obligations and indirect regulations such 
as the Crow Rates lingered, restricting the ability of the Canadian National Railway to 
utilise the facilities, as the Vancouver line was more profitable for it given the mix of 
regulatory obligations it faced.
It was not until Japanese demand for Canadian coal in the 1960s and 70s along with 
congestion issues at Vancouver that any serious thought was given to using the lower-
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cost port at Prince Rupert as a major export hub. Incidentally, Japanese demand was 
also the trigger at Port Hedland (iron ore) and Tauranga (logs) that broke the path 
dependent trajectory they were on. When potential profit reaches a high enough level it
simply cannot be ignored, even when there are powerful interests fighting to maintain 
the status quo.
However, the legacy of the Grand Trunk Pacific still haunted the port and the Canadian 
National Railway were not willing to shift business North. Interest group pressure and a
lack of local control then saw the port taken over by the National Harbours Board 
(NHB), but that only added to its problems. As was shown in Chapter 4, ports under the
NHB's control consistently underperformed the nation's independent ports as well as 
near rivals such as Seattle. This disparity only got worse with the advent of 
containerisation in the 1970s, and the NHB's inability to adjust to this new technology 
saw intense public pressure to remove, or weaken, NHB control over the nation's ports.
In the face of this pressure Ottawa eventually conceded, decentralising decision-
making at the NHB's ports to Local Port Corporations, including one at Prince Rupert.
Changing Prince Rupert's institutions was extremely difficult; given the centralised 
control of ports, the institutions were more heavily influenced by social and political 
factors than economic ones, especially post-Grand Trunk Pacific ownership when the 
government-owned Canadian National Railway assumed control. While this can also 
be true for local public bodies, as centralisation increases so do the costs of transacting
and therefore the costs of negotiating institutional change. Hooghe and Marks dubbed 
this phenomenon “Scharpf's law”, after Fritz Scharpf's insight that:
“As the number of affected parties increases... negotiated solutions incur 
exponentially rising and eventually prohibitive transaction costs”.699
Thus it is well recognised that the cost of transacting in a political market is high, and if 
699 Hooghe Liesbet and Marks Gary, “Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-
Level Governance,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 02 (2003): 13.
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more players are involved on a number of private and political levels, these costs 
increase. That means that unless there was a desire to unshackle Prince Rupert by 
powerful political actors, or private actors with enough influence, transaction costs 
would be too high for any change to occur. The “trigger point” of containerisation, and 
the absolute inability of the existing institutions to enable organisational adaptation, 
was ultimately what broke the inefficient path that Prince Rupert found itself on.
Illustration 6.3: Path Dependency at Prince Rupert, WW1 – 2012
Tauranga's institutional frailties occurred earlier and were resolved just as the other two
ports had seen their trade dry up. Transaction costs rose to a point where the port 
could not function and trade was being stifled, making institutional change more 
profitable than the alternatives. However, Tauranga's hinterland was still tiny by world 
standards and there was no demand for expanded facilities; the entire Bay of Plenty 
region, including Tauranga itself, had just 5,235 people in 1911, or 0.5% of New 
Zealand's total population.700
Somewhat ironically, the lack of demand, development and government attention at 
Tauranga allowed the Harbour Board to resolve a number of conflicts during the pre-
World War Two decades and gradually establish a culture (informal institutions) that 
would enable the port to thrive. This culture, insistence on a user-pays system, and 
conflict-minimising governance structure at Tauranga saw it successfully navigate a 
700 Samuel Harvey Franklin, “BAY OF PLENTY,” in An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, ed. 
Alexander Hare McLintock, 1966, http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/1966/central-plateau-bay-of-
plenty-region/page-6.
224
number of challenges in the 1950s as the Japanese log trade boomed. However, as 
Auckland struggled with congestion and the advent of containerisation, public pressure 
grew for the government to do something and so in 1968 New Zealand decided to 
centralise control of its port industry with the creation of the New Zealand Ports 
Authority (NZPA).
This institutional change caused problems for Tauranga, with the NZPA clearly 
favouring the established interests in Auckland over Tauranga. The problems were 
worsened by a powerful labour force that was largely unwilling to adapt to the 
requirements of container handling. A number of costs had been centralised, such as 
labour through the Waterfront Industry Commission and port charges through the 
NZPA's Port Service Charge. These rigidities allowed inefficient ports to improve their 
bottom line at the expense of the more efficient, such as Tauranga, especially if they 
had sufficient influence over the NZPA to continuously increase capacity through over-
investment.
Eventually, pressure from Tauranga (and importantly, a significant number of New 
Zealand's largest exporters) saw the government intervene and overrule an NZPA 
decision for the first time in 1977, sparking the beginning of waterfront reform. The 
NZPA was abolished in 1988, and by 1989 the institutional matrix constricting New 
Zealand's ports had been altered dramatically for the better, reducing transaction costs 
across the industry and allowing Tauranga to finally live up to its potential. As with the 
NHB in Canada, the centralisation of the nation's ports resulted in rent-seeking and 
regulatory capture by the largest, most established players. While not immediately 
evident the inefficiencies grew as time went by, but most importantly, ports under 
central control demonstrated an inability to adapt to changing circumstances, both to 
cater to new demand (Japan), and to new technology (containerisation).
Port reform in New Zealand eventually took place because over several decades 
problems had slowly built up until a breaking point was reached. As an export-
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dependent nation, failed centralisation through the NZPA, the centralisation and cross-
subsidisation of the port labour force, and the growing public unease over the influence
wielded by the nation's largest ports, saw ports as a ripe target for reform. Similarly to 
Prince Rupert, the advent of containerisation and the well-publicised failure of 
established ports such as Auckland to adequately adapt, finally saw the legislative 
shackles removed from Tauranga after years of political lobbying. 
Once the institutional barriers had been removed, Tauranga's natural and cultural 
advantage – one that had allowed it to succeed, to an extent, even within an 
institutional environment that crippled other ports – saw it rapidly gain on its 
competitors.
Illustration 6.4: Path Dependency at Tauranga, WW1 – 1989
Meanwhile Port Hedland sat neglected despite ample infrastructure at the port due to 
the State's post-boom investment. It remained that way until the Second World War 
when the military took over the port, and then – the port now back in the State's hands 
– the Korean War began in 1950. But the fundamental issues in the North-West had 
not changed: institutional constraints meant that, despite an eventful debate where the 
State considered selling the region to private interests or the federal government, the 
State was still in charge of North-West transport infrastructure.
Constitutionally, the Australian States have to pass Acts to enable railways to pass 
through their territory and so while a transcontinental railway was completed from 
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Kalgoorlie to Port Augusta in 1917, the nationalistic desire for a transcontinental railway
was well below Canada's.701 There was also very little interest in Port Hedland, a small 
town in the North-West. Western Australia was a large State with a small population 
and was struggling to keep up with infrastructure requirements in the South-West, let 
alone in the Northern Goldfields.
Since the establishment of responsible government in 1890, the Western Australian 
State never shared in Canada's enthusiasm – even if out of necessity to achieve 
political goals – for public-private partnership provision of transport infrastructure. If the 
State was involved, it would take on the burden itself. Thus if a miner wanted rail, road 
or port facilities, a common path to take was to lobby the State for it. Private provision, 
given the transaction costs caused by the high risk of potential, but legal, State 
discretionary action against its mineral property rights meant that for institutional 
change to occur, the potential profit of such a change would have to be significant for 
actors to attempt it.
The actions of the Forrest government at the end of the nineteenth century in 
weakening – or rather, never really establishing – mineral property rights by intervening
somewhat arbitrarily saw increased uncertainty and risk and the potential for investors 
to encounter the hold-up problem. It was unable to credibly commit not to expropriate 
ex-post rents so private actors reduced (or never undertook) investment in the region 
accordingly. The passing of the Public Works Act 1902 provides an indication into the 
prevailing mentality at the time, with the Act officially delegating all railway construction 
and ownership to the State, effectively preventing any port from vertically integrating 
with its hinterland unless the State was heavily involved. Forrest believed that it was 
the government's duty “not to sit and wait for traffic, but to create traffic [through 
infrastructure investment]”, and so arguably private provision was never an option – the
701 H.K. Ellison, “Australia’s Trans-Continental Railway,” Royal United Services Institution 56, 
no. 412 (1912): 781–86.
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government would build it before demand was sufficient to finance it.702
Western Australia had been locked into a path where high transaction costs prevailed 
(in highly specific mining-related infrastructure), meaning infrastructure would have to 
be vertically integrated (linking customers and suppliers) through State ownership. The 
nationalisation of several existing transportation services as well as the establishment 
of a number of government trading enterprises by the Australian Labor Party's (ALP) 
Scaddan government further embedded the State on this path in the 1910s. While most
of these ventures were unwound by subsequent Liberal, Nationalist, and even ALP 
governments (Collier's ALP was the first to return the State to a surplus, 16 years after 
Scaddan lost office), nothing had been done about North-West mineral property rights.
However, deficient State institutions were not the only reason that Port Hedland (and 
the North-West) would miss out on another boom, this time in the 1950's through 
lucrative manganese exports. The established players in Canberra, New South Wales 
(NSW) and South Australia (SA) had worked together to thwart any attempts by those 
in the North-West to induce institutional change, by exploiting a regulation passed soon
after the Second World War allowing the federal government to prohibit any export of 
certain commodities without direct approval. Constitutionally, the federal government 
maintained power over foreign trade, and while prohibited from targeting individual 
ports, could pass Australia-wide embargoes or dues on certain products.
At the same time, clever war-time contracting had resulted in Broken Hill Proprietary 
(BHP) being the sole steel producer in Australia and it stood to benefit enormously from
the prohibition of manganese exports. By prohibiting exports, BHP could use its 
monopsony power to buy high-grade manganese on the domestic market for half the 
price that the United States was willing to pay. The federal, NSW and SA governments 
were complicit because the rents extracted by BHP could be used to keep the 
company afloat, as it was struggling in the face of reduced trade barriers and 
702 Evans, CY O’Connor, 120.
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international competition.703 Those States continued lobbying the federal government to
preserve BHP's steel monopoly well into the 1980s, and thus actively worked to 
prevent actors in the North-West from changing the institutional constraints they 
faced.704
The net pay-offs available to the West to change the institutional matrix through the 
political market did not match the profit that the currently empowered actors could 
achieve by maintaining the present, inefficient structure, and so institutional change did
not occur. That is, of course, if they knew whom to pay; according to Buchanan, 
political trades often do not occur not out of a general unwillingness to pay (on balance,
they would be better off if they did), but because groups that are “politically-advantaged
under existing rules will not agree to constitutional reform without compensation, and 
those who might otherwise be willing to pay such compensation may not do so 
because they do not acknowledge the rights of those to whom such payments would 
have to be made”.705
Eventually it was the innovation of State Agreements, first with the Kwinana oil refinery 
in 1952, paper in 1960, alumina in 1961 and then iron ore in 1963, that gradually 
reduced the transaction costs faced by miners in the North-West protecting them from 
potential ex-post rent extraction. As the yet unrealised value of iron ore assets 
increased, mining entrepreneurs demanded more precise property rights and once the 
potential net gain was high enough (i.e., profits after costs, including pay-offs), 
managed to achieve institutional change. There was also a change in the mindset of 
the State government, who – despite pressure from the East – opted not to seize iron 
ore discoveries made by prospectors during the iron ore embargo and hand them over 
703 Russell D. Lansbury, “Workplace Change and Employment Relations Reform in Australia: 
Prospects for a New Social Partnership?,” The Drawing Board: An Australian Review of 
Public Affairs 1, no. 1 (2000): 33.
704 John Warhurst and Gillian O’Loghlin, “Federal-State Issues in External Economic 
Relations,” in Federalism and Resource Development: The Australian Case, ed. Peter 
Drysdale and Hirofumi Shibata (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), 195–196.
705 James M. Buchanan, “Rights, Efficiency, and Exchange: The Irrelevance of Transaction 
Cost,” in The Legacy of Ronald Coase in Economic Analysis, ed. Steven G. Medema, vol. 2
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), 24.
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to the politically-connected BHP, as it had done in the past.
To protect themselves from private ex-post predation, vertically integrated 
organisational forms were written into the agreements, guaranteeing the future of Port 
Hedland so long as the consortium's hinterland mines remained profitable. Given the 
sparse nature of the North-West, this form of vertical integration makes perfect sense: 
there would be very limited, if any, competition for port and rail use other than from the 
consortium; hence, vertically integrating reduces transaction costs by negating the risk 
of hold-ups from the customer. By vertically integrating the consortium also protected 
itself from the same potential hold-up problems that having a single port or rail owner 
would create.
Port Hedland and its hinterland railway were, and still are, almost entirely financed by 
mining companies through the State Agreement. Somewhat ironically, one of the chief 
actors fighting against institutional change for decades prior, BHP, was a major 
member of the first iron ore State Agreement consortium at Port Hedland, showing that 
when potential profit is large enough even established, well connected interests can 
promote change.
Illustration 6.5: Path Dependency at Port Hedland, WW1 – 2012
The level of transaction costs faced by each port at key moments in their past was 
heavily influenced by the institutional constraints they faced at the time. In all three 
cases, demand permitting, it was not until those transaction costs were reduced 
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through institutional reform that they began to thrive, with the reform “trigger” eventually
caused by a combination of factors. For while the ports and port users themselves 
were clamouring for change as a result of the potential profits on offer, the barriers to 
institutional reform in the form of the cost of transacting in political markets had been 
reduced as a result of the general movement of Western governments towards 
economic liberalism. But although all three nations had experienced similar nation-wide
moves towards economic liberalism, in each location the local impetus for reform was 
still different, demonstrating that there are multiple solutions for similar institutional 
problems. It also demonstrates that institutions are historically specific and that past 
decisions – good and bad – constrained and conditioned the development path of each
port.
6.3. Implications and Limitations of the Research
The comparative institutional analysis undertaken in this dissertation demonstrates 
three key lessons. First, institutions can become rigid and can persist for an extremely 
long period time, even in the face of strong demand for change. Institutions are 
historically specific and the unintended consequences of rather innocuous actions 
taken in the past – e.g., the Crow Rates in Canada – can have long lasting effects on 
seemingly unrelated activities. The actors empowered by that existing institutional 
arrangement will fight change unless they are offered net pay-offs that exceed the net 
rents enabled by the existing arrangement (profit potential).
Second, that all of the exogenous constraints a port faces need to be known, with the 
interest groups concerned in both their perpetuation and in their removal considered 
before port reform is attempted.706 Institutional reform is not costless and so an 
understanding of the relevant costs and benefits faced by every actor or group of 
actors involved is an essential ex ante task. Policy makers should not fall prey to the 
706 This group includes both public (policy makers, regulators) and private actors. For instance,
if policy is proposed for a new regulatory body to be established, the incentives faced by 
the regulators to do what is efficient must be included in the analysis, as well as the 
incentives faced by those being regulated.
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“nirvana approach”, where an existing but flawed situation is compared with a 
hypothetical ideal which, in practice, may not be the panacea that it would appear.707 A 
comparative institutional approach should be used instead, where the choice is framed 
as one between alternative, real institutional arrangements. The pitfalls of the “nirvana 
approach” were evident at Tauranga where after concluding that the existing 
arrangement was inefficient, policy makers created the NZPA that in reality could not 
live up to expectations.
New Zealand was then locked in to a costly, inefficient path that empowered various 
interest groups and became self-reinforcing. Interest groups then had to be paid off in 
political markets for reform to happen, which is what we saw with worker compensation
through the Waterfront Industry Restructuring Authority.  A similar outcome occurred at 
Prince Rupert with the takeover of the port by the NHB.
Third, that the hinterland (road, rail) and the institutions governing it are critically 
important to a port's success or failure. At Port Hedland, the entire network from mine 
to sea was eventually vertically integrated, reducing the risk of ex-post hold-ups that 
had previously plagued the region. This allowed the port to avoid the problems 
witnessed at Prince Rupert when an uncooperative Canadian National railway refused, 
due to the institutional constraints it faced, to deal with the port. Likewise at Tauranga 
the State railway company used its influence to reduce road competition through 
buyouts and the perpetuation of transport licensing regulations that protected it from 
road competition. This limited the options available to Tauranga and created a hold-up 
problem where the railway company could deal with many different ports but Tauranga 
had no other options.
Before declaring a port “inefficient”, undertaking governance overhauls or attempting 
institutional reform, these three lessons should be heeded. Attempts at improving a port
may prove futile if institutional constraints prevent truly efficient outcomes from 
707 Demsetz, “Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint.”
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emerging. Without institutional reform, certain organisations or entire industries may 
struggle to be competitive and efficient.
The unique contribution to the literature made in this dissertation is to bring to light new
information about three ports and their institutional arrangements. An empirical, 
intertemporal investigation using the New Institutional Economics framework was 
applied to each port, with insights about both the causes and effects of various events 
that occurred at each port over time.
This research broadens the economics literature by making institutions a key part of 
the analysis. The focus was specifically on ports but this approach could also be 
relatively easily applied to other highly specific forms of infrastructure.
This dissertation does not seek to reinvent port economics, but argues that institutions 
should be included in any comprehensive analysis. It is not expected that the level of 
detail undertaken in this dissertation be included in such studies, just that the 
institutional matrix that constrains the choice set available to actors at a port are 
considered before efficiency-related conclusions are drawn. Without including 
institutions in the analysis, the risk of creating negative unintended consequences that 
may be hard to fix, despite the best of intentions, is increased.
However, as with any research there are also limitations. First and foremost one of the 
biggest strengths of this dissertation's approach is also a weakness: the fact that each 
case study has British institutional heritage and a tradition of British Common Law. The 
barriers involved in investigating the institutional history of a port where the spoken 
language was not English, and where the institutional heritage and legal systems may 
have been different, leaves scope for further comparative research.
On data availability, any historical study will face challenges. All three case studies had 
physical data available in their national and local archives but unfortunately the digital 
age has not quite caught up to the point where those documents could be perused 
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from a desktop computer in one's home country. Perhaps future researchers would be 
able to broaden the literature by investigating ports, or other forms of infrastructure, 
with a more diverse variety of formal and informal institutions without such a significant 
physical requirement. Alternatively, the framework applied in this dissertation could be 
used to examine a port with a similar formal institutional heritage but with a different 
informal, or cultural background (e.g., Hong Kong or Singapore), in an attempt to learn 
more about those institutions. Attempts could also be made to formally quantify the 
pay-offs that particular actors faced at certain points in time, to provide future reformers
with a more reliable estimate of potential obstacles.
Finally, if a researcher was bilingual then a look at how formal institutions such as the 
continental European system of Civil Law affected the development of ports in those 
countries would be an excellent way to progress the port institutional economics 
literature.
6.4. Conclusion
This dissertation undertook a cross-country comparative institutional analysis of three 
ports over a 152-year time span in an attempt to discover what role institutions played 
in the efficiency, organisational forms and ultimately, the outcomes at Port Hedland, 
Prince Rupert and Tauranga.
It looked at how interest groups, acting within the institutional constraints they faced at 
a given time, coped with those constraints and in turn how their behaviour and choices 
affected the institutional environment, if at all.
Each port saw different outcomes and ways of achieving those outcomes, with different
systems, cultures and organisational forms emerging at each one. But there were also 
commonalities, such as the role Japanese demand played in breaking the path-
dependent outcomes each port found themselves on.
It was found that the institutions governing a port are often subjected to interest group 
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pressure by exogenous forces beyond their control and there is not much that one port 
in isolation can do about it. Symptoms of these persistent, inefficient institutions often 
manifest themselves at the port level even though they may be beyond the port's 
control. Institutional change is a long-term process, with seemingly unrelated factors 
that occurred in the past often contributing to the problems witnessed at a particular 
port.
Two forces were consistently the key drivers of institutional change at all three ports. 
First, the opportunity cost of not utilising a port to its potential. When potential profits 
(opportunities foregone) reached a point that actors were able to induce institutional 
change by committing to pay-offs in a political market to alter their choice set, 
institutions tended to change. However, this point is difficult to reach, especially when 
there are powerful forces from a number of different, sometimes unrelated, interest 
groups trying to prevent change. Witness Port Hedland during the manganese boom; 
Prince Rupert during the coal boom; and Tauranga's struggle first with wood and coal 
and then to containerise, all trying to respond to Japanese demand but constrained by 
institutions. In those instances, the actors empowered by the existing arrangement 
were able to outbid those seeking change.708 It was potential profit that was not being 
captured, for example, in the iron ore rich North-West that eventually led to the 
institutions at Port Hedland being changed for the better.
This demonstrates that institutional change is not a costless process and large social 
costs are often inevitable; before acting policy makers need to be sure that the net 
present value of doing nothing, i.e., of maintaining existing inefficient institutions, will 
not exceed the costs of institutional change. However, government should stop short of
trying to pick winners. Prince Rupert saw enormous public funds wasted on it, as did 
Tauranga's rivals. Port Hedland, Prince Rupert and Tauranga all at least at one point in 
708 No actual “bidding” process need take place. It is only when those seeking change are able
to (potential profit opportunities) and know how to (operate in political markets) bid for 
change that they will do so.
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time suffered under institutions that did not facilitate a level of adaptability – “adaptive 
efficiency” – necessary to pick up the proverbial $100 bills. Rather than attempting to 
solve what could be an institutional choice set problem with active policy, institutional 
reform should be considered. Such a path was successfully taken with port 
decentralisation and the abolition of the NHB in Canada; decentralisation, labour 
reform and the abolition of the NZPA in New Zealand; and the introduction of State 
Agreements to solve the mineral rights problem in Western Australia.
Would-be reformers also need to identify the potential winners and losers of 
institutional change and include them in their model. This is because feasible 
institutional alternatives are constrained by elements inherited from the past, and once 
an institution is in place they tend to become self-reinforcing, particularly if they are of 
the 3rd Tier, or constitutional, variety. Actors empowered by the current arrangement is a
reason why institutions are so hard to change. The longer the institutional structure 
remains in place, the more those institutions can become embedded in a nation's 
culture (4th Tier) and once “people believe that something is true and normatively 
appropriate, they do not seek to alter it”.709 In a sense, there are transaction costs 
involved in creating new institutions and the level of transaction costs that actors face 
depends on what is already in place.
Finally, technology played a critical role in breaking self-reinforcing institutions by 
revealing a number of inefficiencies in existing institutions. As Schumpeter described it,
technology as a cause of “creative destruction” almost certainly exists, with inefficient 
institutions that may have persisted indefinitely broken only by a technological change 
that could no longer be ignored.710 While it is best not to wait for new technology to 
create such a “breaking point” before attempting to change inefficient institutions, it 
undeniably played a key role in increasing the potential gains from institutional change. 
709 Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval 
Trade (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 386.
710 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 1943. Reprint (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 81.
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Those potential profits then sufficiently incentivised numerous actors to begin 
questioning the existing institutions at both Prince Rupert and Tauranga, eventually 
breaking the path-dependent outcome the ports were on.
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